

THE CREATION AND CREATOR OF THE WORLD ACCORDING TO THIERRY OF CHARTRES AND CLARENBALDUS OF ARRAS

THE LITERARY SOURCES

Thierry of Chartres presents his theory on the creation of the world in an interesting commentary on the opening chapter of the book of *Genesis*. His authorship of this short treatise might still be uncertain, if we did not possess a letter prefixed to the text in which the writer declares : *Direxi igitur Vestrae Sublimitati libellum quem magister Theodericus, doctor meus, de sex dierum operibus edidit, quem Roma jam suis commisit archivis*¹. The high personage, a lady, to whom the letter and Thierry's treatise were sent may, as B. Hauréau suggests, be either Beatrice of Bourgogne, married to the emperor Frederic Barbarossa in 1156, or Mathilda of England who was first married to the emperor Henry V and later to Geoffrey of Anjou². The writer of the letter claims that her skill had united in unfeigned love the three classes : the clergy, the army and the people. Her renown, therefore, was « famous and glorious, hardly limited to the boundaries of Europe ».

It seems that the writer who describes master Thierry as *doctor meus* had not been asked to send the work. He admired in her « both her love and knowledge of letters » and considered the book a « philosophical gift » in response to her outstanding generosity (*liberalitas*) which surpassed all « imperial munificence ». To add to this unrequested token of esteem, he decided to append a « little tractate » of his own which, he notes, was based on Thierry's lectures on the same subject. He modestly

(1) B. HAURÉAU, *Notices et extraits I* (Paris, 1890), p. 49, transcribed from Ms. Paris, B. N., lat. 3584. A new edition is found at the end of this article.

(2) B. HAURÉAU, p. 51. The reason for this suggestion is seen in the sentence : *Quis enim tantam dominam non velit muneribus quibus possit honorare, cujus inter ceteras virtutes liberalitas omnem imperialem supergressa est munificentiam ?* Beatrice died on Nov. 15, 1184 ; Mathilda on Jan. 30, 1164. According to A. CLERVAL, *Les Écoles de Chartres au Moyen-Age* (Chartres, 1895), p. 193, the work was sent to the empress Mathilda. M. MANITIUS, *Gesch. der lat. Lit. des Mittelalters III* (Munich, 1931), p. 199, seems just as certain that it was sent to Beatrice.

claims that «unable to handle the scythe, I gathered the ears that fell to the earth under the strokes of the robust reaper». Whatever is praiseworthy in it, we are told, should be credited to the master rather than to his student who only desires credit for a special endeavour to reconcile «most views of the philosophers» with the Christian truth so that the word of Scripture may even be strengthened by its adversaries.

Both the letter and Thierry's treatise have been known to exist for a considerable time¹ and an edition of both was made by B. Hauréau in 1890². There is no reason to question the identity of *magister Theodericus* with Thierry of Chartres whom the letter describes as *totius Europae philosophorum praecipuus*. As Hauréau rightly puts it: *Aucun autre Thierry ne peut être, en effet, mis en cause*³. Thierry's reputation was indeed very great. John of Salisbury speaks of him as *magister Theodericus, artium studiosissimus investigator*⁴. Otto of Freising praises him and his brother Bernard as *vir doctissimi*⁵. As early as 1121 Thierry made a name for himself by defending Abelard at the Council of Soissons⁶ and in 1148 he is recorded among the *magistri scholarum* who attended the trial of Gilbert of Poitiers at the Council of Rheims⁷. It is also generally held, though not at all certain, that the *magister Theodericus* to whom Walter of Mortagne addressed a letter concerning the omnipresence of God was no other than Thierry of Chartres⁸. Following a rumour, Walter states at the beginning of his letter: *Pervenit ad nos quod dicere soleatis essentiam Dei non ubique adesse*⁹. We read, however, in Thierry's tractate on *Genesis* (No. 31 of this edition): *Unde Deus totus et essentialiter ubique esse vere perhibetur*.

In view of the fact that Thierry died no later than 1155¹⁰, we may assume that the *tractatulus*, appended to his work and usually cited as *Liber de eodem secundus*, was written after 1155 because it seems very improbable that a student should take it upon himself to send his professor's work as a gift to a high personage while the author himself was still alive¹¹. But who is the author of the *tractatulus*?

Hauréau thought that it was Thierry of Chartres¹. M. Manitius and others repeat the error². A. Clerval doubted this attribution and J. M. Parent sides with Clerval³. But no attempt has been made to establish who wrote it. The two known manuscripts containing the work do not note the author's name⁴. In the manuscript *lat.* 3584 of the Bibl. Nationale in Paris the treatise was originally without a title. But a note was soon added by a scribe or librarian who wrote after Thierry's tractate: *Explicit liber primus. Incipit liber de eodem secundus* (fol. 10). In the copy preserved at the library of Cambrai (no. 339) no such addition is found. There is, however, no doubt that this *Liber de eodem secundus* is the work of the student who remarked in the introductory letter that he added his own «little tract» to Thierry's work: *Cui operi tractatulum quendam supposui*. In accordance with this remark we shall call this work *tractatulus* to distinguish it from the treatise which Thierry himself designates as *tractatus* on two occasions.

The fact that the student refers to Thierry as *doctor meus* will immediately call to mind Clarenbaldus of Arras who in his commentary on Boethius' *De Trinitate* often mentions with pride two of his «venerable professors»: *doctores mei venerabiles, Hugo videlicet de sancto Victore et Theodericus Brito*⁵. Accordingly, such allusions as *meis doctoribus*⁶, *nostris doctoribus*⁷, *nostris doctores*⁸, all refer to Hugh of St. Victor and Thierry of Chartres. In one instance, he uses the term *doctor meus* in the singular which, as W. Jansen has shown, could only apply to Thierry⁹. In our particular case, it is clearly stated that the *doctor meus* is Thierry, not Hugh of St. Victor. In his commentary on Boethius' *De Hebdomadibus* Clarenbaldus manifests his high regard for his former teachers in the same manner¹⁰. Since both manuscripts in which the *tractatulus* is preserved fail to reveal the author's name, we are compelled to study

(1) *Notices et extr.* I (1890), p. 51. Cf. *Notices et extr.* VI (1893), p. 29.

(2) M. MANITIUS, *Gesch. der lat. Lit.* III (Munich, 1931), p. 198. P. DUHEM, 'Thierry de Chartres', *Rev. des sc. phil. et th.* III (1909), 526.

(3) J. M. PARENT, *La Doctrine de la Création*, p. 206.

(4) According to M. MANITIUS (p. 199) the work is lost.

(5) W. JANSEN, *Der Kommentar des Clarenbaldus von Arras zu Boethius De Trinitate* (Breslau, 1926), p. 28.

(6) *Ibid.*, pp. 40* et 46*.

(7) *Ibid.*, p. 45*.

(8) *Ibid.*, p. 67*.

(9) *Ibid.*, p. 59*.

(10) N. M. HARING, 'A Commentary on Boethius' *De Hebdomadibus* by Clarenbaldus of Arras' *Studies and Texts* I (Toronto, 1955), p. 9: *secundum meos doctores*; (p. 21): *meis doctoribus visum est*. Cf. JANSEN, p. 40*: *quod nostris doctoribus non est visum*. Such references are not entirely unknown in contemporary literature. Thus Peter of Poitiers, *Sent.* IV, 7 (P. L., 211, 1166B), speaks of *magister meus*. The author of *De Septem septenis* refers once to *magistrum nostrum* and twice to *magister meus* (P. L. 199, 960A; 961C; 963A).

(1) *Hist. lit. de la France* XIII (1869), p. 379.

(2) *Notices et extraits* I (Paris, 1890), pp. 49-50 and 52-68.

(3) *Notices*, p. 50.

(4) *Metal.* I, 5; éd. Cl. C. I. WEBB (Oxford, 1929), p. 16.

(5) *De Gest. Frid.* I, 47; MGH SS 20, 376.

(6) *Hist. calam.*; éd. J. T. MUCKLE, *Mediaeval Studies* XII (1950), 196.

(7) J. LECLERCQ, 'Textes sur Bernard et Gilbert de la Porrée', *Mediaeval Studies* XIV (1952), 109.

(8) Cl. L. OTT, 'Unters. zur theol. Briefl. der Frühscholastik', *Beiträge* XXXIV (1937), 188 f.

(9) L. D'ACHÉRY, *Spicil.* III (Paris, 1723), p. 522.

(10) J. M. PARENT, *La Doctrine de la Création dans l'École de Chartres* (Paris-Ottawa, 1938), p. 15.

(11) According to CLERVAL, *Les Écoles*, p. 172, Thierry wrote his treatise in 1130-50.

the intrinsic evidence to show that the « little tract » was indeed written by Clarenbaldus.

Although Clarenbaldus was a very versatile writer, we can rightly expect him to express similar thoughts in similar language. In his *tractatulus* (No. 20 of our edition) he offers an argument to prove the existence of primordial matter by successively abstracting the various forms which enter into the formation of a bronze statue. After arriving at the last form in this process he concludes : *Et quod remanebit non nihil est. Est enim materia informis : id nimirum quod Plato dicit esse inter aliquam et nullam substantiam*¹; *Aristoteles autem aptitudinem et carentiam sive corpus incorporeum*². In his commentary on Boethius' *De Trinitate*, Clarenbaldus goes through the same process of mental abstractions and ends with the conclusion : *Non nihil erit quod supererit. Hoc autem est materia informis quam Plato inter aliquam et nullam substantiam esse pronuntiavit, Aristoteles aptitudinem et carentiam dicere non dubitavit*³.

In the anonymous commentary, called *Librum hunc*, we read in a similar context : *Cum ergo dicitur « res possibilitate est », idem est ac si dicatur « ipsa quidem non est sed esse potest ».* *Cum ergo dicitur « res actu est », idem est ac si dicatur « est ».* Bene ergo Plato materiam inter nullam et aliquam dicit esse substantiam⁴. After a brief explanation the author declares : *Aristoteles vero materiam appellat corpus incorporeum*⁵. If we turn to the anonymous commentary on Boethius' *De Trinitate*, preserved in manuscript *lat.* 14489 of the Bibl. Nationale in Paris, we find the short statement : *Materia vero est mutabilitas. Ipsa tamen inter aliquid et nihil est, sicut in Platone dicitur*⁶. Nothing is said concerning the Aristotelian terms.

Our comparison shows that Clarenbaldus and the author of the *tractatulus* approach and handle the question in a manner distinctly different from that of the other two authors who definitely belong to the same school. In his commentary on *De Trinitate* Clarenbaldus uses the example of two statues, one of bronze and one of wood, and introduces it with the words : *Sint in medio positae duae statuæ...*⁷ The author of the *tractatulus* (No. 20) adopts the same pattern of thought : *Ponatur in*

(1) *Timaeus* (Chalcidius interpr.), 24 ; éd. W. A. MULLACH, *Fragm. Phil. Graec.* II (Paris, 1867), p. 179 : *informem capacitatem... inter nullam et aliquam substantiam.* Cf. WILLIAM OF CONCHES, *In Tim. Platonis* ; éd. PARENT, p. 173.

(2) CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Platonis*, 284 (carentia) and 286 (corpus incorporeum) ; éd. MULLACH, p. 242.

(3) JANSEN, p. 44*.

(4) JANSEN, p. 11*.

(5) JANSEN, p. 12*.

(6) Fol. 22v.

(7) JANSEN, p. 44*.

medio statuæ aerea... In both cases, as we have seen, the conclusion is identical, namely that what remains after the mental abstractions of all forms is not nothing (*non nihil*). The doctrine attributed to Plato and Aristotle is given in the same terms with the exception of the addition *corpus incorporeum* in the *tractatulus*. This particular term, we noted, occurs in the commentary *Librum hunc* whose author, however, does not mention the other two Aristotelian expressions. Unless it is assumed and proven that the author of the *tractatulus* copied from Clarenbaldus, the comparison reveals that the *tractatulus* must have been written by Clarenbaldus himself. It goes without saying that an author who calls Thierry *doctor meus* would hardly copy from another student who also refers to Thierry as *doctor meus*.

According to the *tractatulus* the process used to arrive at primordial matter would have to be reversed by beginning with prime matter, if we were to return the abstracted forms to the statue in their proper order. The underlying principle is formulated by the author of the *tractatulus* (No. 21) as follows : *Quicquid enim est ultimum in dissolutione, primum est in compositione*¹. In his commentary on *De Trinitate* Clarenbaldus declares : *Est enim inter philosophos communis animi conceptio quod quicquid est in dissolutione extremum, in compositione sit primum*². The writer of the anonymous *Librum hunc* formulates the same rule in a different way : *Per resolutionem invenitur materia, per compositionem vero Deus et forma*³. Again the comparison shows that Clarenbaldus and the author of the *tractatulus* express themselves in the same manner.

In describing primordial matter, the *tractatulus* (No. 19) proposes the following conclusion : *Est itaque materia primordialis informitas i.e. possibilitas suscipiendi formas, scilicet veniendi de non-esse ad esse, quae utcumque, scilicet imperfecte, potest cognosci.* In his commentary on *De Trinitate*, Clarenbaldus does not offer such a compact description, but he does state : *Materiam siquidem philosophi*⁴ « *possibilitatem* » appellavere, *possibilitatem vero diversos status recipiendi aptitudinem*⁵. In dealing with potency and act, the author of *Librum hunc* begins with the statement : *Possibilitas est aptitudo recipiendi status diversos...* *Haec ergo possibilitas a philosophis « materia » nominatur*⁶. On a later occasion he refers to *possibilitas quae primordialis materia est*⁷. The other anonymous commentary, previously mentioned, lays greater stress on

(1) Cf. CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Platonis*, 301 f. ; de. MULLACH, p. 246

(2) JANSEN, p. 44*.

(3) Ms. Tours, B. M. 300, f. 69 ; JANSEN, p. 11*. reads : *Per compositionem vero dicitur et forma.*

(4) Cf. CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Platonis*, 106 and 283 ; éd. MULLACH, p. 206 and 242.

(5) JANSEN, p. 59*.

(6) JANSEN, p. 10*.

prime matter as the root of changeability : Nam ubi materia, ibi est et mutabilitas. Mutabilitas enim aptitudo est transeundi de uno statu ad alium. Quae aptitudo ex materia est...¹ Another text expresses a similar thought : Actus est immutabilitas, possibilitas vero mutabilitas, scilicet talis aptitudo et potestas transeundi de uno statu ad alium, etiam de non esse ad esse². The final sentence of this quotation may account for the expression : veniendi de non-esse ad esse, as formulated in the *tractatulus*.

Still more convincing than this comparison is the following text from the *tractatulus* (No. 21) : Haec igitur materia a philosophis vocatur « possibilitas absoluta » quia omnem naturam in se habet possibiliter, nullam vero actu. Unde etiam « absoluta » dicitur quia ipsa est utrumlibet. Et sicut ovum animal est possibiliter et ovo omnia membra avis insunt possibiliter et per complicationem, sicut etiam uni grano frumenti insunt multa grana et culmus et paleae, sic materiae omnia insunt possibiliter. The corresponding text in Clarenbaldus' commentary on *De Trinitate* discloses the same association of ideas, examples and terms : Tertius modus universitatis est possibilitas absoluta in qua omnia praeter divina possibiliter sunt complicata, nil vero actu explicatum. Sicut enim in ovo omnia avis membra per complicationem continentur et in uno grano frumenti culmi et paleae cum infinitis granis ab ipso exserendis complicantur, ita in possibilitate absoluta i.e. materia informi³. The thought expressed by the author of the *tractatulus* in the words : quia est utrumlibet occurs earlier in Clarenbaldus' commentary where he points out : Illud enim possibile... ad utrumlibet est⁴. This again substantiates our view that he is also the author of the *tractatulus*.

For the transition from absolute potency to what is called « defined potency » (*definita possibilitas*) the writer of the *tractatulus* (No. 22) requires an agent, called « Absolute Necessity » : Haec autem materia, considerata prout omnia naturaliter in ea actu sunt, « definita possibilitas » est a philosophis appellata quia, ex quo accepit formas, certa res est et rationi cognoscibilis. In hac autem materia operatur Necessitas Absoluta i.e. divina Providentia. Quae quidem est necessitas quia est aeternitas ; absoluta quia nulli debet hoc quod est. In his commentary on *De Trinitate* Clarenbaldus likewise explains « defined potency » on the basis of the knowability of forms : Unde et « definita » dicitur quia, quid unaquaeque res in ea sit, ex sua forma definite intelligi potest⁵.

(1) Ms. Paris, B. N., lat. 14489, fol. 22. The term *mutabilitas* was already used by St. Augustine, *Confess.* XII, 6 ; P. L. 32, 828. It was later adopted by John Scotus (*De Divis. naturae* I, 57 ; P. L. 122, 500C) who, in addition, borrowed the word *capacitas* from Plato's *Timaeus*.

(2) *Ibid.*, fol. 25.

(3) JANSEN, p. 64*. Cf. p. 88*.

(4) JANSENS, p. 59*.

(5) JANSEN, p. 64*.

He offers the same explanation of the Absolute Necessity, identified with the divine Providence : Necessitas absoluta, quae est divina providentia, in qua omnia complicantur. Et dicitur « absoluta » quia nulli debet hoc quod est. Ipsa enim est divinitas... Quoniam ergo forma sine materia aeternitas est, et ipsa Deus est quoniam Deus aeternitas est¹.

Clarenbaldus then continues : Ab hac autem Necessitate Absoluta necessitas descendit complexionis sive concatenationis cum ea, quae in Absoluta Necessitate complicata sunt...² Exactly the same wording occurs in the *tractatulus* (No. 23). To strengthen the argument that we are indeed confronted here with one and the same author, we may quote from another writer who presents the same thoughts but in his own way : Absoluta Necessitas rerum omnium complicatio est in simplicitate. Necessitas complexionis earum rerum explicatio in eodem ordine, qui ordo a physicis « fatum » dicitur³. Absoluta autem possibilitas est ejusdem universitatis rerum complicatio in possibilitate tantum, de qua veniunt ad actum. Et vocatur a physicis primordialis materia sive chaos⁴. Determinata vero possibilitas est explicatio possibilitatis absolutae in actu cum possibilitate. Sic earundem rerum universitas⁵ quattuor modis est⁶.

It is worth noting that the term *concatenatio* does not occur in this text and that this author speaks of *possibilitas determinata* whereas both Clarenbaldus and the *tractatulus* speak of *concatenatio* and prefer the term *possibilitas definita*. To confirm this significant difference of terminology we can cite a text from Clarenbaldus' commentary on Boethius' *De Hebdomadibus* : In Necessitate enim Absoluta ab aeterno omnia in simplicitate quadam complicata constiterunt et in ea omnia erant quod ipsa, ut Johannes Evangelista, summus theologorum testatur : *Quod factum est, in ipso vita erat*. Cumque in ipso vita essent, descendencia per necessitatem complexionis ad heimarmenen⁷ jam se in possibilitate

(1) JANSEN, p. 64*.

(2) JANSEN, p. 64*.

(3) Cf. CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Platonis*, 142 ; ed. MULLACH, p. 214 : Providentiam Dei esse voluntatem, voluntatem porro ejus seriem esse causarum... series causarum est « fatum » cognominatum.

(4) Cf. CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Platonis*, 122 ; ed. MULLACH, p. 209 : Post chaos enim, quam Graeci hylen, nos silvam vocamus...

(5) Cf. CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Platonis*, 266 ; ed. MULLACH, p. 238 : Necessitatem nunc appellat hylen quam nos latini silvam possumus nominare, ex qua est rerum universitas.

(6) Ms. Paris, B. N., lat. 14489, fol. 19v.

(7) Cf. Asclepius, 27 ; ed. W. SCOTT, *Hermetica* I (Oxford, 1924), p. 362 : Quam heimarmenen nuncupamus, o Asclepi, ea est necessitas effectrix rerum omnium quae geruntur semper sibi concatenatis necessitatis nexibus vincta... Necessitas vero cogit ad effectum ; cf. éd. A. D. NOCK, A. J. FESTUGIÈRE, *Corpus hermeticum* II (Paris, 1945), 354-355. See also MARTIANUS CAPELLA, *De Nupt. Philol.* I, 7 ; I, 64 ; II, 213 ; ed. A. DICK (Leipzig, 1925), pp. 7, 30, 78.

definita manifeste depromunt ac fato subsunt¹. In a similar context, the author of the *tractatulus* (No. 22) quotes the same text from St. John with the same apposition: *summus theologus*.

Other texts and expressions could be cited to show that the writer of the *tractatulus* and Clarenbaldus must be one and the same person, but the evidence produced so far suffices to establish the fact that the writer of the letter who calls Thierry *doctor meus* and who sent his own *tractatulus* along with Thierry's treatise was no other than Clarenbaldus of Arras.

We have made no attempt to investigate the authorship of two anonymous commentaries which are closely related to Thierry and Clarenbaldus. They definitely belong to the school of Chartres. The first of these two works, usually quoted by its opening words *Librum hunc*, has been partly edited by W. Jansen as a work probably written by Thierry. Excerpts of the second² have been published by J. M. Parent³, who also transcribed part of the *tractatulus* which we have shown to be Clarenbaldus' work⁴. There is no need to stress the importance of a full edition of this «little treatise».

When Clarenbaldus sent Thierry's work as a gift to the illustrious lady, he did not send the entire tractate, since in both manuscripts which contain the three works, viz., Clarenbaldus' letter, Thierry's and Clarenbaldus' commentaries on *Genesis*, the text of Thierry's treatise breaks off after the second sentence in chapter 46 of our edition. The other four of our six manuscripts do not contain Clarenbaldus' introductory letter and *tractatulus*. The division is very important in order to establish the text of Thierry's work, not as it was passed on by Clarenbaldus, but as it was originally written by Thierry. It is slightly shorter than Clarenbaldus' *tractatulus* and ends just after Thierry's announcement to explain the third Person of the Trinity as *connexio aequalitatis* (No. 47). That Thierry elaborated on this doctrine either in his lectures or writings can be gathered from the fact that both Clarenbaldus and *Librum hunc* give a logical continuation of Thierry's rather unique trinitarian theory applied to the Holy Spirit⁵.

There are good reasons to assume that Thierry never completed his *tractatus*. If he had completed it, we could expect to find traces of the

continuation in at least one of the four manuscripts that contain the work without Clarenbaldus' letter and *tractatulus*. The variants of these four manuscripts prove that they belong to at least two if not three separate families. In addition it is very unlikely that Clarenbaldus should have omitted an integral part of the work if the part dealing with the third Person had existed. Rather than transmit the tractate in the unfinished form as Thierry apparently left it for some unknown reason, Clarenbaldus decided to omit Thierry's announcement of the continuation and a few sentences leading up to this point.

Clarenbaldus' *tractatulus* was also planned as a larger work than is actually preserved in the two known manuscripts. Toward the end of his work (No. 45), he notes three different methods of interpreting Scripture and remarks: *Et nos has tres lectiones in littera diligenter exequemur*. Yet the «little tractate» does not fulfill this promise. He also remarks (No. 44) that he will explain at what hour of day God made the Garden of Eden. But no such explanation is proffered in the *tractatulus*. On an earlier occasion (No. 39) he notes: *Sicut postea de creatione angelorum et de libero arbitrio eorum loquentes ostendemus in expositione litterae*. Again his «little tract», as we possess it, never touches upon these points.

It would seem useless to speculate on the question whether, like Thierry, Clarenbaldus failed to carry out his plan of a larger work. The fact that he speaks of his commentary as a *tractatulus* indicates that what he sent as a «philosophical gift» was not of conspicuous length, if not shorter than Thierry's tract.

Unfortunately, the two manuscripts (Paris, B. N., lat. 3584; Cambrai, Bibl. munic., lat. 339) which alone contain the *tractatulus* are here of little help because they are very closely related and agree to such an extent that they must be considered as *gemelli*. If they belonged to different families, their contents might differ in length. But, to add to our difficulty, the Paris manuscript is incomplete. The upper half of folio 16 is gone and the following folios were either cut or torn out. The last sentence on fol. 16^v breaks off (No. 35) in the middle of a word: *Quidam quarto modo diem appel-*. As a result about a third of the text, preserved in the Cambrai manuscript, is missing in the Paris manuscript. The Cambrai manuscript contains the text as published in this edition and ends on fol. 89 with some three lines on the folio left blank. The flourishes of the last words indicate clearly that the scribe had come to the end of his work. This allows us at least to conjecture that the copy he used also ended there.

(1) CLARBALDUS, *De Hebdomadibus*, 19; ed. HARING, p. 10.

(2) Ms. Paris, B. N., lat. 14489.

(3) *La Doctrine de la Création*, pp. 180-205.

(4) *Ibid.*, pp. 203-213. The transcription was made from the fragment preserved in Ms. Paris, B. N., lat. 3584, and contains a number of errors for which the manuscript cannot be made responsible. Thus the abbreviation for *omnipotens* was twice read as *omnium factor* (p. 209, lines 2-3). The word *ad fati* (p. 210, line 18) is 'transcribed' as *per temporis*. Instead of *actus existendi* (p. 209, line 17) the source reads *actus existentium*. Such omissions as *nuntius* (p. 209, line 3), *aëri* (p. 209, line 22), *vero non* (p. 211, line 24) were not caused by a faulty manuscript.

(5) JANSEN, pp. 14* and 62*. See also Ms. Paris, B. N., lat. 14489 fol. 54v.

THE CREATION OF THE WORLD ACCORDING TO THIERRY

After the preliminary questions concerning the hitherto unknown author of the *tractatulus*, and the actual or conjectural length of both works, the time has come to examine the doctrinal contents and interrelation of both treatises. We shall first follow Thierry's exposition without personal comment. References to his sources are given in the footnotes. Although much of Thierry's explanation can be readily understood, some points of doctrine called for further clarification. The teaching of Clarenbaldus is treated in the same manner.

Thierry professes in his introductory chapter that he intends to explain the first part of *Genesis* according to physical science and to the letter of the text. He promises to elaborate on the «historical sense of the letter» without considering the allegorical and moral meanings which the «holy expositors» have sufficiently expounded¹. The execution of this plan is something without equal in the history of exegesis. Thierry first specifies the four causes of the world: God, its efficient cause; God's Wisdom, its «formal» cause; God's kindness, its final cause; the four elements, its material cause². Since all things of the world are changeable and perishable they must have an originator (efficient cause). And since they are arranged with intelligence and in the most beautiful order, they must have been created with wisdom («formal» cause). Considering that their Maker does not stand in need of anything but is the highest and self-sufficient Good, He must have created out of kindness and love

(1) An exposition of Thierry's cosmological ideas is given by E. JEAUNEAU, 'Simple notes sur la cosmogonie de Thierry de Chartres', *Sophia* XXIII (1955), 172-183.

(2) Cf. WILLIAM OF CONCHES, *In Tim. Platonis*; ed. V. COUSIN, *Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard* (Paris, 1836), p. 655: Est efficiens causa divina essentia, formalis divina sapientia, finalis divina bonitas, materialis quattuor elementa. See also WILLIAM OF CONCHES, *In Consol. Boethii*; ed. PARENT, p. 124. JOHN OF SALISBURY, *Polygraphon*, VII, 5; ed. CL. WEBB II (Oxford, 1909), p. 108. When these authors speak of the Divine Wisdom as the «formal cause» of all things, they use the term in a Platonic, not Aristotelian, sense. They transfer to the Divine Wisdom the abstract realm of Plato's ideas or forms, as had already been done by St. Augustine, John Scotus and others. WILLIAM OF CONCHES, *In Tim. Platonis*; ed. PARENT, p. 143, points out that the Divine Wisdom is called the «formal cause» of the world because the Creator made the world according to a divine concept or form comparable to a builder's plan of an edifice. The author of *Librum hunc* (JANSEN, p. 15*) maintains that we can rightly state that «the forms of all things emanate from that simple divine Form because everything has its equal counterpart (*essendi aequalitas*) in it». As a consequence, God or rather the Divine Wisdom is the *forma essendi*, the exemplary cause, of all things in this Platonic sense. It means, in other words, that the divine idea is the exemplary cause of the universe. The transition from the existence in the divine Intellect to its created existence requires efficient causality which Thierry attributes to the Father.

to communicate His happiness (final cause). Considering also that the making of order presupposes disorder, the latter preceded in order to manifest the Creator's wisdom in the establishment of order¹. He who thus observes the structure of the world will recognize these causes, including the material cause, i.e., the four elements which the Maker Himself created out of nothing in the beginning (No. 2)².

In the opening sentence of *Genesis* Moses names the efficient cause, God, and also the material cause, viz., the four elements in the words «heaven and earth». Wherever we read *God said*, etc., he notes the «formal» cause, i.e., God's wisdom, because the word «say», if used of God, means nothing but the predisposing of the shape and form of future things in his coeternal Wisdom³. Similarly, where we read that *God saw all the things that He had made and they were very good*, Moses signifies God's kindness and pleasure at what He created. Hence the most holy Trinity is active as efficient cause by creating matter; as «formal» cause by informing and ordering created matter; as final cause by loving and governing it. The efficient cause is the Father, the «formal» cause the Son, the final cause the Holy Spirit, the material cause the four elements. Every corporeal substance subsists out of these four causes (No. 3).

Now Thierry deals with the question of time and defines a «natural day» as the space within which one entire rotation of the heavens is completed. We also use the word «day» to designate the illumination of the air caused by the heavens. As such it is clearly distinguished from the darkness which is called «night». In this context, Scripture uses the word «day» in both meanings. In order to reconcile «the sayings of the Saints», according to which God created all things either simultaneously (*Eccli.* xviii, 1) or in six days (*Exod.* xx, 11), Thierry applies the former text to the creation of primeval matter, the latter to the informing of matter by forms.

In the first moment of time God created matter. Because heaven is of supreme lightness and cannot remain steady and because it contains all things, it could not progress in a straight local movement. Hence it began to move in a circular movement from the very first moment of its creation. The space covered in the first complete rotation has been called the first day (No. 5). During that first rotation the higher element, i.e., fire illuminated the upper parts of the next and lower element, i.e., the air. For it is in the nature of the celestial fire to shine upon the air

(1) This thought is criticized by WILLIAM OF CONCHES, *Phil. mundi*, I, 21; P. L., 172, 53CD.

(2) The numbers in brackets refer to the numeration used in the edition at the end of this study. The presentation of the doctrine follows the text and its terminology as closely as possible to preserve the author's characteristic way of handling the subject.

(3) Cf. CLARENBALDUS, *De Hebdomadibus*, 46; ed. HARING, p. 20.

and to warm up water and earth by means of the air. The philosophers tell us that fire has two powers: brightness and heat¹. Thus it naturally illuminates the air and imparts heat to water and earth. Its heating power dissolves solid objects². If heat is felt in the air, it is because the air itself is mixed with the lower elements.

On the first day, therefore, God created matter and light, i.e., the illumination of the air caused by the higher element, i.e., by fire (No. 6). Through this illumination of the air the fire naturally warmed up the third element, i.e., the water and in doing so suspended the water in vaporous form above the air. For it is in the nature of heat to dissolve water into very minute drops and to raise it above the air by virtue of its own movement. The watery vapour in a cooking-pot and the clouds in the sky bear out this fact. Clouds and vapours are nothing but the conglomerations of very small water drops lifted into the air by the power of heat³. If this heat becomes stronger, the conglomeration changes into pure air; if it becomes weaker, those tiny drops rushing against one another turn into larger drops and cause rain. If wind compresses such small drops, they turn into snow; the larger drops become hail (No. 7)⁴.

The huge masses of water which at first reached into the region of the moon were suspended through heat above the highest ether. As a result the second element, i.e., the air was, during the second rotation, located between the water below and the suspended vapours. This is what Moses had in mind when he said: *And He placed the firmament amidst the waters*⁵. Then indeed could the air aptly be called «firmament», i. e., firmly supporting the higher water and restraining the lower water in such a way as to bar their passage. Perhaps the air is rather called firmament because, in its lightness, it firmly compresses the earth in its every part and solidifies it. For there is a reciprocal relation between the solidity of the earth and the lightness of air: the solidity of earth is produced by the action of the light air enveloping it; for all its lightness and mobility, the air, on the other hand, derives its stability from the earth on which it rests⁶. Thus during the second rotation of the heavens the fire, which had illuminated the air on the first day, warmed up the water and placed the firmament between the

vapours and water. The space of that rotation has been called the second day (No. 8).

Now it was only natural that the earth should appear after the water had been diminished. The natural course of events demanded the appearance of islands, not of one continuous stretch of land, as can easily be demonstrated. The more steam rises in a cooking-pot the less water remains in it. Similarly, if we cover the entire surface of a table with a film of water and place a fire over it, the film will at once begin to become thinner and some dry spots will appear on the surface of the table, while the water will contract and gather in certain places. Thus, during the third rotation, the air, which was located between the vapours and the water and consequently agitated by a greater heat, brought about the appearance of land and islands (No. 9).

During the same rotation it came to pass that through the heat of the higher air, which was mixed with the moisture of the land that had just emerged from the waters, the earth conceived the power to produce plants and trees. This was quite a natural process. It was likewise natural that the heat on that third day should produce the stars from that huge mass of waters on the firmament (No. 10). The fact that the stellar bodies are really made of water is a certainty because the two upper elements, fire and air, are by nature without density, so much so that neither of them is visible to the eye except by accident¹. If some ignorant people maintain that they can see heaven when the air is clear, since they imagine they see something green, they are absolutely wrong because, where our sight fails and errs, imagination takes over and makes us see what in reality we do not see, just as we imagine we see the darkness when we close our eyes.

While our sense of sight originates in the light in our eyes, light cannot function unless it is reflected by an obstacle of some density. If, for instance, the lower air which is between us and a wall cannot provide such an obstacle to make it visible, much less so the upper air which is purer². It is precisely because it is hidden from our sight that we call the air heaven³. Hence it is certain that every visible body is of some density which is derived from the density of either water or earth. Thus the clouds become visible on account of the density of their watery vapours. Flames which are seen in cloudy air or in some burning material owe their visibility to watery vapours. A sun ray which seems to run through a window is only visible because of small particles of dust

(1) Cf. CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Platonis*, 258; ed. MULLACH, p. 236. WILLIAM OF CONCHES, *De Phil. mundi* III, 6; P. L., 172, 76D, disagrees with this theory.

(2) Cf. CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Platonis*, 42; p. 186.

(3) Cf. WILLIAM OF CONCHES, *Phil. mundi* III, 7 ff.; P. L., 172, 77B.

(4) Cf. WILLIAM OF CONCHES, *Phil. mundi* III, 8; P. L., 172, 77D.

(5) Cf. WILLIAM OF CONCHES, *De Phil. mundi* II, 6; P. L., 172, 59C.

(6) Cf. E. JEAUNEAU, 'Simple notes sur la cosmogonie de Thierry de Chartres', *Sophia* XXIII (1955), 175.

(1) Cf. CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Platonis*, 246; ed. MULLACH, p. 234.

(2) See WILLIAM OF CONCHES, *De Phil. mundi* II, 4; P. L., 172, 58 D.

(3) This remark is based on an ancient derivation of 'celum' from celare. ISIDORE, *Etym.* XIII, iv. 3, borrowed the idea from St. AMBROSE, *Hexameron* II, 4, 15; P. L., 14, 164D.

that run through the ray and light up under the sunlight. Hence nothing is visible unless either water or earth presents an obstacle (No. 12).

If therefore a body appears visible in the sky, it must be so because of the density of either earth or water. But earth cannot be raised to the firmament by heat or in any other way. But it is a natural property of water that it can be lifted up in this manner. For that reason all things that appear visible in the heavens must come from water. Such things are the clouds, lightnings and the comets. Similarly the stellar bodies must consist of water. Moreover, physical science attests that all things that are sustained with food must be nourished with the material of which they consist. And the physicists¹ tell us that the stellar bodies are nourished with fluid (No. 13).

The stellar bodies were therefore made and compressed from the water of the suspended vapours during the fourth rotation or the fourth day. When they began to move, the heat was increased by their movement. This heat rose to a point where it became life-giving heat (*vitalis calor*) which first settled upon the water, i.e., upon the element above the earth. And thus aquatic animals and fowl were created during the fifth rotation called the fifth day.

Through the moisture the life-giving heat naturally reached the earth. And thus the animals of the earth were created. Among them man was made in the image and likeness of God. The space of this sixth rotation has been called the sixth day (No. 14).

Thierry then summarizes the events of the first six days and points out that no other mode of creation was left. In other words, whatever is born or created after the sixth day, comes into existence in one of the modes already described. When we read that *God, The Lord rested on the seventh day* (Gen. ii, 2), it means that God ceased from adopting new modes of creating things after He had established perfect harmony among the elements. Although He later created some monsters and still creates things, He did and does so in one of the manners previously explained and by way of seminal causes (*causae seminales*) which He implanted in the elements during those six days (No. 16).

The seminal causes are then described by Thierry as follows: Fire is only active, earth only passive. The two elements between them are both active and passive. Fire acts upon the air which serves as a vehicle carrying the power of fire to the other elements. Both fire and air act upon the water which, in turn, serves as a vehicle conveying the power of the higher elements to the lowest one. Thus the fire is, as it were, the artificer and efficient cause; the earth, as it were, the working material or material cause; the two elements between them are, as it were, the instrument or uniting agent by which the act of the highest element

is administered to the lowest. By their intervention they balance and join the excessive lightness of fire and the excess gravity of the earth.

Such and similar powers, called seminal causes, were implanted in the elements by God the Creator of all things, who adjusted them in such a way that out of these powers of the elements should come both the orderly succession of times and the proper climate, and that at the proper moments of time, which follow one upon another by virtue of those powers, should be produced corporeal creatures. This, so Thierry tells us, will suffice as a description of the causes and the succession of times (No. 17).

He now proceeds to the literal exposition of the text. *In the beginning God created heaven and earth* (Gen. i, 1). The verse means that «first»¹ He made «heaven and earth» in the sense that He created nothing before and that He created both simultaneously. Then Thierry sets out to explain what is meant by «heaven and earth» and how the physicists present their simultaneous creation.

Reason perceives that every corporeal being derives the reason for its compactness and slowness from the quick movement and perpetual agitation of light things enveloping it; light things derive their agility from the fact that their motion and agitation rest upon some solid body. For lightness requires the solidity of a body and *vice versa*.

It is obvious to Thierry that the hardness of earth comes from the light objects surrounding it, because a thing is hard when its parts do not easily yield to separation. The fact that the earth is hard is not due to the nature of the particles of which it is composed because they could not otherwise be transformed into light things, i.e. into air or fire. Yet it is well known that the particles of elements are actually changed into one another (No. 18).

Moreover, the fact that earth and water are bodies is not due to the weight of the upper elements, for they have no weight. Hence it remains that the two lower elements, water and earth, are condensed to the point of solidity by the quick motion of the light objects surrounding them. Their motion, however, must rest upon something solid, as can be proven by induction². When a man walks from one place to another, he firmly puts one foot on the earth while moving the other. Thus his transposition rests on something immobile. When a finger moves, it rests on the palm of the hand; the palm on the arm; the arm on the shoulder. And so it is with the movements of the other parts of the

(1) At least as early as St. Ambrose, the Latin exegetes of the verse speculated on the various meanings of the phrase *In the beginning*. See AMBROSE, *Hexameron* I, 4, 12-16; P. L., 14, 139A. JOHN SCOTUS, *De Div. naturae* III, 18; P. L., 122, 679C.

(2) Cf. CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Platonis*, 122; ed. MULLACH, p. 210: *Omnis quippe motus post stationem sumit exordium*.

(1) Cf. CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Platonis*, 118; ed. MULLACH, p. 209.

body. He who throws a stone acquires the impetus of the throw by resting on something solid. The firmer his hold is the more effective is his throw. The flight of birds starts from a solid support. And not only the educated but even the unlearned know that a circular movement rests upon a centre (No. 20).

The course of the stars shows that the movement of the celestial fire or of the lower air is a circular movement. It could not be otherwise because their movement is necessary and would either always go forward in one direction or turn back. It could not go forward forever, for such a motion comes to a standstill. Hence the celestial fire and the lower air must have a circular movement and rest upon a solid, immobile centre. Their agility and lightness, as previously said, come from their movement, for their single particles move freely and do not tenaciously cling to one another. Therefore they become fluid and yield to touch without our realizing it. They cannot resist pressure except by accident, nor can they weigh upon anything. That is why they are light. Considering that fire and air are light, their lightness demands solidity to rest upon. Solidity, as we have seen, requires lightness that surround it. And the substance of earth and water comes from compactness.

Since this is so, the divine philosopher Moses rightly said that the four elements were created. By «earth» he meant all solid bodies; by «heaven» the light and invisible elements, because by their nature they are hidden from our eyes (No. 21). Moses now describes the state of the elements saying: *The earth was void and empty* (Gen. i, 2). Being void means being without the form that the earth later received through its harmony with the other elements. The earth was empty, i.e., without the plants, trees and animals that were later created in it.

The second element, the water, is expressed in the sentence: *And darkness was upon the face of the deep* (Gen. i, 2). This means that the deep, i.e., the water was dark. According to some exegetes, Moses then speaks of the third element, the air¹, saying: *And the spirit of the Lord moved over the waters* (Gen. i, 2). In other words, the air, the spiritual quality of which somehow approaches the refinement of the divine Spirit, whirled over the waters (No. 22).

Thierry now proposes his personal modification of these interpretations. He holds that in saying, *The earth was void and empty*, Moses adopted the word «earth» to designate the formlessness of two elements, earth and water. Their «voidness» is to be seen in that they were still so

(1) The theory that the word *spiritus* in this verse means «the air we breathe» is already recorded by St. Ambrose, *Hexameron* I, 8, 29; P. L., 14, 150A. Ambrose (cum sanctorum et fidelium sententia congruentes) claims that it designates the Holy Spirit. He derived this view from St. Basil, *In Hexaem. hom.* II, 6; P. G., 29, 43A. It was later accepted by John Scotus, *De Divis. naturae* II, 19; P. L., 122, 552C.

mixed together that they could hardly be distinguished. Their «emptiness» consisted in that they lacked the forms that were later created out of them. The darkness over the deep describes the formlessness of the third element, i.e. of the air. Just as the air is informed by light, its formlessness (or lack of light) is called darkness. At that time the darkness of the air was so great that the air almost approached the slowness of water and was more compact than the densest fog. In fact it was almost like water, though it still had the characteristics of air.

This density of the air was caused by the fact that its darkness was not yet pierced by fire. The fire still lacked the power to cut through the darkness. Since at that time the fire lacked the power it now has, it was indeed close to the density of the air, it was without movement which would break its density. Thus the word «darkness» illustrates the primeval quality of the fourth element (No. 23).

The ancient philosophers called this formlessness or quasi-uniformity of the elements sometimes *hyle*, sometimes *chaos*¹. Moses calls the same confusion *heaven and earth*. Owing to their formlessness these elements were almost completely alike. Considering that the difference was so negligible that it could be ignored, the philosophers called them «formless matter». Plato, however, recognizing the minute difference that does exist between them taught that matter, i.e., the confusion of elements lies underneath the four elements². But this should not be understood to mean that matter preceded the four elements in creation or in point of time³. It only means that as a matter of course confusion precedes distinction just as sound precedes the word⁴, or genus its species (No. 24).

Thierry now turns our attention to the expression *the Spirit of the Lord*. The term designates the power of the artificer (*artifex*) who is to give form and order to matter. Moses, we learn from Thierry, was well advised in mentioning the operative power of the artificer after speaking of matter, because all things that exist or are seen on heaven and earth have their existence through that power operating on matter. Matter of itself is without form and cannot obtain any form without the power of the artificer who works on and directs it (No. 25).

The philosophers call this power by different names. Mercurius⁵ calls it «spirit» in his *Trismegistus* (No. 26). Plato calls it the «world

(1) CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Platonis*, 122; ed. MULLACH, p. 209. Cf. AUGUSTINE, *De Gen. ad litt. lib. imp.*, 4, 12; *De Gen. contra Manich.* I, 5, 9; P. L., 34, 224; 178. AMBROSE, *Hexameron* I, 7, 25; P. L., 14, 147B.

(2) *Timaeus* (Chalc. interpr.), 24; ed. MULLACH, p. 179: *informem capacitatem... inter nullam et aliquam substantiam...*

(3) Cf. AUGUSTINE, *De Gen. ad litt.* I, 15, 25; P. L., 34, 257.

(4) Cf. *ibid.*

(5) W. SCOTT, *Hermetica* I (Oxford, 1924), pp. 310 and 314; or NOCK-FESTUGIÈRE, *Corpus Hermeticum*, II (Paris, 1945), pp. 313 and 315.

soul» in his *Timaeus*¹. Virgil refers to the «spirit» in a poem². The Hebrews vary in their terminology. Moses and Salomon speak of «the spirit of the Lord», while David calls this power the «word of the Lord»³. The Christians call it «the Holy Spirit» (No. 27).

Moses, «the wisest of philosophers», mentions the Creator's operative power because formless matter does not receive forms of itself. In saying that *the Spirit of the Lord moved over the waters* he adopted the word «waters» to designate matter in its entirety, first because the elements were still in a state of confusion; secondly because the mixture resembled water more than anything else; thirdly because the ancient philosophers hold that moisture is the foremost and principal matter in the creation of things⁴. Indeed through heat the natural moisture proceeds from the earth into plants and trees and then hardens. Moreover it is beyond doubt among physicists that animals are procreated from humid and liquid seed and derive their bodily structure from it. The fact that stones and metals dissolve into liquid proves that they are condensed from fluid⁵. We have already seen that the stars were created from water. For that reason some philosophers considered water the matter of all things, and a poet (Virgil)⁶ called the Ocean the *Father of things* (No. 28).

Now Thierry takes up the sentence: *And God said, Be light made* (Gen. i, 3). With this statement Moses begins to explain the order in which the *Spirit of the Lord* proceeded to work on matter in the manner eternally planned and defined by the Creator's Wisdom. Thierry avails himself of the opportunity to speak about the divinity so that we may understand what is meant by *And God said*, and why Moses mentions the Spirit before mentioning the Word. He insists that what he is about to discuss is taken from true and holy theology (No. 29).

..

Before we follow Thierry's speculation on God and the Trinity, we may pause for a short appraisal of his doctrine on creation. It goes without saying that Thierry's cosmogony is primitive from the point of view of modern physics and astronomy, but he offers all that the physicists

(1) Cf. *Timaeus*; ed. MULLACH, p. 159: Ex quo apparet sensilem mundum animal intelligens esse...

(2) VIRGIL, *Aen.* vi, 724. Cf. ABELARD, *Introd.* I; P. L., 178, 1027 BC.

(3) *Ps.* xxxii, 6; *Sap.* i, 7.

(4) Cf. AMBROSE, *Hexameron* I, 2, 6; P. L., 14, 135A: quod ex aqua constarent omnia, ut Thales dicit... CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Plat.*, 330; ed. MULLACH, p. 252.

(5) CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Platonis*, 24; éd. MULLACH, p. 186: Natura corporis fluida est.

(6) VIRGIL, *Georg.* iv, 380.

and astronomers of his time had to offer. Their views were obviously just as primitive, based as they were on the assumption that the entire universe consists of four elements: fire, air, water and earth. In the words of Ch. Haskins, «Thierry's *De sex dierum operibus* is a daring piece of Platonism», but «the trace of Aristotelian physics found therein carries us no further than Macrobius»¹. P. Duhem who presents a thorough historical analysis of Thierry's physical theories stresses the author's *audace rationaliste*². Hence it may be worthwhile examining Thierry's daring and audacity a little more closely.

He attempts first to give a rational explanation of the creation in accordance with the physical and astronomical knowledge available to him. In this regard a great deal of work had been done by William of Conches, whose theories were deeply influenced by Constantinus Africanus and the works of Chalcidius and Macrobius³. Thierry then applies the results of his explanation to the Biblical narrative. This sort of rationalism reverses the traditional approach only in the sense that the earlier commentators first considered the text itself and then suggested how it conformed with their physical knowledge. As a rule, they refused to go into such details as Thierry gives his readers. Although the results of Thierry's new approach do not differ greatly from what we can find in the commentaries of Ambrose, Augustine or Bede, Thierry's attitude may fitly be called rationalism as far as he uses human reason to prepare the way for a deeper understanding of the Biblical account.

In dealing with the four causes that account for the creation of the world, Thierry first offers rational proof of their existence and then turns to the Scriptural text to confirm his rational argument. Thus, for instance, he briefly proves the existence of God as Creator before he cites the first verse of *Genesis* to corroborate it. He considers the creation of the world a work of the entire Trinity and assigns efficient causality to the Father, «formal» causality to the Son, final causality to the Holy Spirit. Previously he had called the Son God's Wisdom, the Holy Spirit God's Goodness (*benignitas*). We have seen that, on a later occasion, he declares that *the Spirit of the Lord*, mentioned by Moses, designates the artificer's power (No. 25) which the Christians call «Holy Spirit» (No. 27). This identification of the Holy Spirit with the divine power is perhaps more open to suspicion than his identification of the

(1) CHARLES H. HASKINS, *Studies in the Hist. of Mediaeval Science* (Cambridge, Mass., 1924, p. 90).

(2) P. DUHEM, *Le Système du monde* III (Paris, 1910), pp. 184-193. See also A. CROMBIE, *From Augustine to Galileo* (London, 1952), pp. 13-18.

(3) Cf. H. FLATTEN, *Die Philosophie des Wilhelm von Conches* (Koblenz, 1929), p. 114. An earlier attempt to combine the teaching of Plato's *Timaeus* with that of *Genesis* was made by JOHN SCOTUS, *De Divis. naturae* III, 26 ff.; P. L., 122, 693C. In addition, Scotus drew on «Plinius secundus in Naturali Historia».

Son with the divine Wisdom. It is well known that both Abelard and William of Conches had been severely criticized on account of trinitarian theories similar to the views expressed here by Thierry.

Concerning the material cause of the world Thierry states without ambiguity that God created the four elements out of nothing at the beginning of time. He does not admit that matter is or even could be eternal. Not entirely new, except for its scientific presentation, is Thierry's teaching that, after the creation of matter, evolution, based on certain God-given evolutionary principles, took place in the course of time. To be more precise, these evolutionary forces cause both the orderly development of the universe and time itself. Of course, Thierry's theory has very little in common with Darwinism.

Thierry defines a «natural day» as the space covered during one complete rotation of the heavens, but he does not explicitly claim that Moses uses the word to designate a 24 hour period. The light during the first three days was provided by the uppermost of the four elements, i.e., by the celestial fire which also produced the heat required for the evolution of life. In fact, after their creation the elements followed a course inherent to their respective nature. Fire, the most mobile of them, commenced the spherical movement because of its lightness and instability. When the heat, generated by fire and transmitted by air, reached the two lower elements, water and earth, the latter conceived the power to produce plant life. The same heat created the stars, and their movement helped increase the temperature of the water to a point where it produced animal life first in the water and then on the earth. Concerning the creation of man, we only learn from Thierry that among the animals of the earth man was made to the image and likeness of God. He says nothing about the creation of the soul, though we may assume that he shared the Augustinian view of the pre-existence of souls, a theory derived from the premise that God created all things simultaneously¹.

The theory of evolution expounded by Thierry and, as we shall see, by Clarenbaldus, may explain a little incident told by Clarenbaldus who went to the Archives of St. Vincent's at Laon to pursue some studies. He was met by the abbot who asked him to explain how the Creator breathed the breath of life into the first man's face². Unfortunately, Clarenbaldus does not tell us how he satisfied the inquisitive abbot. Although Clarenbaldus states at the end of his *tractatulus* that the soul is created in time, he, too, fails to speak of it in connection with the origin of man. It is also worth mentioning here that Clarenbaldus says

(1) *De Gen. ad litt.* VII, 24, 35; P. L., 34, 368. Cf. É. GILSON, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin* (Paris, 1931), pp. 94 ff.

(2) N. HARING, 'A hitherto unknown commentary', *Mediaeval St.* XV (1953), 212.

nothing about Plato's world soul which Thierry, as we have seen, identifies with the «Spirit of the Lord», i.e., a power which, he claims, the Christians call «Holy Spirit»¹.

The process of evolution, outlined by Thierry, is somehow self-sufficient through the interplay of what he calls seminal causes. The first and highest of them is the fire *quasi artifex et efficiens causa*; the lowest the earth *quasi materialis causa*. The balance between these extremes is brought about through two intermediate causes: air and water. These and other causes, imparted to the elements by their Creator, warranted the orderly process of evolution of corporeal creatures. But Thierry is far from eliminating God's influence in the evolutionary process. Above the *quasi artifex* he places the power of the divine Artificer required for the explanation of the existence of forms, because formless matter does not of itself acquire forms but «through the moving and operating power of the Artificer». The fact that Moses calls this power *Spiritus Domini* leads Thierry to an interesting discussion of the divinity.

THIERRY'S PRESENTATION OF THE TRINITY

Thierry first summons the four disciplines that lead man to the knowledge of his Creator: arithmetic, music, geometry and astronomy². All otherness (*alteritas*), so Thierry begins, is preceded by oneness (*unitas*). The number two is the principle of all otherness, because the word 'other' always presupposes two. The number one (*unitas*), therefore, precedes all mutability, since all mutability results from the number two. For nothing can be changed or moved, unless it is previously capable of turning one way or another. Consequently this otherness and mutability is preceded by the one (No. 30).

Every creature is subject to mutability, and whatever exists is either eternal or created. Since the One precedes every creature, He must be eternal. The eternal is nothing but the divinity. The One, therefore, is the divinity itself³. But the divinity is the cause of existence (*forma*

(1) See WILLIAM OF CONCHES, *De Phil. mundi* I, 15; PL 172, 46CD. H. FLATTEN, *Die Philosophie*, pp. 126 ff. TULLIO GREGORY, *Anima mundi* (Florence, s. a.), pp. 41 ff.

(2) Cf. CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Platonis*, 355; ed. MULLACH, p. 258: *Etenim qui aderant omnes erant instructi praecipuis doctrinis quas «ingenuas disciplinas» appellavit... geometrica, musica, arithmetica, astronomia... ut per eas tamquam gradibus ad summum culmen philosophiae perveniatur.*

(3) Cf. CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Platonis*, 35 f.; ed. MULLACH, p. 188. *Ibid.*, 293; p. 244: *Pythagoram Deum quidem «singularitatis» nomine nominasse, silvam vero «duitatis».* See also AUGUSTINE, *De Musica* I, 19 ff.; PL 32, 1094. It may be noted here that it is occasionally difficult to decide whether, in a given statement, Thierry uses word *unitas* as a mathematical or theological term. His arguments go from mathematics into theology and return from theology into mathematics. As a result

essendi) of all things, because just as a thing is bright or warm by virtue of light or heat, so all things derive their existence (*esse*) from the divinity¹. For that reason God is said to be everywhere entirely and essentially (*essentialiter*)². Hence the One is the cause of existence of all things. Therefore it has rightly been said: Every being that exists, exists because it is one (No. 31)³.

When we affirm that the divinity is the *forma essendi* of all things, Thierry continues, we do not intend to say that the divinity is a form existing in and together with matter after the manner of triangularity and such like. We do mean to say that the presence of the divinity gives all beings their whole and only existence (*esse*) to such an extent that even matter itself derives its existence (*existere*) from the presence of the divinity, not *vice versa*. Creatures do not exist out of or in the divinity.

When we say that the One is the cause of existence of all creatures, this is to be understood in the same sense. Likewise, when we use the word 'God' without any further specification, we mean the divinity. But when we make an addition or use the plural, saying 'a god', 'some gods', the word refers to those partaking of the divinity (No. 32). Again, the same applies to the term 'the One'. Used without specification it designates the divinity. Used with some specification or in the plural, the word refers to whatever partakes of oneness⁴. Thus we speak of 'some unit' (*aliqua unitas*) or 'two units' (*duae unitates*) and so on. Whenever the philosophers attribute parts to the One, they do not ascribe them to the One Himself but to participants, for arithmetic teaches us that the number one is indivisible. In like manner, any multiplication of the number one for the creation of numbers pertains to things partaking

it is occasionally debatable whether a particular statement is primarily mathematical or theological. In the rendition of his *unitas*, students of his tract may therefore disagree, but it seems that the best English translation of *unitas* is 'the One' whenever it is used of God.

(1) See *Librum hunc*, ed. JANSEN, p. 10*: *Sicut enim calor forma calendi est, albedo quoque forma albendi est, sic Deus forma essendi est.*

(2) *Ibid.*: *Si Deus forma essendi est, Deus ubique est totus et in omnibus essentialiter est.*

(3) BOETHIUS, *In Porphy.* I; P. L., 64, 83B. *Librum hunc*, p. 14*. CLARENBALDUS, *De Trin.*, p. 62*.

(4) In the light of the Platonist background of these distinctions, it should be kept in mind that just as a thing is white by participation of whiteness, or a man is just by participation of justice, a thing is one by participation of oneness. If a man has one head, one nose, or even one arm and one leg, etc., he not only participates of *humanitas*, which as ideal form can only be one, but also of oneness which, as transcendental form, accompanies his head, heart, nose, etc. Here again it is sometimes extremely difficult to draw a clear line of distinction, because participation may be both substantial and accidental (in the field of categories), it may be both logical and ontological.

of it. From that participation comes their existence (*existere*) and multiplication (No. 33).

As a consequence, there is only one essence (*substantia*) and only one existence (*essentia*) of the One who is the divinity and highest goodness itself. But the number one which, if multiplied, compounds numbers, or the ones of which numbers consist, are nothing else but participations which are the existences (*existentiae*) of creatures. As long as a thing partakes of the One, it perseveres. As soon as it is divided, it perishes. For the One is the very conservation and form of existence; division is the cause of destruction. Out of the true One who is God all plurality is created. Hence in the divinity itself there is no plurality, no number (No. 34).

Since weight and measure, place and shape, time and movement, quantity, quality and relation, all derive their existence from numbers, it is necessary that the One, who is the most exalted divinity, surpasses all these things by the excellence of His nature. Hence He cannot be defined by weight or measure, place or shape; He cannot have movement, quantity, quality or relation. He is Oneness, i.e., eternity and the never-ending duration of things, the fountain-well and origin of all (No. 35).

Considering that the One creates every number and that numbers are without limit, it follows of necessity that there is no limitation to the power of the One. Consequently, the One is omnipotent in the creation of numbers. The creation of numbers is the creation of things. Hence the One is omnipotent in the creation of things. Being omnipotent, the One must be the divinity (No. 36).

Thierry now proceeds to consider *aequalitas*, the Equal One. The generation of numbers out of other numbers in arithmetic is manifold and varied. Numbers generate some numbers out of their own selves: thus the number two, multiplied by itself, generates the number four¹, the number three generates the number nine, etc. Numbers generate some numbers by multiplication with other numbers: thus the number two multiplied by three, generates the number six, etc.

The first type of generation produces only tetragons, cubes, circles, spheres, all of which preserve equal proportions. The second type produces only oblong figures with unequal sides (No. 37). The first type stays within the same nature; the second produces things of a different nature.

The generation from the number one is twofold: multiplied by other numbers, it generates all numbers; multiplied by itself, it can only generate its equal, while all other numbers, multiplied by themselves, produce

(1) Cf. CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Platonis*, 36; ed. MULLACH, p. 188.

numbers not equal to the multiplicands. One multiplied by one is nothing but one (No. 38)¹.

The substance, therefore, of the Begetter (*gignens*) and the Begotten (*genitus*) is one and the same, because both are truly one. For the One cannot of Himself beget anything but what is equal to the same One. Since equality precedes inequality, the generation of equality must come first. And since the One begets both (equality and inequality) and cannot but beget inequality, if multiplied by any number other than the number one, He must necessarily beget an Equal One, if multiplied by that which by nature precedes all numbers. Consequently the One cannot but beget an Equal One out of Himself and His own substance (No. 39).

Thus it is manifest to Thierry that the Equal One whom the One generates out of Himself and out of His substance precedes every number by His very nature. Considering that the generation of this Equal One is substantial to the One, and that the One precedes every number, the generation of the Equal One must indeed precede every number. The Equal One and His generation from the One is eternal because, as previously said, that which precedes every number is eternal. There can be no two or more eternal beings. Hence the One and the Equal One are one (No. 40).

Although the One and the Equal One are completely one in substance, the « divine philosophers » have adopted the word « person » to designate them. Nothing can beget its own self, and it is one property to be the Begetter (which is the property of the One) and another property to be the Begotten (which is the property of the Equal One). To designate these properties which are, by eternal identity, the properties of the One and the Equal One, they adopted the word « person », in the sense that the eternal substance itself is called the person of the Begetter inasmuch as it is the One ; the person of the Begotten inasmuch as it is the Equal One.

Since the One is the first and only cause (*esse*) of all things and since the Equal One exists as the One equal to the One, it follows necessarily that the Equal One is the equal cause of the existence (*existentia*) of all things, i.e., their certain mode or eternal limiting definition or boundary which defines and determines all things in such a way that nothing can exist on this side or the other side of the limits set by the Equal One. The One equal to the One is, as it were, the image (*figura*)² and the brightness (*splendor*) of the One : the image, because He is the tetragon of the One or a mode in which the One operates in all things ; the bright-

(1) Taken as a theological statement, the same sentence could mean and perhaps does mean : The One multiplied by the One is nothing but the One. This leads immediately to the next statement where the terminology changes from *generare* to *gignere*.

(2) Cf. *Hebr.* i, 3. CLARENBALDUS, *De Trin.*; ed. JANSEN, p. 62*.

ness, because He enables us to distinguish all things from one another. For all things are distinguished from one another by their final end and mode (No. 41).

The ancient philosophers used to call this Mode or the One equal to the One either the intellect of the divinity or Providence or the Creator's Wisdom¹. And rightly so, because, since the divinity is the One, the One is the only cause (*esse*) of all things. Therefore the One equal to the One is a certain Mode and nothing can exist on this side or the other side of it. This Mode is nothing else but the first and eternal Wisdom who alone fixes the boundaries of all things. From that Wisdom the forms and measures of things have their existence (*existere*). In that Wisdom are formed the concepts (*notiones*) of all things.

The knowledge of a thing is always contained in what is equal to it. If the latter exceeds or falls short, we should not speak of knowledge but of false imagination. For that reason it has been said that the One equal to the One must be the equal cause of the existence (*aequalitas existentiae*) of all things. Indeed we speak of a concept of a thing when it is the proper description of it by which it is distinguished from all others (No. 42).

Just as all things derive their existence (*existere*) from the One, so do their forms, mode and measure come from the One equal to the One. A man exists because he is one ; if he is divided, he perishes. In like manner, man's form proceeds from the one equal to the same one by which man subsists². If anything is added to or taken from this « one » we can no longer speak of the form of a man (*humanitas*). A thing cannot exist (*existere*), unless the equal cause of the existence of man or stone or any other creature exists in some matter. From this we can conclude that just as the One equal to the One contains and generates the concepts of things so does He contain and produce the forms of all things ; just as the One procreates all numbers, so does the One equal to the One produce the proportions and inequalities of all things. All things resolve themselves into Him (No. 43).

Now Thierry applies this explanation (of the divine ideas) to the measures, weights and modes of things (No. 44). Then he resumes his speculation on the second Person. Since the One equal to the One is the equal cause of existence which makes things exist and, like an eternal law and rule of existence, lays down and defines their limits, it is, according to Thierry, beyond doubt that the One equal to the One is for all things

(1) Cf. CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Platonis*, 141 ; ed. MULLACH, p. 213.

(2) The Platonist idea of man as participating of man's form (*humanitas*) is here transferred to what Thierry calls the Equal One in whom the divine forms or ideas reside, whereas the existence of man is here attributed to the One, understood as efficient cause. In this sense there is but one *humanitas* of which all human beings partake. Cf. CLARENBALDUS, *De Trin.*; ed. JANSEN, p. 42*.

the eternal form of existence and « formal » cause in accordance with which the eternal Artificer has laid down the mode of existence (*existere*) for all things.

Moreover, since the One equal to the One is the equal cause of existence (*existentia*), it is obvious that the same Equal One is the truth of all things. For the truth of a thing is nothing but its equal cause of existence in such a way that, in grasping it, the mind stays within, and does not stray from, its limits (No. 45). If it does stray beyond the limits, the result is falsehood which is without reality, while truth is the first being and first reality of all things. He who says what is true, always says what is in a thing¹. Otherwise he strays off into falsehood. When therefore the equal cause of truth is as described, it is quite manifest that the Equal One Himself is the divine Word. For the divine Word is nothing but the Creator's pre-definition (*praeфинilio*) defining the essence, quality and quantity of all things or how they are established in rank, time and place. This pre-definition is for all things the equality of existence below or beyond which they cannot exist (No. 46).

The Word, Thierry continues, has been shown to be the One equal to the One. The One is the divinity and begets the One equal to the One. Hence the divinity is the Word. Of Its generation a certain great philosopher has said : *God has spoken once* (Ps. lxi, 12). Thus he made mention of the One and the Word².

With these remarks Thierry concludes his discussion on the first two Persons of the Trinity. Then he announces his intention to explain the third Person as the Bond (*connexio*) between the Equal One and the One. But here the tractate ends.

* * *

It has been suggested that, in his trinitarian speculation, Thierry developed an idea expressed by St. Augustine : In Patre unitas, in Filio aequalitas, in Spiritu sancto aequalitatis unitatisque concordia³. The text was well known, of course, and a contemporary of Thierry's maintained that Augustine took refuge in mathematics to express what is ineffable and incomprehensible⁴. Thierry was probably more directly

(1) At this point the treatise breaks off in the two manuscripts which contain Clarenbaldus' letter and his *tractatus*.

(2) See *Librum hunc* and CLARENBALDUS, *De Trin.*; ed. JANSEN, pp. 14* and 62*. JOHN SCOTUS, *De Divis. naturae* II, 35 (P. L., 122, 615B), offers the following translation of a text taken from a sermon of St. Gregory Nazianzen (*Or. XXIX*, 2; P. G., 36, 75B) : *Monas a Principio in Dyada mota usque in Triade stat.* The Augustinian thesis is cited and discussed by ALAN OF LILLE, *Theol. reg.*, 4; P. L., 210, 652B.

(3) PSEUDO-BEDE, *In Titulo*; P. L., 95, 395 B.

inspired by a statement attributed to Parmenides by the author of *De Septem septenis* who quotes him as saying : *Deus est unitas. Ab unitate gignitur unitatis aequalitas. Connexio vero ab unitate et unitatis aequalitate procedit*¹. There could be no more succinct summary of Thierry's teaching. But the question whether Thierry derived his knowledge from Plato's *Parmenides* or from references found in other writers is not easy to answer.

Although there is no definite evidence that Thierry was familiar with a Latin translation of Plato's *Parmenides*, there is a remarkable affinity of ideas between them. A few quotations will bear this out. According to Plato, Parmenides declares : « The one is, then, only one, and there can be no two »². He had previously stated : « Then if one exists, number must also exist... But if number exists, there must be many, indeed an infinite multitude of existences ; or is not number infinite in multitude and participant of existence ? »³. It will be recalled that Thierry used this thought to prove the omnipotence of God. Thierry's derivation of the Equal One may well be based on Parmenides' conclusion : « Then the one must possess likeness to itself »⁴. On one occasion, Thierry warns that, whenever the philosophers attribute parts to the One, they do not ascribe them to the One Himself but to participants. We read in *Parmenides* « Well, since they are other than the one, the other things are not the one... And yet surely the others are not altogether deprived of

(1) *De Septem septenis*, 7; P. L., 199, 961B.

(2) PLATO, *Parmenides*, 140; ed. and tr. H. N. FOWLER, *The Loeb Class. Lib.* (London, 1926), p. 275. The surprising affinity of ideas could be accidental, though it seems that the existence of a translation should not be ruled out categorically. The author of *De Septem septenis*, quoted above, also cites : Parmenides quoque dicit : *Deus est cui esse quidlibet quod esse omne id quod est* (P. L., 199, 961B). Pseudo-Bede (PL 95, 397C) wrote about the same time : *Parmenides philosophus « Deus, inquit, est cui quodlibet esse quod est est omne id quod est »*. Fortunately, the text is also cited by Alan of Lille as (seventh) theological axiom : *Deus est cui quidlibet, quod est, est esse omne quod est* (P. L., 210, 627C). However, he does not disclose the source of the axiom. An anonymous commentator of Boethius *De Trinitate* (Ms. Paris, B. N., lat. 14489, fol. 30) claims : *Secundum quod Plato dicit in Parmenide, Chalcidio testante, quod unum est exemplar omnium rerum et (non) plura exemplaria, in quo nulla diversitas, nulla ex diversitate contrarietas, ut in Platone dicitur.* In an similar manner, Alan of Lille cites (P. L., 210, 333A) Plato's *Phaedo* on the evidence of Chalcidius *In Tim. Plat.*, 56; ed. MULLACH, p. 194. Entirely different in tone is a text cited in the school of Chartres and transcribed by R. Klibansky, ' *Plato's Parmenides in the Middle Ages*', *Mediaeval and Ren. Studies* I (1943), 2 : *Inde est quod Plato in Parmenide ait quod omnes formae, in eo quod sunt forma et sine discretionem, sunt forma formarum nec sunt plures formae sed una forma quae, quia mutabilitati conjuncta non est, immateriari non potest.* Despite the verbal difference, this text seems to be related to the previous one.

(3) PLATO, *Parmenides*, 144A; ed. FOWLER, p. 257. Cf. *De Musica*, II, 3; P. L., 63, 1197A.

(4) PLATO, *Parmenides*, 161C; p. 315.

the one, but they partake of it in a certain way... Because the others are other than the one by reason of having parts »¹. If Thierry knew Plato's *Parmenides*, we may even point to this work as a source of the pantheistic tendency the school of Chartres has been accused of, for *Parmenides* claims : « Therefore if one exists, the one is all things »².

The author of *De Septem septenis* also refers to Pythagoras : Haec est illa trium unitas quam solam adorandam esse docuit Pythagoras³. There is no denying that the school of Chartres paid very much attention to the teaching of Pythagoras and his school⁴. We learn from Boethius that either Pythagoras or his « heirs » maintained that the number two (*binarius*) is the basis of all diversity : Hunc (binarium) alteritatis principium esse dicebant. Boethius declares in the same work : Omnia quaecumque a primaeva rerum natura constructa sunt, numerorum videntur ratione formata⁵. We are also told that all variations of inequality grow out of equality⁶ and that all multiples descended from the number one⁷. We have noted how such terms as *generare*, *procreare*, first used to describe the relationship of numbers, served Thierry to lead over to the more commonly accepted terminology of *gignens* (Father) and *genitus* (Son). Thus the *Arithmetica*, where such verbs as *generare*, *nasci*, *procreare* are frequently used in connection with numbers, provided Thierry with convenient starting point in his speculation. Even Music, as he declared at the beginning, was to assist him in his explanation of the divinity⁸.

It was Boethius who furnished Thierry with the principle : Omne quod est, ideo est, quia unum est⁹. The principle is also invoked by the author of *De Unitate et uno* who speaks of the One as follows : Unitas est descendens a prima unitate quae creavit eam. Prima enim et una unitas, quae est unitas sibi ipsi, creavit aliam unitatem quae est infra eam¹⁰.

If would, of course, be preposterous to assume that Thierry was anxious to ignore the trinitarian doctrines as they had been traditionally presented.

(1) *Parmenides*, 157BC ; p. 301.

(2) *Parmenides*, 160B, p. 311.

(3) *De Septem septenis*, 7 ; P. L., 199, 961C.

(4) CLARENBALDUS, *De Trin.* ; ed. Jansen, p. 56*. *Librum hunc*, pp. 7* and 12*.

(5) *De Arithmetica* I, 2 and II, 27 ; P. L., 63, 1083B ; 1135B.

(6) *De Arithmetica* I, 32 ; II, 1 ; P. L., 63, 1110C ; 1113C.

(7) *De Arithmetica* II, 2 ; P. L., 63, 1115B : Omnes enim multiplices... ab unitate discesserunt.

(8) Cf. PSEUDO-BEDE, *In Titulo* ; P. L., 95, 396B : Sicut enim unitas principium est numeri ita, ut dicit Boethius in *Musica*, aequalitas principium est multiplicis. See *De Musica* II, 7 ; P. L., 63, 1200A : Est autem quemadmodum unitas pluralitatis numerique principium ita aequalitas proportionum.

(9) *In Porph.* I ; P. L., 64, 83B.

(10) GUNDEBALDUS, *De Unitate et uno* ; PL 63, 1075D or ed. P. CORRENS, *Beiträge* I (1891), 5.

But it was no easy task to arrive at a concept of person within the lifeless framework of mathematical relationship. It was perhaps less difficult for Thierry to describe the Equal One as the « image » of the One, as St. Paul had inspired him to do, but the transition to the Pauline *splendor* in the same context was hardly based on a logical premise. Thierry experienced the same problem in his attempt to explain the Equal One as the Word, as « a certain philosopher » (Ps. lxi, 12) had inspired him to do.

The root of Thierry's difficulties lies in what can aptly be defined as « bold rationalism ». While St. Augustine and others had tried to approach the trinitarian mystery by explaining it as an expansion of the internal, intellectual life from Father to Son, Thierry preferred to begin with what St. Augustine might have called a manifestation of the Trinity. We saw that, according to Thierry, creation reveals God as efficient, « formal » and final cause of the universe. The first of these three causes is the Father, the second the Son, the third the Holy Spirit. These personal names do not appear once in Thierry's digression on the divinity, although the relationship of Father and Son is insinuated in the terminology *gignens* and *genitus*. But Thierry could not go further without admitting that there are relations in God, which he explicitly denies¹.

In order to develop his concept of the trinitarian mystery Thierry summons the *quadrivium* rather than revelation. The multiplicity of beings or numbers leads him to the One as « the fountain-well and origin of all beings ». All successive steps, as described by Thierry, follow with a sort of mathematical certainty and necessity. We have noted that the school of Chartres has been suspected of pantheism². The suspicion is based principally on the presentation of God as the *forma essendi* of all beings. As if he had foreseen the possible misunderstanding of this terminology, Thierry insists : Hoc non dicimus quod divinitas sit aliqua forma quae in materia habeat existere (No. 32). He wants us to understand it in the sense that the presence of the divinity accounts for the entire being of all creatures to such an extent that it includes both matter and form : ut etiam ipsa materia ex presentia divinitatis habeat existere (No. 32).

The verb *existere*, used in both sentences, occurs repeatedly in similar

(1) See No. 35 of our edition.

(2) Cf. M. DE WULF, 'Le Panthéisme chartrain', *Beiträge*, Suppl. III, 1 (1935), 282-288. De Wulf admits that he had misinterpreted Bernard Sylvestris until the doctrine was clarified by E. GILSON, 'La cosmogonie de Bernardus Sylvestris', *Arch. d'hist. doctr. et litt.* III (1928), 1-24. De Wulf's interpretation is rejected by J. M. PARENT, *La Création*, pp. 82 ff. ; É. GILSON, *La Philosophie du Moyen Âge* (Paris, 1952), p. 272 ; T. GREGORY, *Anima mundi* (Florence, s. a.), pp. 80 ff. Less definite is A. FOREST, *Le mouvement doctr. du XI^e au XIV^e siècle*, published in *Hist. de l'Église* XIII (Paris, 1951), 77 f.

remarks made by Thierry. We have also noted his occasional use of *existentia*. But we expect too much of him if we wonder why he did not speak of *forma existendi*, *causa essendi*, etc. After all, the word *forma* designates a cause and we have seen that, in the language of Thierry, the Son of God is the « formal cause » of all things. This means that the ideas and forms of all things reside in God's Wisdom. Since they are not subsisting ideas in the original Platonic sense but identical with God's absolute simplicity, God is all things, the formal or ideal cause of all things, including the existence of those things that ever exist. The One does not impart His own divine form to them, but holds every created being together so that it remains one, because, as Thierry remarks, the created being would perish, if the One did not preserve its existence : *Unitas essendi conservatio et forma est ; divisio vero causa interitus*¹.

Thierry's *forma essendi*, accordingly, aims first of all at the existence of all things in the divine intellect ; then at the existence of created units or numbers whose very existence was also eternally conceived in the divine Wisdom. God also conceived their unity or oneness without which they could not exist. Created beings or numbers partake of that divine idea just as every human being partakes of God's eternal concept of the form of man, called *humanitas*. Their oneness is ultimately the created image of the eternal One and thus they participate in Him : *quae vera unitate participantia inde habent existere et multiplicari* (No. 33). Thus creatures are participations of the One, not by identity with Him, but by deriving everything from Him, including their existence : *Unitas vero, quae multiplicata componit numeros, vel unitates quibus numeri constant, nihil aliud sunt quam verae unitatis participationes quae creaturarum existentiae sunt* (No. 34).

Thierry insists that the word *unitas* is no longer applicable to God as soon as the word is combined with other numbers. This is his mathematical way of saying that the divine One cannot be participated by multiplication or participation of His essence : *Unde etiam philosophi, cum partes unitati assignant, non essentiae unitatis sed participantibus unitate partes adscribunt* (No. 33). In other words, when a creature is one and exists only by being one, it must not be interpreted as being one with the One. Indeed the One is transcendental, not immanent in a pantheistic sense, and surpasses all things « by the eminence of His nature »... *necesse est ipsam unitatem, quae est summa divinitas, omnia praedicta eminentia suae naturae transgredi* (No. 35). He is not subject to categories *sed est unitas, i.e., aeternitas et interminabilis rerum perma-*

[1] No. 34 of our edition. Cf. CLARENBALDUS, *De Trin.*; ed. JANSEN, p. 62* : *Si ergo in pluralitatem partium distrahatur, statim in interitum suum cadit... Cum ergo partium pluralitas illi sit causa interitus, eadem unitio est ei causa ut sit.*

*nentia, quae cunctorum est fons et origo*¹. If this is pantheism, i.e., a doctrine that God is everything and everything is God, the term must be used very loosely by those who accuse the school of Chartres of such an error².

Hence we cannot agree with R. L. Poole when he claims that Thierry « argued from the doctrine of the unity of all being, that all being is God, and that God is the form of being of all things »³. It is just as wrong to claim that, according to Thierry, the divinity is « la forme essentielle de toutes choses »⁴. Such a verdict simply transfers Aristotelian realism into Platonist idealism which is the only legitimate philosophical background of the Christian Platonism that reigned supreme at the school of Chartres.

In this connection it is worth mentioning that Thierry's term *unitas* which, applied to God, I have rendered by « the One » does not at all mean the « unity of all being » in the sense that « all being is God ». The abstract term *unitas*, applied to God, stands for the concrete word *unus* as Clarenbaldus explains when he writes : *Rectius ergo, si theologicè loqui volumus, Deus « unitas » dicitur quam « unus »*⁵. The main reason for this usage and apparent subtlety was a grammatical one, understandable only against a Platonist background. When we say that Peter is one and that God is one, we use the word « one » in two different meanings. Peter is one by participation of oneness just as he is, say, white by participation of whiteness, or just by participation of justice. But God is not one by participation of oneness just as He is not God by participation of divinity, or just by participation of justice. To prevent a misunderstanding, as Clarenbaldus points out, it is theologically more accurate to say *Deus est unitas* than *Deus est unus*. We know

(1) No. 35 of our edition. Cf. MACROBIUS, *In Somnium Scipionis* I, 6, 7; ed. F. EYSENHARDT (Leipzig, 1893), p. 496 : *Unum autem quod... unitas dicitur... ipse non numerus sed fons et origo numerorum.*

(2) In speaking of the divine Form, the author of *Librum hunc* (ed. JANSEN, p. 9*) declares : *Haec enim est essendi forma, quae facit scilicet omnia esse.* The writers of this period made a clear (logical) distinction between essence and existence. Thus CLARENBALDUS, *De Hebdomadibus*, 22; ed. HARING, p. 11 states : *Unde inter decem quaestiones naturales prior est illa in qua quaeritur an res sit.* In the same sense, WILLIAM OF CONCHES, *De Phil. mundi* I, 4; P. L., 172, 43A, writes : *Undecim sunt quae inquiruntur circa unamquamque rem : an sit...*

(3) R. L. POOLE, *Illustrations of the Hist. of Med. Thought and Learning* (London, 1920) p. 101.

(4) A. CLERVAL *Les Écoles de Chartres*, p. 255. Later (p. 258), Clerval comes to the conclusion that Thierry is a *panthéiste réaliste*.

(5) JANSEN, p. 61*. ALAN OF LILLE, *Theol. reg.*, I; P. L., 210, 623A, connects the word *unitas* with the Greek *monas* : *Deus non solum unus, immo et monas i.e. unitas esse dicitur.* This connection had already been made by John Scotus, *De Divis. naturae* III, 11; P. L., 122, 653B : *Si unitas, quae a Graecis dicitur 'monas', omnium numerorum principium est...*

that, for instance, Gilbert of Poitiers, whom Clarenbaldus had in mind, did not accept this particular argument, but they did agree on the grammatical rules in general.

We have noted a weakness in Thierry's trinitarian doctrine and his denial of relations in God: *Nulla igitur in deitate pluralitas; quare nec numerus* (No. 34). This heavy emphasis on the divine unity, is only an echo of the Boethian: *Nulla igitur in eo... pluralitas... idcirco nec numerus*¹. But while Boethius was Augustinian and left room for relations, Thierry and Clarenbaldus were Pythagorean and suffered from a tendency to overstress the divine unity against the Trinity of Persons. We have seen that, in Thierry's theory, the One begets the Equal One (*aequalitas*). The Begetter and the Begotten remain one and the same substance on the strength of the mathematical principle: *Unitas semel nihil aliud est quam unitas* (No. 38). However, to be the Begetter and to be the Begotten are properties of the One and the Equal One respectively. According to Thierry, the «divine philosophers» adopted the word «person» to express these properties in the sense that «the eternal substance itself is called the Person of the Begetter as far as it is the One; it is called the Person of the Begotten as far as it is the Equal One». Thierry's system leaves no room for a number within the number one. In other words, it leaves no room for a «numerical» distinction of Persons.

Thierry's view conflicted sharply with that of Gilbert of Poitiers who insisted strongly on the numerical distinction to avoid Sabellianism. Clarenbaldus sided with his master against Gilbert: *Ex hoc loco episcopi Pictaviensis error ortus esse videtur, ut tres personas numero differentes assereret*². We should admit that Clarenbaldus refused to accept such a doctrine because it would imply accidents in God³, but we must also admit that both his and Thierry's refusal obscured what later generations called the real distinction between the trinitarian Persons. Clarenbaldus writes: *Nullae sunt in Deo differentiae, quibus persona differt a persona, nisi quod una non est alia... Ubi ergo nulla est differentia, nulla est omnino pluralitas: igitur unitas tantum*⁴.

This tendency to overstress the divine unity against the Trinity is at the root of Thierry's failure to draw a clear line between the divine Persons and divine attributes. When he interprets the *Spirit of the Lord* in *Genesis* i, 2 as the «Artificer's power», he deals with a term of which the interpretation has varied among exegetes. But when he declares that it is precisely this power which «the Christians call Holy Spirit», he definitely leaves himself open to suspicion. He also tells us that the

ancient philosophers called the Equal One «the intellect of the divinity or Providence or the Creator's Wisdom» (No. 42) but makes no attempt to clarify the matter. We find a similar ambiguity in William of Conches who writes: *Est ergo in divinitate potentia, sapientia, voluntas, quas sancti «tres personas» vocant: vocabula illis a vulgari propter affinitatem quandam transferentes, vocantes potentiam divinam «Patrem», sapientiam «Filium», voluntatem «Spiritus sanctum»*¹. To this corresponds Thierry's division between *omnipotentia*, *sapientia* and *benignitas*. However, to give Thierry the benefit of the doubt, we may assume that he taught a personal and truly trinitarian God because of considerations other than his Pythagorean approach which could really lead him no further than to a divine Monad, or at best a Pythagorean Triad. But the Monad destroys the Trinity and the Triad nullifies the divine unity. Far from belittling Thierry's ingenuity, our analysis is only meant to show that his choice of the *quadrivium* appears to be inferior to other devices chosen to throw light on a mystery which defies purely rational proof and challenges the human mind more than Thierry was willing to admit.

THE DOCTRINE OF CLARENBALDUS OF ARRAS

Clarenbaldus does not simply repeat his master's words and thoughts in the *tractatulus* he resolved to append to Thierry's treatise. He first compares the *Book of Genesis* to the other books of the *Pentateuch* and finds a similar arrangement among the books of Roman law (Nos. 1-5). Then he discusses the concept of prophecy or divine inspiration (Nos. 6 f) and the three possible ways of interpreting Scripture. Although all of them aid our knowledge of the Creator, he decides to begin with the «interpretation of the letter» (No. 8).

The creation of the world, expressed in the first verse of *Genesis*, provides us with arguments so certain that we can prove even to pagans and unbelievers that the world has a Creator. The argument is as follows: The world is made up of contrary elements which are either warm or cold, moist or dry. Hence either nature or chance or an artificer put these contrary elements together. But nature only unites what is alike; it flees from things that oppose one another². The very definition of chance requires the existence of causes that bring about unexpected results. If therefore the world had been made by chance, those causes

(1) BOETHIUS, *De Trin.*, 2; ed. PEIPER (Leipzig, 1871), p. 154.

(2) JANSEN, p. 77*.

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 51*.

(4) *Ibid.*, p. 102*.

(1) *De Phil. mundi* I, 5; P. L., 172, 44D. Cf. WILLIAM OF S. THIERRY, *De Erroribus G. de Conchis*; P. L., 180, 333C.

(2) Cf. CLARENBALDUS, *De Hebdomada*, 24; ed. HARING, p. 11: *Fugiant enim naturaliter sese dissimilia sicut similia naturaliter ad sese applicantur.*

would be prior to the Maker of all things. Consequently, those causes would be prior to Him from whom they come, which is illogical (*inconveniens*). Hence neither nature nor chance made the world.

It follows that it was made by an Artificer who was neither man nor angel: he was no man, because the world was prior to man; no angel, because by definition an angel is only a messenger of one who sends him. An angel is not omnipotent, but He who made the world is omnipotent. Hence the Artificer was God. To say that the world made itself, is utter nonsense (Nos. 9 f.).

Clarenbaldus now claims that the ignorance of creation and other doctrines leads to heresies. As an example he cites and discusses the errors of Nestorius and Eutyches concerning the Incarnation (Nos. 11-16). The discussion hardly goes beyond what Boethius had to say on the subject.

After this digression, Clarenbaldus returns to the creation of all things. The Son of God created the universe in its entirety, i.e., both its fundamental sources and its determinate shape. As Principle He created the former; as Word the latter. There are three fundamentals: primeval matter, seminal causes (*seminalis ratio*) and the beginning of time. According to St. Augustine, primordial matter is the formlessness (*informitas*) of corporeal and incorporeal nature, which formlessness can somehow be grasped by the abstraction of forms. A seminal cause is a hidden power implanted in the elements or in things composed of elements. Owing to this power one thing produces another one at its given time and in its normal course. The beginning of time is the first moment, i.e., the first movement of created being from formlessness to form or from non-being to being (No. 17).

Primeval matter is formlessness, i.e., the potency to receive a form or to pass from non-being into being. The intellect can conceive it only imperfectly because of the confusion prevailing in the formlessness of primordial matter. It is well known, as we learn from Clarenbaldus, that the intellect follows the form and its determinate shape, not confusion. We say therefore that formlessness can be grasped somehow by the removal of forms. Since formlessness is nothing else but being possible or possibility, it follows that it can only be reached by removing forms. Once we strip a formed object of its forms, nothing remains but its being possible, nothing remains but the potency to receive these forms. When all the forms are removed, the act of existing things perishes, because all actuality (*esse*) comes from a form (No. 19).

To illustrate this process of removing forms, Clarenbaldus chooses a statue made of brass¹. If, in our minds, we remove the form which

makes it a statue, only brass remains. If we remove the properties of brass, only (the element of) earth remains. If we deprive earth of its frigidity and dryness, then what remains is not nothing. For what remains is formless matter, that indeed which Plato¹ teaches to be between nothingness and substance, or which Aristotle² calls ability (*aptitudo*) or lack of form (*carentia*) or incorporeal body (No. 20). It would be wrong to think that it is absolutely nothing, because if we reversed the process of removing forms, we should have to presuppose matter, for whatever is last in dissolving a thing comes first in composing it.³

This matter has been called « absolute potency » (*possibilitas absoluta*)⁴ by philosophers because it contains every nature in a possible, not actual, state. The potency is called absolute because it is both matter and all things. Just as the bird and all the members of its body are potentially and still undeveloped in the egg, or just as one grain of wheat contains many grains with their stems and chaff, so are all things contained in matter. But matter is not an actual thing (No. 81). When philosophers view matter as that which actually contains all things they call it « defined potency » (*possibilitas definita*) because it is a definite and intelligible thing as soon as it receives forms⁵.

That which operates on this matter is the Absolute Necessity (*necessitas absoluta*)⁶, i.e., divine Providence which is Necessity because it is eternity; absolute because it owes to nothing that which it is. In other words, the divine Wisdom operates in matter. Just as all natural beings exist by act and nature in defined potency, so do these same beings exist in the divine Wisdom in a sort of undeveloped simplicity. They are identical with the divine Wisdom. St. John the Evangelist, an excellent theologian, confirms this where he says: *All things were life in Him* (John i, 4)⁷.

From this Absolute Necessity descends the necessity of combination or concatenation⁸, because the things which are enveloped in the Absolute Necessity unfold and descend from the Eternal One in a line of destiny

(1) *Timaeus* (Chalc. interpr.), 24; ed. MULLACH, p. 179.

(2) CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Plat.*, 284 and 286; ed. MULLACH, p. 242.

(3) Cf. CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Plat.*, 301 f.; ed. MULLACH, p. 246.

(4) The term *possibilitas* designating matter is used, for example, by Chalcidius, *In Tim. Plat.*, 283; ed. MULLACH, p. 242. However, the term *possibilitas absoluta* seems to have been coined in the school of Chartres.

(5) The expression *possibilitas definita* or *determinata* is likewise a creation of the school of Chartres.

(6) This term goes back to *Trismegistus*; ed. W. SCOTT, *Hermetica I* (Oxford, 1924), p. 362: *Quam heimarmenen nuncupamus, o Asclepi, ea est necessitas effectrix rerum omnium...* Again, the specification *absoluta* was introduced by the school of Chartres.

(7) See AUGUSTINE, *De Gen. ad litt.* II, 6, 12 and V, 15, 33; P. L., 34, 268; 332.

(8) Cf. CLARENBALDUS, *De Heb.*, 19; ed. HARING, p. 10.

(1) Cf. CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Platonis*, 283; ed. MULLACH, p. 242. BOETHIUS, *De Trin.*, 2; ed. PEIPER, p. 152.

(*fatum*) and are, as it were, produced in concatenated and intertwined steps¹.

Clarenbaldus tells us that St. Augustine presents the same doctrine in different terms². In his terminology the Absolute Necessity is called the Word, i.e., the divine Wisdom; by «seminal reasons» he means the necessity of combination; he calls the absolute potency matter and designates the defined potency as product (*opus*). Pythagoras also adopted a different terminology. In the number one he found God, i.e., the Absolute Necessity; in the number two he discovered matter, i.e., the absolute potency; in the number three, the first number to have a middle term (*terminus medius*)³, he saw the necessity of combination; in the number four, which is the first actual tetragon, he found matter clothed in the forms of the four elements, i.e., the defined potency (Nos. 23 f.).

Some people have held the heretical opinion that primeval matter is coeternal with God⁴. But the authority of the Fathers and reason militate against this error. St. Augustine states clearly that the Son of God is the Creator of formless matter, and Moses declares that *the earth was void and empty*, i.e., formless. Thus he asserts that God created formless matter (No. 24). Reason proves the same. Since primeval matter is nothing but potency, and potency nothing but mutability, it must descend from immutability. Immutability is eternity and eternity is God. Hence mutability must descend from eternity. Therefore primeval matter descends from God and is not coeternal with Him. Moreover, primordial matter is changeable in every respect. Nothing changeable is eternal. Consequently matter is not coeternal with God.

Clarenbaldus then enlarges on the concept of seminal causes which the philosophers call «natural cause» or «likeness of reproduction» (*similitudo nascendi*)⁵, while the theologians speak of «seminal reason» (*seminalis ratio*)⁶. It is, as previously defined, a power or natural ability to reproduce its own likeness. For that reason a grain of wheat will not produce a bean or *vice versa*; a sheep will not produce a man or *vice versa*. This natural ability is not to be confused with potency, although both may be found together. Potency results from matter, the natural ability from the Artificer, i.e., from God. The seminal

(1) Cf. CLARENBALDUS, *De Hebdomada*, 19 and 30; pp. 10 and 13.

(2) See *De Gen. ad litt.* VI, 10, 17; P. L., 34, 346.

(3) Cf. CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Plat.*, 38; ed. MULLACH, p. 189. Since there is no number between one and two, the number three is the first to have a *terminus medius*.

(4) Cf. AUGUSTINE, *De Gen. ad litt. lib. imp.*, 1, 2; P. L., 34, 221.

(5) Cf. AUGUSTINE, *De Gen. ad litt.* III, 12, 19; P. L., 34, 287.

(6) Cf. AUGUSTINE, *Quaest. in Hept.* II, 21; P. L., 34, 602: *Insunt enim corporeis rebus per omnia elementa mundi quaedam occultae seminariae rationes, quibus cum data fuerit opportunitas temporalis atque causalis prorumpunt in species debitas suis modis et finibus.* *De Gen. ad litt.* V, 20, 41; P. L., 34, 336: *Movet itaque occulta potentia universam creaturam suam... quaque semina evolvunt.*

cause is like a seed which reproduces its own likeness in the normal course of nature (*consuele*)¹. It was implanted in matter or in the elements by God, the Creator of all things². The fact that, by virtue of seminal causes, things reproduce other things of the same kind in the manner described does not result from matter itself. It is important to stress the normal course of nature to eliminate abnormal deviations from the type and to exclude causes which are outside of the normal process (No. 27).

In making this distinction, Clarenbaldus makes allowances for such divine interventions as miracles and sacramental transubstantiation, because they do not result from seminal causes (No. 28). It is therefore erroneous in his opinion to think that nothing ever happens against the ordinary course of nature, since, according to God's eternal plan and for reasons only known to the Creator Himself, many events happen against the normal course of nature, though not against nature as far as nature is God's will. Some people who erred in this respect denied the possibility of Virgin Birth and transubstantiation (No. 29).

After dealing with primordial matter and seminal causes, Clarenbaldus briefly discusses what he calls the «principle», i.e., beginning of time. According to St. Augustine, time is the movement of a created being from one state to another whereby things follow or succeed (one another) as ordained by the administration of God who created all things³. Consequently, the beginning of time is the beginning of such movement. The beginning is the first moment, the first movement, or the time when the seminal cause begins to tend to its effect and fulfilment (*integritas*).

In so far as the Son of God is the Word, He conceived the forms of all things from all eternity and ordained the seminal causes to reach their fulfilment. Even now and until the end of the world He disposes the succession of time together with the Father and the Holy Spirit. This divine conception of forms has been called the creation⁴ in the Word (No. 30).

God therefore operates in four ways: *formaliter* in the Word by conceiving the forms of all things; *informiter* in matter; *seminaliter* in the seminal causes; *actualiter* and *reparative* in the succession of time. Of the first three it has been said, *He created all things at once* (*Eccli. xviii, 1*).

Of the latter it is written: *My Father works even until now, and I work* (*John v, 17*). He works *reparative* because the things that perish

(1) *De Gen. ad litt.* VI, 5, 8; P. L., 34, 342: *secundum potentiam per Verbum Dei tamquam seminaliter mundo inditam, cum creavit omnia simul... ex quibus omnia suis quaeque temporibus jam per saeculorum ordinem fierent.*

(2) *De Gen. ad litt.* VI, 8, 12; P. L., 34, 344: *Sapientia... rebus factis rerum faciendarum causas inserebat.* Cf. *Ibid.* VI, 10, 17; P. L., 34, 346.

(3) *De Gen. ad litt.* V, 5, 12; P. L., 34, 325.

(4) Cf. *De Gen. ad litt.* II, 6, 12; P. L., 34, 268.

in the movement of time are, by the operation of Christ, restored by the very same movement. Hence all things continue to exist in these successions¹, though not in themselves (No. 31).

Although both faith and reason show that matter was created by God, it did not, in point of time, precede the formation of things, because matter and form, the components and the whole, were created together and simultaneously (No. 32)².

Clarenbaldus now turns to the interpretation of the work of the six days, called *Hexameron*. We call «day» the illumination of the air by the sun or by the celestial light. The celestial light preceded the creation of the sun and brought about the three days prior to the creation of the sun. According to Bede³, this celestial light still rises and sets with the sun. However, the creation of the sun was not superfluous because, being a sort of twilight, the celestial light was too weak to illuminate the air (No. 33).

We also call «day» the space of 24 hours in accordance with the rotation of the heavens⁴. In this sense it is written: *And there was evening and morning, one day* (Gen. i, 5). We finally call «day» the distinction or division between the various creations and works. Accordingly, *evening* and *morning* have different meanings. If the word «day» is taken to mean the illumination of the air, the word *morning* designates the rise of the celestial light or the sun; *evening* its setting. If «day» is taken to mean a space of 24 hours, its *morning* is the beginning of those 12 hours during which the air in the celestial hemisphere appears bright through the sun or the celestial light, up to the point when it turns dark; its *evening* is the beginning of those 12 hours during which the same air appears dark, up to the point when it turns bright. Thus *morning* also designates the 12 hours of day, and *evening* the twelve hours of night.

When we take the word «day» to designate the division between the various creations and works, *morning* refers to the fundamental sources, *evening* to their perfection. Hence *evening* is placed before *morning*, because the stages of perfection are superior. Some people understand by the word «day» the knowledge of angels concerning creation: their morning knowledge perceives created beings as they exist in divine Providence; their evening knowledge sees them as they exist in them-

(1) See AUGUSTINE, *De Gen. ad litt.* VI, 9, 14 f.; P. L., 34, 344 f. HONORIUS AUGUSTOD., *Hexameron*, 4; P. L., 172, 260D: *Omnia enim, quae Deus creavit, in aeternum permanere creduntur, licet alia in alia permutentur.* *Ibid.*, 5 (265B): *Et haec cuncta Filius cum Patre usque modo operatur per quem adhuc omnis corporea creatura in meliorem statum transformatur.* See also ALCUIN, *In Gen. interr.*, 18; P. L., 100, 519A.

(2) *De Gen. ad litt.* I, 15, 29; P. L., 34, 257.

(3) Cf. BEDE, *Hexam.* I; P. L., 91, 17AB.

(4) See WILLIAM OF CONCHES, *De Phil. mundi* II, 28; P. L., 172, 70D.

selves. Although Clarenbaldus must have known that Augustine¹ was the father of this theory, he thinks little of it (No. 35).

First, i.e., in the first moment of time God created heaven and earth and light. The word *heaven* designates the two upper elements, i.e., fire and air; the word *earth* signifies the two lower elements: earth and water. God created them all simultaneously, including the first moment of time (No. 36). Time, being an accident, has no existence of its own; it exists in and through its causes. For substances are not only the causes of qualities and other accidents but are also the causes of time. They are causes inasmuch as it is natural to them to change and vary through the succession of times. Unless there are things that change there can be no successions; consequently no time. For time is nothing else but succession. For that reason we say that substances that change in succession are the causes of time and that time is created together with them. For God is the Creator of substances, not of accidents. But accidents are created together with substances (No. 37)².

In the first moment of time the four created elements were formless. Earth was created formless because, at the first moment, it lacked what it later received, i.e., its form and completion; it still lacked all things that later came out of it at their proper time. Water was created formless because it lacked the completion of form which it now possesses and because it lacked the things that later came out of it. Air was formless because it lacked the completion of form which it later acquired, i.e., it lacked stars and light. The fourth element, fire, was formless because it lacked its later perfection (No. 38).

The formlessness of light consisted in the fact that the angels, created in the first moment of time, had not yet turned to God nor were confirmed in light and knowledge. For, as the holy doctors say, in the first moment of time the angels were created in fire and had not yet turned to God to be confirmed in light and knowledge. But in the second moment of time some of them turned to God and were confirmed in light and knowledge, while some were cast into darkness on account of their jealousy. It is true that all angels were created in a state of goodness, but not in the state of beatitude acquired by those who were confirmed in it, as we (so Clarenbaldus promises) shall show when we deal with the creation of angels and with their free will. When it is said that the angels were created «before the times» (*ante tempora*), it means that they were created in the first moment initiating the succession of times (No. 39).

In the first moment of time when God created the four elements, He

(1) *De Gen. ad litt.* VI, 30, 47 ff.; P. L., 34, 315.

(2) In his *De Hebd.*, 7; ed. HARING, p. 6, Clarenbaldus voices a similar view: *Omnis enim creatura actu subsistit. Accidentia autem, quae, notiones dicuntur, mentis tantum receptaculo colliguntur.*

also created the light. But in that first moment the light did not shine. That is why we say that the air was created formless, i.e., dark, without brightness and stars. But in the second moment the light began to move around the earth, as the sun does now, and thus brought about the first 24-hour day. By its first rotation it illuminated the air and ignited the fire and what is connected with it. In the second rotation the light again illuminated the air and, in conjunction with the heat which it produced, drew up the waters from below and placed them above the air, called ether. Thus the firmament was made : it firmly held the vapours in place (No. 40).

It is a natural property of heat to attract water through the agency of the air and suspend it in or above the air in vapourized form. Thus the sun daily produces clouds. The illustrations which Clarenbaldus then offers are taken from Thierry's tractate (No. 41). When the vapours ascended and left the space between the land and the lunar region, the lower air, i.e., this *humid substance* which we breathe¹ was made of water. The upper air, i.e., the ether above which the vapours had risen became the firmament. All this happened during the second rotation.

The light rotated the third time and illuminated the air. Greater masses of water ascended and the earth appeared in the form of islands. That is why we read : *And dry land appeared* (Gen. i, 9). Again Clarenbaldus borrows his illustrations from his master, Thierry (No. 42).

Then the earth conceived the power to produce, like a nursery, plants and trees, etc. When the Fathers claim that (at that time) Paradise was made in its entirety, including its trees, apples and all, it appears that this was miraculous, because the earth was not yet capable of producing its plants, trees and animals. It had only received the power to produce them, but did not actually do so except in Paradise. We read, *He had planted a paradise of pleasure from the beginning* (Gen. ii, 8), i.e., on the third day. The word « beginning » comprises the three days preceding the creation of the sun. On that third day the waters of the earth were placed where they are now.

The celestial light rotated a fourth time. And under the influence of the heat transmitted by the air, the masses of water ascended so much that the upper air, which had become the firmament, was condensed by the water masses. Thus on the fourth day the stars, the sun and the other stellar bodies were made from condensed air and water. By the addition of the sun the brightness of the air was increased (No. 43). As a result, the heat increased and reached the element under the air, i.e., the water surrounding the earth. Thus the water, mixed with

heat, conceived and produced its animals, fish and fowl. This took place on the fifth day.

On the sixth day, after the water had receded, the earth, combined with heat, produced plants, trees and its animals. And man was created and placed in paradise. Clarenbaldus then remarks : We shall shortly state during what hour of day this happened. *God*, he continues, *rested on the seventh day*. This means that He ceased from creating in a manner different from those which He had adopted in the first six days (No. 44).

After this *physica lectio*, Clarenbaldus promises to interpret the same text allegorically, morally and historically. He considers it important to adhere to this order. To give an example, he notes that, when the question is raised whether the soul was created together with the angels, we answer that the angels were created in the first moment of time, not within time. The soul was created within time when man was created.

This, so Clarenbaldus assures us, has been beautifully described by Marcius Felix Capella in the scene where Jupiter places the diadem of his daughter Eternity on the head of his daughter Psyche (soul). Jupiter is the Creator ; his four daughters symbolize the four states of existence. The first of these is eternity, a state of things that are without beginning or end. In eternity, i.e., in the divine intellect the reasons for all things exist together. They are not different reasons, however, because the reasons for all things are nothing else in God but one single divine reason which applies itself to all things that are to be created and governed. Although Sacred Scripture speaks as if God were changeable, it is only a human form of expression.

The second state is called *sempiternitas*, the state of things that began to exist in the first moment of time and will never end. Such is the world according to philosophers. Perpetuity, the third state, is attributed to things that began within time and will never cease to exist. Such are the souls. Finally, *temporalitas* is the state of things which began within time and will come to an end within time. Such are buildings and most works of nature (Nos. 46-48)¹.

Capella, we learn from Clarenbaldus, calls these four states of existence « Jupiter's daughters ». The golden diadem symbolizes eternity ; roundness signifies that eternity is without beginning or end. Jupiter the Creator, placed Eternity's diadem on Psyche's head. The fact that he took it away from his daughter Eternity shows that, although he made the soul immortal, he did not fully stamp it with the dignity of etern-

(1) Cf. CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Plat.*, 128 ; ed. MULLACH, p. 211 : *Humecta substantia*

(1) Cf. WILLIAM OF CONCHES, *In Tim. Plat.* ; ed. PARENT, p. 152 : *Aeternum quod caret principio et fine ut Creator ; sempiternum est quod caret fine habet principium non in tempore sed cum tempore ut mundus ; perpetuum est quod incipit in tempore et caret fine ut anima*. This text shows that William of Conches was of those philosophers who held that the world would have no end.

because he ordained it to be made after the beginning of time. The immortality of the soul is, as it were, a diminished eternity. Here the *tractatulus* ends.

Clarenbaldus was obviously too modest when he insisted that his personal contribution to Thierry's tractate was insignificant. His comparison between the *Pentateuch* and the books of Roman law is perhaps less valuable than his attempt to define how Moses came to his knowledge concerning the creation of the world. His argument demonstrating the existence of God, treated rather summarily by Thierry, goes back to the *Philosophia mundi* of William of Conches¹. The digression into the errors of Nestorius and Eutyches is not particularly enlightening, though it reveals his familiarity with the last of the Boethian *Opuscula sacra*.

More striking is Clarenbaldus' repeated claim that the Word is the Creator of all things. In defining primordial matter, he surpasses his master in clarity and precision. He sees the entire creation in four progressive stages or phases: first of all in the plan or providence of God who is « Absolute Necessity ». This plan is unfolded in successive steps by what he terms « necessity of combination or concatenation ». It is the actual execution of the divine plan in an orderly and coherent succession of times. In this execution primordial matter presents two aspects to be considered: its absolute potency (*possibilitas absoluta*) and the actuation of this potency, called « defined potency » (*possibilitas definita*). The distinction seems to coincide with what later generations will call primary and secondary matter. Absolute potency cannot be clearly understood but becomes intelligible through the forms by which it becomes defined potency.

Clarenbaldus also offers a clearer analysis of the seminal causes and their relationship to primordial matter. The fact that, in the normal course of nature, a sheep will not give birth to a man is, as he points out, not directly due to the potency of matter as such but to a natural power or aptitude, added and implanted by the Artificer, i.e., God. The Creator may change and suspend this natural power for special reasons. Thus the rod of Aaron budded and bloomed, and the Virgin conceived and gave birth without loss of her virginity².

Concerning the question of simultaneous or successive creation Clarenbaldus is more explicit than Thierry. The latter simply declares that

(1) *De Phil. mundi* I, 5; P. L., 172, 44AC. See also his *Gloss on Boethii De Consolatione*; ed. PARENT, p. 131. Cf. G. GRUNWALD, *Gesch. der 'Gottesbew. im Mittelalter'* Beiträge VI (1907), pp. 67 ff.

(2) Cf. *Sent.* II, 18, 6; ed. Quaracchi (1916), p. 391.

simultaneous creation refers to primeval matter, while successive creation means the *distinctio formarum*, i.e., the gradual forming and shaping of matter. Clarenbaldus distinguishes between the fundamentals (*inchoativa*) and their state of perfection (*perfecta*). The terminology is borrowed from St. Augustine¹. The fundamentals comprise three aspects or phases: God conceives the forms of all things in the Word and operates by imparting both the forms and the seminal causes to matter at the beginning of time. In this sense, he maintains, it is said that God created all things simultaneously. The state of perfection comprises the actually existing forms of things, the effects produced by seminal causes, and the entire actual succession of times. Although all things were created simultaneously at the beginning of time, God continues to operate throughout the succession of times. He does so by actuating (*actualiter*) and repairing (*reparative*) all things. All things created by God continue to exist, not in themselves, but in the succession of times. According to Clarenbaldus, Christ restores or repairs all things the very moment they perish. Unfortunately, he does not elaborate this somewhat obscure point. But a key to the theory may be found in William of Conches who writes: *Nihil in mundo perire physica sententia est*². The idea serves to show, that, on the one hand, a substantial change is not a new creation out of nothing, and that, on the other hand, the sum total of God's creation remains constant. It seems, that the theologian Clarenbaldus transfers the doctrine to theology and ascribes to Christ the function of preserving the total of God's creation.

Clarenbaldus' interpretation of the word « day » follows and enlarges Thierry's exegesis. Thierry defines « day » as the space covered by a complete rotation of the heavens or as the illumination of the air. Clarenbaldus defines it either as the illumination of the air or a period of 24 hours (required for a rotation) or as the distinct phases in the production of creatures. He frankly admits that he thinks little of the (Augustinian) theory that the word may refer to the knowledge of the angels concerning creation³. Thierry does not even mention St. Augustine's view.

While Thierry concentrates on the physical exposition of « heaven and earth », Clarenbaldus speculates on such questions as how time was created, how the angels were created « before all time », how the Garden of Eden could exist fully developed on the third day.

(1) *De Gen. ad litt.* IV, 11, 18; P. L., 34, 346.

(2) *Dragmaticon Phil.*; ed. G. GRATAROLUS (Strasbourg, 1567), p. 233. W. FLATTEN, *Die Philosophie*, p. 144. See also HUGH OF ST. VICTOR, *Didasc.* I, 6; ed. CH. BUTTIMER (Washington, D. C., 1939), p. 13: *Dictum est: Nihil in mundo moritur eo quod nulla essentia pereat.* JOHN OF SALISBURY, *Metal.* II, 17; ed. WEBB, p. 94: *etiamsi temporalia perire contingat, rerum numerus nec minuitur nec augetur.* AUGUSTINE, *De Lib. arbitrio* II, 17; P. L., 32, 1265.

(3) *De Gen. ad litt.* IV, 30, 47 ff.; P. L., 34, 315.

In comparing the master and his pupil, we cannot fail to notice that Thierry was indeed the « robust reaper » as described in the introductory letter. His exposition is succinct and dogmatic. He cites earlier writers very rarely and only to clarify questions of terminology, not to confirm his own teaching. Thus he names only Plato, « Mercurius » and Virgil. Thierry's crisp and powerful logic is most evident in the second part of his treatise where he deals with the Trinity.

Clarenbaldus describes himself as the pupil who followed behind his master. Although his exposition is often not as concise and authoritative as Thierry's, it is occasionally superior from a metaphysician's point of view. Considering the general training in philosophy available at the time, his explanations of prime matter, seminal causes, time, etc., are outstanding examples of his high intellectual achievements. They are not mere repetitions of thoughts expressed by Thierry but genuine results of personal penetration. He is more anxious to quote or refer to ideas voiced by Christian and non-Christian writers of the past. Thus he endeavours to prove that St. Augustine and Pythagoras shared his doctrine, if not his terminology, with regard to the origin of all things. He calls St. John *summus theologus*, while Thierry's Moses is *prudensissimus philosophorum* and his theologians are *divini philosophi*.

Although this different nomenclature was not of particular importance at a time when both terms were still felt to be foreign words, we cannot deny that this usage of *philosophus* and *theologus* reflects a different spirit. Thierry's *divinus philosophus*, it seems, is the thinker who ascends from creation to God by the power of reason rather than by the word of revelation. He adapts the Biblical narrative to his cosmology, not *vice versa*. But we have seen that Thierry steps on much more perilous ground where he tries to transform the trinitarian God into a Neo-Pythagorean Triad. If Thierry had at all thought of claiming the support of earlier Christian writers for his novel approach to the trinitarian mystery, he would have been at a loss to find them. The atmosphere pervading Thierry's treatise is indeed that of a « divine philosopher » rather than a theologian.

Clarenbaldus could not simply shake off the effects of Thierry's lectures and made it a special point to reconcile « most views of the philosophers » with the Christian truth. In comparison to other contemporary writers, he offers a very small amount of patristic quotations. If we call to mind that, for instance, Gilbert of Poitiers was equally sparing in this regard, we find here a certain pattern reflecting the spirit of Chartres. It reveals a pronounced tendency, not to disregard the teaching of the past, but to integrate Christian and non-Christian thoughts and to propose them in a largely new and more scientific form. It is obvious that in theology where the authentic voice of tradition is more important than the author's philosophical presentation, the scholastic method of Chartres

was bound to be superseded by a method in which ecclesiastical tradition, presented in its original form, kept its place as an indispensable tool for a proper approach to the revealed faith. This, no doubt, was one reason why the school of Chartres soon yielded to the greater fame of the school of Paris.

DESCRIPTION OF THE MANUSCRIPTS

The works in which Thierry and Clarenbaldus express the views just described and analyzed are preserved in six manuscripts, all of which contain Thierry's tractate, whereas only two of them contain Clarenbaldus' letter and *tractatulus*. The following description of the manuscripts provides the essential details concerning these works.

- A. — Paris, B. N., *lat.* 3584, fols. 1-16^v. *Saec.* XII. It contains the letter (fols. 1-1^v), Thierry's *tractatus* (fols. 1^v-10) and part of Clarenbaldus' *tractatulus* (fols. 10-16^v). The upper half of fol. 16 is cut or torn out, the rest is missing. B. Hauréau used this manuscript for his edition of the letter in *Notices et extraits* I (Paris, 1890), pp. 49 f. J. M. Parent also made use of it for his transcription of (part of) the *tractatulus*, in *La Doctrine de la Création dans l'école de Chartres* (Paris-Ottawa, 1938), pp. 208-213.
- C. — Cambrai, Bibl. munic. 339 (321), fols. 74-89. *Saec.* XIII in. It once belonged to St. Aubert near Cambrai and contains the letter (fols. 74-74^v), Thierry's *tractatus* (fols. 74^v-81^v) and Clarenbaldus' *tractatulus* (fols. 81^v-89). The manuscript is very closely related to A, but no direct copy¹.
- P. — Paris, B. N., *lat.* 647, fols. 167-173. *Saec.* XII. It belonged to the Abbey of Beauré in the diocese of Beauvais, according to an entry made in the fourteenth century: *Liber sanctae Mariae de Prato*². The manuscript contains only Thierry's *tractatus*, preceded by a commentary on the Pauline Epistles, written by Radulphus Flaviacensis³, and a brief gloss on *Is.* xxviii, 10.
- Q. — Paris, B. N., *lat.* 15601, fols. 98-100. *Saec.* XII. It once belonged to the Sorbonne library⁴ and contains only Thierry's *tractatus*. The text is closely related to that of P.

(1) *Catal. Gén.* XVII, 124.

(2) Cf. PH. LAUER, *Bibl. Nationale: Catal. Gén. des manuscrits lat.* I (Paris, 1939), pp. 229 f.

(3) A. M. LANDGRAF, 'Unters. zu den Paulinenkommentaren', RTAM VIII (1936), 353 f.

(4) L. DELISLE, 'Inventaire des manusc. lat. de la Sorbonne', *Bibl. de l'École des Charles XXXI* (1870), 16.

<CLARENBALDI EPISTULA>

Ut¹ asserit Tullius Cicero, *tanta est vis probitatis, ut eam in eis quos numquam vidimus diligamus et, quod majus est, in hoste miremur*². Quod autem Cynicus³ ille probitatem laudari quidem sed statim algere commemoravit, illis est proponendum qui virtutem nonnisi alicujus emolumenti causa⁴ colendam arbitrantur. Quae opinio vulgaris⁵ quidem et stulta est. Virtutes enim in eo rerum genere sunt ponendae, quae per se placent, tametsi nullius emolumenti spes reluceat.

Cognoscens itaque in Vestra Nobilitate quadrifariae virtutis ramos virere, inter quos etiam tam litterarum amorem quam earundem scientiam, satagebam alicujus philosophici muneris obsequio Vestrae Bonitati prius fore carus quam proximus. Quis enim tantam Dominam non velit muneribus quibus possit honorare, cujus inter ceteras virtutes liberalitas omnem imperialem supergressa est munificentiam? Cujus solertia triformem hominum ordinem⁶, clerum, militiam, populum, non simulata sibi dilectione devinxit. Unde orta fama celebris et gloriosa vix terminis clauditur Europae.

Direxi igitur Vestrae Sublimitati libellum quem magister Theodericus, doctor meus, de sex dierum operibus edidit, quem Roma jam suis commisit archivis. In quo quantum philosophiae contineatur, liquido apparet, cum ipse — utpote totius Europae philosophorum praecipuus — qualiter exemplaris forma in materia operans cuncta produxerit, juxta physicas tantum rationes edoceat. Cui operi tractatulum quendam supposui quem ab ipsius lectione ita collegi, tamquam si, impotens falce metere, decidentes a falce robusti messoris spicas collegissem. In quo si forte quid⁷ inveniatur laudabile, fonti potius est adscribendum quam ex fonte haurienti.

Verumtamen hoc in meo labore inveniri spero praecipuum, quod plerasque philosophorum sententias christianae veritati accommodavi quo etiam ab adversariis divina pagina robur acciperet et munimentum. Quippe, ut vulgari⁸ proverbio dicitur: *Vera laus est ab hoste*. Sicut enim in Augustino me legisse recordor, philosophorum sententias christianae veritati accommodare hoc est *spoliare Aegyptios et ditare Hebraeos*⁹.

1 Cf. B. HAURÉAU, *Nolices et extraits* I (Paris, 1890), p. 49. 2 CICERO, *De Amicitia* ix, 29. 3 JUVENAL, *Sat.* i, 74. 4 causam C. 5 Cf. CLARENBALDUS' letter to Odo in *Mediaeval Studies* XV (1953), 213. 6 add. id est C. 7 aliquid C. 8 vulgariter A. 9 *De Doctr. christ.* II, 40, 61 f.; P. L., 34, 63.

tempore vel loco. At hujusmodi praefinitio aequalitas existentiae rerum est intra quam vel ultra quam nequit aliquid consistere¹.

[47] At hujusmodi aequalitas unitatis aequalitas est. Veritas est modus rerum aeternus et caetera, quae superior tractatus assignavit aequalitati unitatis. Verbum igitur deitatis unitatis aequalitas est. At unitas deitas. Et ipsa unitas aequalitatem unitatis gignit. Deitas igitur Verbum. De qua generatione quidam magnus philosophus ita dicit: *Semel locus est Deus*². Ecce iste³ unitatis et Verbi mentionem breviter et aperte fecit. Hactenus de aequalitate unitatis. Nunc quomodo connexio aequalitatis et unitatis ab utroque earum procedat explicandum est secundum disciplinas propositas⁴.

<CLARENBALDI TRACTATULUS⁵>

[1] Liber iste a Graecis *Genesis* vocatur et similiter a Latinis⁶, eo quod in principio hujus operis de caeli et terrae generatione tractat. Consuetudo enim fuit Hebraeis secundum operum principia voluminibus imponere nomina. Unde et Evangelium Matthaei *Liber generationis Jesu Christi* vocatum est. Hinc etiam apud Hebraeos liber iste vocatus est *Bresilh*⁷ quod Septuaginta interpretes, Symmachus quoque et Theodotion *Principium*, Aquila vero *Capitulum* interpretatus est. Unde habetur: *In capitulo libri scriptum est de me*⁸. Neque tamen Evangelium Matthaei ubique de generatione Jesu Christi neque liber iste de generatione caeli et terrae ubique docet.

[2] Dicto, quare liber iste *liber Genesis* sit appellatus⁹, inquiramus quae in principio hujus operis sint consideranda. Ea nimirum sunt sex: primo enim loco de ordine *Pentateuchi* videndum est; secundo, quid auctor in hoc opere intendat et de finali operis causa; tertio, de titulo, scilicet quare liber iste *Liber Genesis* sit appellatus, de quo jam satis dictum esse existimamus; quarto loco, quomodo liber iste prophetia sit et quare; quinto, quibus modis liber iste sit exponendus; sexto de rerum creatione.

Lex igitur Moysi, quae ab Hebraeis dicitur *Thorath*¹⁰, a Graecis et Latinis *Pentateuchus* appellatur, quoniam quinque libris clauditur. *Penta* enim quinque, *teuca* liber interpretatur¹¹. Et inde *Pentateuchus* appellatur. Sunt autem libri per quos *Pentateuchus* dividitur: *Genesis*,

¹ existere R. ² Ps. lxi, 11. ³ add. philosophus RT. ⁴ End of PQRT. ⁵ Explicit liber primus. Incipit liber de eodem secundus m. rec. A, fol. 10. No title is found in C, fol. 74. ⁶ add. generatio m. rec. C. ⁷ ISIDORE, *Etyl.* VI, i, 4. Cf. ANGELOMUS, *In Gen.* i, 1; P. L., 115, 112 C. ⁸ Ps. xxxix, 8; *Hebr.* x, 7. Cf. ST. BASIL, *In Hexaem. hom.* 1, 6; P. G., 29, 18A: In capitulo fecit Deus, hoc est subito et brevi. ⁹ (sit appell.) appellatur C. ¹⁰ ISIDORE, *Etyl.* VI, i, 5. ¹¹ *Ibid.*, VI, ii, 2.

Exodus, Leviticus, Liber Numeri, et Liber Deuteronomii. Et in his tota lex Moysi continetur.

[3] Et primum quidem locum obtinet *Genesis*, eo quod per ipsum instituimur ad legem Dei¹. In *Genesi* quippe continetur rerum generatio et distinctio personarum Trinitatis, quemadmodum necessaria sunt ad divinae scripturae intelligentiam. Nec mirum quia eis velut fundamento² omnis divinae scripturae cognitio innititur. Tractatur etiam in *Genesi* de generatione sanctorum Patrum et vita. Cujus cognitio utilis est ad notitiam juris naturalis. Igitur quia *Genesis* caeli et terrae generationem et distinctionem personarum Trinitatis et vitam sanctorum Patrum continet, quibus omnibus ad intelligentiam legis Dei instruimur, idcirco primo ponitur loco velut fundamentum *Liber Geneseos*.

[4] Post *Genesim* primum tenet locum *Exodus* in quo praecepta Dei summi principis ponuntur. Sed quare *Exodus* dicatur, legendo *Exodum* opportunius dicitur. Post *Exodum* *Leviticus* sequitur in quo docetur jus sacerdotale. Et est *Leviticus* quasi quaedam explicatio *Exodi* quia quae in *Exodo* breviter et summatim tanguntur, in *Levitico* explicite et diffusius docentur. Post *Leviticum* autem ponitur liber *Numeri* et in eo jus humanum docetur et auctoritas totius populi distinguitur per classes³ et tribus. Extremus omnium *Deuteronomius* ponitur in quo omnium praedictorum continetur recapitulatio.

[5] Est autem attendendum quod, imitando Moysen, divinum auctorem, legum saecularium et Romanarum latores primum *Institutiones* praemittunt. Post eas sequitur *Codex* in quo edicta et decreta saecularis principis, i.e. Romani Imperatoris constituuntur quemadmodum in *Exodo* edicta regis tyrannici. Deinde sequuntur *Digesta* in⁴ quibus divina jura docentur et humana sicut in *Levitico* sacerdotalia jura docentur⁵ cum humanis. In extremis vero locantur *Authentica* in quibus priora recapitulantur sicut in *Deuteronomio*. Et ad hunc quidem modum saecularium legum latores scriptores legis divinae imitantur.

[6] Ecce diximus de ordine *Pentateuchi* et causas talis ordinis assignavimus et quare liber iste *Genesis* intituletur primum diximus. Deinceps videamus quomodo prophetia sit. Prophetia siquidem est divina inspiratio eventus rerum immobili veritate denuntians. Et interpretatur visio. Unde in *Libro Regum* propheta plerumque «videns» appellatur. Nec tamen quoslibet videntes futura «prophetas» vocamus sed eos tantum quorum corda Spiritus sanctus inflammavit. Balaam enim non fuit propheta neque Sybilla quia corda eorum Spiritus sanctus non afflaverat, quamvis tamen Deo volente futura praecognoscerent.

¹ om. C. ² fundamentum C. ³ casses C. ⁴ om. C. ⁵ et humana sicut... docentur om. C.

[7] Prophetia vero pluribus modis denuntiatur sicut quandoque per sensum corporis : ut cum Moyses virgam vidit versam in colubrum vel non-ardentem ardere rubum¹. In quo praesignatum est beatam Virginem Mariam nullo igne sive carnalis desiderii commixtione parituram. Aliquoties vero per apocalypsim aut per somnium sicut Danieli et Ezechieli. Aliquando per intelligentiam sicut David regi aut Isaiae aut Paulo ad tertium caelum rapto. Sed quae per intelligentiam denuntiantur, aut factis denuntiantur aut dictis : factis ut Arca Noe vel sacrificio Abrahae. Item, quae dictis, aut praedicendo futura ut *Ecce Virgo concipiet et pariet filium*², aut ostendendo praesentia ut *Hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis et caro de carne mea*³, aut item res gestas narrando ut *In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram*. Moysi namque mundi creatio per intelligentiam comperta est per quam et Paulo Christi Evangelium cognitum.

[8] Dicto quomodo sit prophetia, dicamus quot modis liber iste sit exponendus. Igitur ut sancti perhibent doctores tribus modis exponendus est, i.e. historialiter, allegorice, moraliter. *Historialiter* hoc modo, ut exponantur res gestae juxta litterae sonum et significationem. *Allegorice* ita ut in rebus narratis aliud figuretur quod vel ad Christum respiciat vel ad ecclesiam. Unde allegoria Graece, alieniloquium Latine interpretatur⁴. *Moraliter* vero sic ut per ea quae narrantur ad bonam vitam informemur. Unde multipere christiano gaudendum est quod his tribus quasi adminiculis ad cognitionem sui Conditoris juvatur. Quia ergo tribus modis scriptura ista exponenda est, ut diximus, primum quomodo secundum litterae significationem exponenda est videamus.

[9] *In principio*, inquit Moyses, *creavit Deus caelum et terram*. De creatione rerum hic aliquid videtur esse dicendum, ut manifestior fiat intellectus litterae. Etenim rerum creatio quasi quidam introitus est ad divinas scripturas et ad cognitionem Creatoris. Ex creatione enim mundi adeo certa argumenta sumi possunt, ut etiam paganis et incredulis probari possit mundum habuisse Conditozem. Hoc modo : Mundus iste ex contrariis elementis conjunctus est, calidis, frigidis, humidis, siccis. Natura ergo vel casus vel artifex haec tam adversantia sibi conjunxit⁵. Sed natura similia similibus applicat, refugit vero contraria. Non ergo natura mundum fecit. Neque vero casus. Casus enim est inopinatae rei eventus ex diversis causis confluentibus⁶ propter aliud et aliud inceptis. Si ergo casus mundum fecisset, causae, quae casum operatae essent, ante omnium rerum essent Creatorem. Ergo essent ante eum a quo ipsae essent. Quod est inconveniens. Causae enim quaedam omnem casum praecedunt, quarum concursu casus fit. Casus ergo mundum non fecit.

¹ Ezod. iv. 3 and iii. 2. ² Is. vii. 14. ³ Gen. ii. 23. ⁴ ISIDORE, *Etyim.* I, xxxvii, 22. ⁵ Cf. BOETHIUS, *De Cons. phil.* III, prosa 12; CSEL 67, 73. ⁶ influen-
tibus C.

[10] Igitur, quia nec natura nec casus mundum fecit, cum aut natura aut casus aut artifex mundum fecerit, sequitur ab artifice eum esse factum. Sed artifex ille nec homo erat nec angelus. Homo non erat, quia mundus prior homine factus est. Item, angelus non erat, siquidem hoc nomen angelus *nomen est officii, non naturae*¹. Interpretatur enim *nuntius*². Sed nuntius nuntiantis nuntius dicitur. Et major est nuntians nuntio. Angelus ergo factor mundi non erat, quippe omnipotens non est qui, alio praesidente, sit nuntius.

Sed qui fecit mundum, omnipotens est. Non ergo angelus mundum fecit. Quare artifex ille Deus erat. Dicere autem quod seipsum mundus fecit, maniacy furoris est signum.

[11] Notandum vero est esse tria principia ex quibus sacris scripturis catholica profluit agnitio, scilicet rerum creatio, de qua diximus, et sacramenta et virtutes, de quibus nisi sciatur quid teneri debeat multae haereses proveniunt. Quemadmodum ex ignorantia creationis rerum haeresis³ Eutyechiana et Nestoriana ortae sunt. Putantes enim utrique, i.e. Eutyches et Nestorius humanam naturam sine humana persona esse non posse, in contrarias haereses inciderunt, ut alter eorum, i.e. Nestorius sicut duas in Christo fatebatur naturas sic et duas in eo assereret personas dicens divinam naturam et humanam proprias semper servare personas⁴. Alter vero, i.e. Eutyches veritus duas dicere in Christo fuisse personas, unam asseruit tantum permansisse naturam dicens Christum ex duabus sed non in duabus consistere naturis. Fortasse enim putabat humanitatem prorsus cessisse in divinitatem⁵. Quod quidem impossibile est.

Sicut enim Boethius in libro *De Duabus naturis et una Christi persona* contra eundem haereticum argumentatur, hoc erat impossibile, cum divinitas et humanitas nullum habeant unius materiae commune subiectum⁶. Divinitas enim forma est extra materiam⁷. *Sola siquidem illa in se transfigurari possunt quae et unius materiae commune habent subiectum et in se facere possunt et a se pati*⁸.

[12] Sic ex ignorantia creationis rerum in has et his deteriores haereses multi inciderunt sicut adhuc hodie quidam imperiti dicunt Christum individuum hominis, hujus videlicet speciei, esse. Quod quidem falsum est. Cum enim omnis species specialissima sit totum esse substantiale suorum individuum, si Christus esset illius speciei individuum, totam Christi substantiam species illa compleret. Nihil igitur haberet a divinitate. Quamvis enim Christus aliquis homo sit, tamen haec species homo non praedicatur ad quid sed ad quale de Christo. Haec enim natura homo

¹ ISIDORE, *Etyim.* VII, v. 2. ² *Ibid.*, VII, v. 5. Cf. AUGUSTINE, *De Gen. ad litt.* V, 19, 17; P. L., 34, 334. ³ *om. C.* ⁴ Cf. BOETHIUS, *Contra Eutychem*, 4; ed. R. PEIPER (Leipzig, 1871), p. 199. ⁵ *Ibid.*, 6; p. 206. ⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 207. ⁷ Cf. BOETHIUS, *De Trin.*, 2; ed. PEIPER, p. 153. ⁸ BOETHIUS, *Contra Eutychem*, 6, p. 207.

de nullo praedicatur ad quid¹ quod non sit individuum hominis. Ad quale vero praedicatur haec species de Christo quoniam in eo vim habet differentiae substantialis. Est autem hoc nomen Christus datum ex humanitate tertiae personae Trinitatis. Christus enim interpretatur unctus². Et subauditur: plenitudine donorum. Et est translatum hoc nomen a regibus et sacerdotibus ad tertiam personam Trinitatis. Duae enim personae in veteri Testamento ungebantur: rex scilicet et sacerdos. Unde hoc nomen translatum est.

[13] Multis praeterea erroribus alios involutos fuisse comperimus propter praedictam rerum creationis ignorantiam³ sicut eos qui Christum ex Maria carnem non assumpsisse mentiebantur fingentes Deum carnem quandam praeparasse in caelo et, cum vellet nasci, carnem illam angelorum ministerio in utero beatae Virginis inductam⁴. Quae quidem caro per ipsam ut per instrumentum nasceretur, non vero de ipsa. In quem errorem illa etiam Evangelii⁵ auctoritas prave intellecta illos impulit: *Nemo ascendit in caelum nisi qui de caelo descendit*, etc.⁶.

[14] Opponebant enim hoc modo: Si Christus de Adam carnem assumpsit, quomodo potuit non subiacere originali peccato? Omnes enim qui ab Adam descenderunt, originali peccato subjacuisse manifestum est, praeter solum Christum⁷. In Christo autem neque peccatum neque voluntas fuit ulla peccandi. Quam quidem oppositionem Boethius⁸ dicit habere quaestionem omni modo animadvertendam. Si enim, inquit illi, corpus Christi ex humana carne sumptum est, ergo aut ex tali qualis fuit Adam ante peccatum aut qualis fuit post peccatum. Si ex tali, qualis fuit ante peccatum, nullo modo debuit Christus mori quoniam nec peccatum nec voluntatem peccandi habuit. Adam enim si non peccasset, prorsus mortem non sensisset. Nullo igitur modo Christus mori debuit.

[15] Item, si talem suscepit hominis statum, qualis fuit Adam post peccatum, consequens esse videtur quod Christus subjectus fuerit peccatis et bonum a malo pura integritate non discreverit, quia has passiones Adam post peccatum suscepit. Hanc vero quaestionem Boethius hoc modo solvit dicens tres hominum posse intelligi status: primum quidem⁹ qualis¹⁰ erat status in Adam antequam peccasset. In quo statu, quamvis adhuc se nullo peccato polluerat ideoque morti nihil debebat, poterat tamen peccandi habere voluntatem. Secundus vero status intelligitur ad quem Adam pervenire potuisset, si Deo permansisset oboediens. Tunc etenim id subsequutum fuisset, ut non solum non peccaret sed ut nec peccare vellet nec posset. Tertius autem status est post peccatum, in quo mortis necessitas subsecuta est et peccatum et peccandi voluntas.

¹ sed ad quale... quid *om. C.* ² ISIDORE, *Etym.* VII, ii, 5. ³ *eras. C.* ⁴ Cf. BOETHIUS, *Contra Eutychen*, 5; p. 203. ⁵ JOHN III, 13. ⁶ BOETHIUS, *Contra Eutychen*, 5; p. 206. ⁷ Deum *C.* ⁸ *Contra Eutychen*, 8; p. 215. ⁹ *om. C.* ¹⁰ quia *e corr. C.*

[16] Ex his igitur tribus statibus singulis Christus sumpsit quiddam, non totum. Ex tertio enim statu, i.e. ultimo, in quo nimirum mortis necessitas subsecuta est, mortale corpus sumpsit ut morte mortem destrueret. Quod vero in eo nulla fuit voluntas peccandi, ex illo statu sumpsit ad quem¹ meruisset pervenire, si oboediens Deo permansisset. In quo scilicet nec peccare vellet nec posset. Quod vero Christus esurivit et sitivit, manducavit et bibit, et quod aliorum hominum more in somnum lapsus est, ex illo statu sumpsit qui eo tempore erat, cum¹ nondum se peccato polluerat. Quo tamen tempore illi poterat adesse delinquendi voluntas. In quo statu non est credendum quod Adam vivere potuisset nisi manducasset et bibisset. Quia ergo Christus ex his statibus singulis quiddam accepit, non totum, non est necesse eum vel ab Adam corpus non accepisse, quod haeretici putaverunt, vel originali peccato fuisse obnoxium.

[17] Abiectis itaque minus peritorum erroneis sententiis, quod ex sanctis doctoribus colligitur de rerum creatione videamus. Filius Dei Creator universorum est tam inchoativorum quam perfectorum. Creator inchoativorum est secundum hoc quod est Principium. Perfectorum vero secundum hoc quod est Verbum. Sunt autem tria inchoativa, scilicet primordialis materia, ratio seminalis et principium temporis. *Primordialis materia* est secundum beatum Augustinum informitas corporeae vel incorporeae naturae quae per privationem formae utcumque potest intelligi². *Seminalis* vero *ratio* est vis occulta inserta elementis vel eis quae constant ex elementis secundum quam vim alia ex aliis suo quaeque tempore consuete nascuntur. *Principium* autem *temporis* est primum momentum, scilicet primus motus creaturae de informitate ad formam, de non-esse scilicet ad esse.

[18] Et haec sunt tria inchoativa quorum Creatorem Filium Dei credimus et asseveramus³. Revertamur autem ad primordiale materiam et perscrutemur qualiter debeat intelligi quod dicitur de ea, quia scilicet est informitas corporeae vel incorporeae naturae quae per privationem formae utcumque potest intelligi. Deinceps quae de reliquis inchoativis dicuntur perscrutabimur.

[19] Est itaque *materia primordialis* informitas, i.e. possibilitas suscipiendi formas, scilicet veniendi de non-esse ad esse, quae utcumque, scilicet imperfecte, potest intelligi⁴. Confusionem enim non perfecte valet intellectus deprehendere, quae est in informitate primordialis materiae. Intellectus quippe formam et terminationem sequitur non confusionem. Unde dicitur quod *utcumque, scilicet imperfecte, potest intelligi* informitas per privationem formae. Cum enim informitas nihil

¹ *Supple.*: Adam. ² Cf. *De Gen. ad litt.* I, 1, 2; P. L., 34, 247. ³ asserimus *C.* ⁴ CLARENBALDUS, *De Trin.*; ed. JANSEN, p. 59*. *Librum hunc*; p. 11*.

aliud sit quam possibile esse sive possibilitas, per privationem formae tantum potest intelligi. Ablatis namque formis quoquo modo a rebus formatis, nihil nisi possibile esse remanet, scilicet possibilitas suscipiendi formas. Formis etenim ablatis, deperit actus existentium rerum. *Omne namque esse ex forma* provenit¹.

[20] Potest autem hoc modo materia per privationem formarum cognosci. Ponatur in medio statua aerea cui mente et cogitatione eam formam abstrahamus unde habet dici « statua ». Quod ergo remanebit, erit aes. Item, aeri detrahimus mente eas proprietates unde habet dici « aes ». Et quod relinquitur, erit terra. Porro terrae abstrahimus frigiditatem et siccitatem. Et quod remanebit, non nihil est². Est enim materia informis : id nimirum quod Plato dicit esse *inter aliquam et nullam substantiam*; Aristoteles autem *aptitudinem* et *carentiam* sive *corpus incorporeum*³.

[21] Nec est putandum illud omnino nihil esse quoniam, si quis eam statuam cui modo formas detraximus voluerit retexere, oportebit eum illud assumere. Quicquid enim est ultimum in dissolutione, primum est in compositione. Haec igitur materia a philosophis vocatur *possibilitas absoluta* quia omnem naturam in se habet possibiliter, nullam vero actu. Unde etiam absoluta dicitur, quia ipsa est utrumlibet⁴. Et sicut ovum animal est possibiliter et ovo omnia membra avis insunt possibiliter⁵ et per complicationem, sicut etiam uni grano frumenti insunt multa grana et culmus et paleae, sic materiae omnia insunt possibiliter. Ipsa vero non est aliquid actu.

[22] Haec autem materia considerata prout omnia naturalia in ea actu sunt, *definita possibilitas* est a philosophis appellata quia, ex quo accepit formas, certa res est et rationi cognoscibilis⁶. In hac autem materia operatur *necessitas absoluta*, i.e. divina providentia. Quae quidem est *necessitas* quia est aeternitas⁷; *absoluta* quia nulli debet hoc quod est. Divina namque sapientia in materia operatur. Et sicut omnia naturalia in definita possibilitate actu et natura subsistunt, ita eadem in divina sapientia sive providentia per quandam simplicitatem complicata. Nihil in ipsa sunt nisi quod ipsa divina sapientia est. Quod etiam Johannes evangelista, summus theologus, testatur dicens : *Omnia in ipso vita erant*⁸.

¹ BOETHIUS, *De Trin.*, 2; ed. PEIPER, p. 152 : Omne namque esse ex forma est. ² CLARENBALDUS, *De Trin.*; p. 44*. ³ CLARENBALDUS, *De Trin.*; p. 44*. ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 59*. ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 64*. ⁶ Cf. CLARENBALDUS, *De Trin.*; ed. JANSEN, p. 64*. ⁷ id est divina... aeternitas om. C. ⁸ John i, 4. Cf. *Librum hunc*; ed. Jansen, p. 21*. CLARENBALDUS, *De Hebdom.*, 19; ed. HARING, p. 10 : In necessitate enim absoluta ab aeterno omnia in simplicitate quadam complicata constituerunt et in eo omnia erant quod ipsa, ut Johannes Evangelista, summus theologorum, testatur : *Quod factum est in ipso vita erat*. *Comm. in Boeth. de Trinitate* (Ms. Paris, B. N., lat. 14489, fol. 19) : Et Trinitas est unitas, unitas scilicet complicans in se omnium rerum universitatem in simplicitate, quae ab antiquis vocatur *absoluta necessitas*.

[23] Ab hac autem necessitate absoluta descendit *necessitas complexionis* sive *concalenationis*, cum ea, quae in absoluta necessitate complicata sunt, ab aeterno ad fati seriem descendunt quasi gradibus concatenatis et sese complectentibus administrantur¹. Haec sunt itaque quattuor rerum universitates quas Augustinus aliis nominibus significans *Omnia*, inquit, *per ipsum facta sunt in Verbo, in materia, in seminalibus rationibus, in opere*².

Verbum autem absolutam necessitatem, hoc est divinam sapientiam vocat. *Seminales rationes* vocat vires occultas insertas materiae secundum quas per necessitatem complexionis alia ex aliis temporibus³ consueve producantur. *Materia* vero vocat possibilitatem absolutam. *Opus* vero possibilitatem definitam.

[24] Pythagoras⁴ quoque diu admiratus, quare numerus in denario terminaretur — numeri enim sequentes denarium tantum sunt reciproactiones ut undecim unus et decem, duodecim duo et decem, et sic deinceps — tandem hujus admirationis hoc modo exitum invenit, ut in unitate Deum i.e. *necessitatem absolutam*, in binario materiam i.e. *absolutam possibilitatem* ratione alteritatis constitueret, in ternario qui primus omnium numerorum medio termino connectitur *necessitatem complexionis*,

¹ CLARENBALDUS, *De Hebdom.*, 19; ed. HARING, p. 10 : Cumque in ipso vita esset, descendunt per necessitatem complexionis ad heirmarmenon jam se in possibilitate definita manifeste deprimunt ac fato subsistunt. *Ibid.*, 30; p. 13 : Sicut enim totius numeri series ab unitate incipiens unitate terminatur, sic omnis creatura ab operante principio descendens ad fati seriem... *Comm. in Boeth. de Trinitate* (Ms. Paris, B. N., lat. 14489, fol. 19*) : Absoluta enim necessitas rerum omnium complicatio est in simplicitate. Necessitas complexionis earum rerum explicatio in quodam ordine, qui ordo a physicis fatum dicitur. Absoluta autem possibilitas est ejusdem universitatis rerum complicatio in possibilitate tantum, de qua veniunt ad actum et vocatur a physicis primordialis materia sive chaos. Determinata vero possibilitas est explicatio possibilitatis absolutae in actu cum possibilitate. Sic eadem rerum universitas quattuor modis est. Fol. 25 : Possibilitas namque est mutabilitas quam philosophi appellant primordiale materiam. ² Cf. AUGUSTINE, *De Gen. ad litt.* VI, 10, 17; P. L., 34, 346. *Comm. in Boeth. de Trinitate* (Ms. Paris, B. N., lat. 14489, fol. 19) : Est tamen universitas rerum quattuor modis : et una et eadem universitas est in absoluta necessitate, est in necessitate complexionis, est in absoluta possibilitate, est in determinata possibilitate. Et hi sunt quattuor modi existendi universitatis omnium rerum... Et ea quidem universitas est in necessitate absoluta, in simplicitate et unione quadam omnium rerum quae Deus est. Est etiam in necessitate complexionis in quodam ordine et progressionem, immutabiliter tamen. Est in possibilitate absoluta, in possibilitate tamen sine actu omni. Est etiam in determinata possibilitate possibiliter et actu. ³ *Read* : suis quaeque temporibus *or* suo quaeque tempore. Cf. AUGUSTINE, *De Gen. ad litt.* IV, 5, 8; P. L., 34, 342 : ex quibus omnia suis quaeque temporibus... See also No. 28 of this edition. ⁴ Cf. *Librum hunc*, p. 12* : Ubique enim (Plato) magistrum suum sequitur Pythagoram qui unitatem et binarium duo rerum principia constituit : unitatem 'Deum' appellans, per binarium materiam designans. See also CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Platonis*, 35; ed. MULLACH, p. 188. AUGUSTINE, *De Gen. ad litt.* IV, 2, 2; P. L., 34, 296.

in quaternario qui primus opere et actu tetragonus est materiam quattuor elementorum formis vestitam, hoc est *possibilitatem definitam* intellexeret. Supra quos quattuor modos universitatis, quia nihil esse videbat, etiam supra denarium qui ex his quattuor fit numeris i.e. unitate, binario, ternario, quaternarioque rationabiliter nullum numerum naturaliter posse accrescere comperit.

De praedicta item informitate dicit Augustinus¹: *Mundum fecisti de infirmi materia*, hanc auctoritatem sumens de libris Salomonis². Et sciendum quod quidam voluerunt hanc informitatem, scilicet materiam primordiale, coaeternam Deo esse: nimis imperiti qui et auctoritate sanctorum doctorum et inrefragabilibus rationibus satis abunde³ confutantur. Dicit enim Augustinus quod *Filius Dei Creator est informis materiae*⁴. Moyses quoque in hoc opere dicit: *In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. Terra autem erat inanis et vacua*, scilicet informis. Hic asserit Moyses quod informitas a Conditor universorum, Deo, creata sit. Et ita percutit illorum haeresim qui stulte de primordiali materia senserunt.

[25] Rationibus quoque convinci possunt. Cum enim primordialis materia sit possibilitas et nihil aliud, possibilitas vero non nisi mutabilitas⁵ oportet eam ab immutabilitate descendere. Mutabilitas enim ab immutabilitate ex necessitate descendit. Immutabilitas vero est aeternitas quae Deus est⁶. Quare necesse est mutabilitatem ab aeternitate descendere⁷. Et sic primordialis materia a Deo descendit. Et ita non est coaeterna Deo⁸.

Item, materia primordialis omni modo mutabilis est sed nullum mutabile aeternum. Quare nec ipsa est aeterna. Et ita non est coaeterna Deo. Unde manifestum est eos, qui id dixerunt, falsam protulisse sententiam.⁹ Quare dicamus quod catholice dici debet, scilicet quod Filius Dei, qui Creator est universorum, informem de nihilo creavit materiam.

[26] Amplius de seminali ratione agendum est quae a philosophis *naturalis ratio* sive *similitudo nascendi*, a divinis vero auctoribus *seminalis ratio* vocatur¹⁰. Est itaque, ut diximus, ratio seminalis vis insita elementis, etc. Quod ita debet intelligi: vis, scilicet aptitudo naturalis juxta quam similia ex similibus producuntur. Unde fit ut de grano tritici non nascatur

¹ AUGUSTINE, *De Gen. ad litt.* I, 14, 28; P. L., 34, 256. ² Sap. xi, 18. ³ habuisse C. ⁴ Cf. *De Gen. ad litt. lib. imp.*, 3, 6; P. L., 34, 222. ⁵ *Comm. in Boeth. de Trinitate*. (Ms. Paris, B. N., lat. 14489, fol. 21v): *Materia autem mutabilitas est*. ⁶ *Ibid.*, fol. 22v: *Sed ab immutabilitate descendit mutabilitas*. The same statement is found on fol. 25. ⁷ Cf. CLARENBALDUS, *De Trin.*; ed. JANSEN, p. 60*. ⁸ *Comm. in Boeth. de Trinitate*, fol. 22v: *Unde patet error eorum qui dixerunt quod materia coaeterna esset Deo. Ipsa enim a Deo descendit et Deus eam creavit*. ⁹ Cf. AMBROSE, *Hexameron*, I, 1, 3; P. L., 14, 135A. HRABANUS MAURUS, *In Gen.* I, 1; P. L., 107, 443A. ¹⁰ Cf. CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Platonis*, 23; ed. MULLACH, p. 185. AUGUSTINE, *De Gen. ad litt.* V, 20, 41; VI, 5, 8; VI, 8, 12; P. L., 34, 336; 342; 344.

faba, vel de faba triticum, vel de pecore homo, vel de homine pecus. Juxta quod ait Augustinus: *In semine arboris tota arbor primitus fuit, non mole corporeae magnitudinis sed vi potentiae causali. Quam arborem ex grano exiguo vis illa mirabilis produxit qua valuit adjacens humor commixtus terrae tamquam materies verti in ligni qualitatem*¹.

[27] Illa itaque *aptitudo naturalis* qua hoc fit, vis insita elementis vel eis quae constant ex elementis dicitur. Et est aliud aptitudo et aliud possibilitas. Et quamvis in eodem queant inveniri, aliunde tamen possibilitas et aliunde provenit aptitudo. Possibilitas namque ex materia, aptitudo vero ex artifice, scilicet Deo, rebus inest. Aptitudo enim, quae est seminalis ratio, semen est quo alia ex aliis similia producuntur. Et sicut semen ex viro vel ex mare emittitur in matricem, sic ratio seminalis, scilicet aptitudo naturalis juxta quam alia ex aliis consueve nascuntur ab artifice Deo, qui cuncta creavit, inserta est materiae vel elementis. Nec est ex ipsa materia, ut juxta eam quaelibet res alias res ejusdem generis producant consueve, scilicet non contra solitum cursum naturae. Et *consueve* dicitur ad remotionem monstruosorum, quae non secundum solitum cursum naturae proveniunt, et ad remotionem illarum causarum, quae non solito naturae cursu res faciunt evenire.

[28] Nam super motum cursumque naturalem potestas Creatoris habet aptum se posse de his omnibus facere aliud quam eorum seminales rationes habent: sicut virga Aaron praeter solitum frondit, floruit, et peperit amigdala; sterilis mulier inventa in senecta peperit; virgo concepit, virgo peperit, virgo ante partum, virgo post partum; panis cotidie in altari in carnem Christi, vinum per benedictionem vertitur in sanguinem. Quae omnia multa aliter, quam rerum ratio seminalis habeat, ex occultis quibusdam causis in mente Dei absconditis manifestum est evenire.

Sunt enim duo causarum genera. Unum genus causarum est quae insertae sunt elementis ex quibus alia ex aliis suo quaeque tempore consueve producuntur. Aliae vero causae sunt in mente Creatoris ab aeterno absconditae quas ipse rebus conditis non inseruit. Ex quibus miracula ad ostensionem suae gratiae, quando vult, depromit. Propterea *mysterium* nostrae salutis Apostolus *absconditum*² dixit, non in mundo in quo sunt absconditae seminales rationes omnium rerum naturaliter oriturarum — sicut absconditus erat *Levi in lumbis Abrahae* quando et ipse *decimatus est* — sed in Deo qui universa creavit.

[29] Nemo itaque impie cogitet sicut quidam impii cogitaverunt nihil contra naturam, scilicet contra solitum naturae cursum, provenire posse, cum ex quibusdam causis occultis quae in mente Creatoris ab aeterno sunt absconditae ad ostensionem gratiae Dei multa contra solitum

¹ *De Gen. ad litt.* V, 23, 44; P. L., 34, 337. ² *Col. i*, 26.

naturae cursum proveniant, non contra naturam quae est voluntas Dei, quia contra eam nihil in mundo potest evenire. Quod quia denegaverunt quidam dicentes nihil posse evenire contra naturam, scilicet contra solitum naturae cursum — quod omnino falsum est — idcirco negaverunt Virginem posse peperisse, panem etiam in altari verti in carnem et vinum in sanguinem eo quod horum seminalis ratio hoc non habeat. Dicitur autem rerum ratio seminalis occulta vis, scilicet inserta materiae et difficilis ad cognoscendum.

[30] Sequitur de principio temporis de quo nos Augustinus aperte docet tempus ita definiens: *Tempus est creaturae motus de uno in aliud consequentibus*, i.e. succedentibus rebus secundum ordinationem administrantis Dei qui cuncta creavit¹. Principium igitur temporis est principium huiusmodi motus. Istud autem principium nihil est aliud quam primum momentum, i. e. primus motus creaturae aut tempus quo seminalis ratio ad effectum suum atque integritatem tendere coepit. Et de inchoativis haec dicta sufficiant.

Perfecta autem sunt formae rerum, effectus seminalium rationum, integra successio temporum. Nam in eo quod Filius Dei Verbum est vel existit, formas rerum ab aeterno concepit et seminalibus rationibus integritatem adesse iussit et temporalem successionem etiam nunc et usque in finem mundi cum Patre et Spiritu sancto ad nostram utilitatem disponit. Sed formarum in Verbo conceptio a sanctis doctoribus proprie dicitur *creatio in Verbo*².

[31] Quattuor igitur modis operatur Deus: in Verbo formaliter rerum formas concipiendo, in materia informiter, in seminalibus rationibus seminaliter³. De quibus tribus modis dictum est: *Qui vivit in aeternum, creavit omnia simul*⁴. In successionibus vero temporum operatur actualiter et reparative. Nam motu temporum ea, quae intereunt, per eundem motum Christo operante reparantur. Unde omnes res, licet non in se, tamen in successionibus permanent. Unde dictum est: *Pater usque modo operatur. Et ego operor*⁵. Cum itaque quattuor modis Deus operetur, ut supra dictum est, constat eum universitatem in Verbo creasse formaliter, in materia informiter, in primordialibus rationibus complicate et seminaliter, in successionibus temporum reparative et actualiter. Et hi sunt modi quibus *universitas rerum* existit.

[32] Sciendum autem, licet materiam a Deo creatam esse et catholica fides praescribat et certissima ratio doceat, non esse tamen temporaliter priorem rebus formatis, cum sit utrumque simul concreatum: et unde factum est et quod factum est. Sicut enim vox materiae verborum est, verba

vero formatam vocem indicant quod non informis vox prius emittatur quam in verba formetur, ita Deus non prius informem sed formatam creavit materiam¹.

[33] Praetractatis igitur illis sex, de quibus agendum proposuimus, deinceps de *Exaemeron*, i.e. de operibus sex dierum tractemus. *Exaemeron* enim sex dierum interpretatur. Sed prius quibus modis dies dicatur videamus, ut postea de operibus sex dierum evidentius doceamus. Dies itaque uno modo dicitur illuminatio aëris per solem sive per caelestem lucem. Additum autem est *per caelestem lucem* quoniam lux quaedam caelestis, creationem solis praecedens, tres dies sine sole effecit. Quae lux quidem, sicut Beda² testatur, ex quo sol creatus est, comitatur solem et oritur sole oriente et occidit occidente. Nec erat superfluum post illam lucem solem creari, quia lux illa non erat sufficiens ad aëris illuminationem. Sed, sicut sancti doctores asserunt, diem efficiebat similem crepusculo.

[34] Alio modo dicitur dies per conversionem caeli spatium xxiv horarum. Juxta quod dicitur: *Factum est vespere et mane dies unus*. Tertio modo dicitur dies creaturarum³ operumque distinctio. Deinceps videamus secundum unamquamque acceptionem diei, quid sit *mane* et quid sit *vespere*. *Mane* itaque diei, prout dies pro illuminatione aëris accipitur, est ortus illius caelestis lucis sive solis; *vespere* vero ejusdem occasus. Caeterum secundum hoc quod dies spatium xxiv horarum appellatur, *mane* diei est principium illius spatii xii horarum quo aer in superiori hemisphaerio lucidus apparet sive per solem sive per praedictam caelestem lucem, et finis ejusdem spatii xii horarum quando obscuratur. *Vespere* vero est principium illius spatii xii horarum quo superius hemisphaerium obscuratur et finis illius spatii quando illuminatur. Et ita *mane* pro xii horis diei et *vespere* pro xii horis noctis accipitur.

[35] Cum vero dies pro distinctione creaturarum et operum ponitur, *mane* pertinet⁴ ad inchoativa, *vespere* autem ad perfectiva. Unde *vespere* ante ponitur, *mane* vero post ponitur, quippe perfectiva digniora sunt inchoativis. De quibus utrisque superius dictum est. Quidam quarto modo diem appellant⁵ *cognitionem angelicam*⁶. Et secundum hoc *mane* vocant angelicam cognitionem quam habent de rebus ut sunt in divina providentia; *vespere* vero distinctionem rerum per eandem angelicam agnitionem in angelis. Quam sententiam nos parum appetiamur.

[36] Amplius vero, prioribus praemissis, de ordine sex dierum secundum tempus pertractandum est. Primo igitur Conditor universorum, Deus, creavit caelum et terram et lucem. Et in principio, i.e. in primo temporis

¹ De Gen. ad litt. V, 5, 12; P. L., 34, 325. ² Cf. AUGUSTINE, Enarr. in Ps. xxxii, 2, 5; P. L. 36, 288. De Gen. ad litt. II, 6, 12; P. L., 34, 268. ³ Cf. ALCUIN, In Gen. interr., 19; P. L., 100, 519A. ⁴ Eccl. xviii, 1. ⁵ Cf. De Gen. ad litt. IV, 12, 23; V, 20, 40; P. L., 34, 304; 335. Joan. V, 17.

¹ AUGUSTINE, De Gen. ad litt. I, 15, 29; P. L., 34, 257. ² Cf. Hexaemeron I; P. L., 91, 17AB. HUGH OF ST. VICTOR, De Sac. I, 1, 15; P. L., 176, 199A. ³ naturarum AC: vel creaturarum marg. C. ⁴ permanet C. ⁵ End of A. ⁶ Cf. De Gen. ad litt. IV, 28, 46 ff.; P. L., 34, 315.

momento *caelum et terram creavit*, scilicet quattuor elementa. Nomine enim «caeli» duo superiora elementa quae sibi cohaerent, ignis scilicet et aer, nomine vero «terrae» quae sibi quoque cohaerent ad invicem, terra scilicet et aqua, designantur. Creavit autem ea primo temporis momento, non quod illud temporis momentum praeparaverit in quo parato prius ea deinde creaverit, sed illud temporis momentum ipsis simul concreavit elementis.

[37] Nimirum cum tempus habeat esse in aliquo et per aliquid, quoniam accidens est, non est per se creatum sed illis, quae ei causae sunt, concreatum. Non enim tantum substantiae causae sunt qualitatum et aliorum accidentium verum etiam causae temporis sunt. Causae, inquam, sunt eo quod natura earum est mutari variarique successione temporum. Quod nisi essent, quae successione mutarentur, non esset successio. Et sic non esset tempus. Tempus enim nihil aliud est quam successio. Unde substantias quae successione mutantur causas dicimus esse temporis, i.e. successionis. Et ideo dicimus esse concreatum substantiis, non ante substantias creatum. Deus enim tantum Creator est substantiarum, non accidentium¹. Accidentia vero concreata sunt ipsis substantiis.

[38] Primo igitur temporis momento creata sunt quattuor elementa et id ipsis concreatum est elementis. Sunt autem creata informia ipsa quattuor elementa primo temporis momento. Terra creata est informis, quia primo temporis momento caruit eis quae postea habuit, scilicet caruit forma i.e. integritate formae. Caruit quoque omnibus illis quae ex ipsa postea suo quaque tempore processerunt. Aqua quoque informis creata est quia primo temporis momento formae integritate, in qua modo est, caruit et omnibus aliis quae postea ex ipsa processerunt. Aer etiam informis primo momento temporis creatus est quia caruit integritate formae quam postea habuit, scilicet primo momento temporis stellis caruit et luce quae postea habuit. Quartum quoque elementum, ignis scilicet, creatus est informis, i.e. carens integritate formae quam postea habuit.

[39] Informitas autem ejus erat quod angeli, qui in ipso primo temporis momento creati sunt, nondum conversi erant ad Deum nec confirmati in luce et scientia². Fuerant enim angeli, ut sancti doctores dicunt, primo temporis momento in ipso igne creati. Non autem conversi sunt ad Deum nec confirmati in luce et scientia primo momento. Sed statim secundo temporis momento quidam conversi sunt de eis et confirmati in luce et scientia; quidam vero in tenebras per invidiam detrusi. Et sunt quidem omnes angeli creati in bono statu, i.e. in tali in quo nihil mali erat, non in statu beatitudinis³ in quo postea manserunt qui confir-

mati sunt, sicut postea de creatione angelorum et de libero arbitrio eorum loquentes ostendimus in expositione litterae. Et quoniam primo temporis momento *angeli creati sunt*, idcirco dicit auctoritas quod creati sunt *ante tempora*, scilicet primo momento temporis, ante successionem temporum⁴. Unde non dixit ante tempus, sed ante tempora, per «tempora» designans successionem temporum.

[40] Lucem quoque creavit Deus primo momento temporis quando creavit elementa, quae dum fieret, scilicet primo momento temporis, non illuminabat. Unde dicimus quod aer informis creatus est, i.e. tenebrosus, primo temporis momento carens luce sicut et stellis. Sed secundo postea momento coepit converti lux illa sicut modo sol convertitur circa terram ita ut conversione sua de puncto ad punctum spatium xxiv horarum i.e. diem, sicut sol modo facit, efficeret. Et ita convertendo se de puncto caeli ad punctum post primum momentum, primo prima conversione sua illuminavit aëra, inferius scilicet elementum, post ignem et quod cohaeret igni. Post primam deinde conversionem quae² fecit primam diem qua primo illuminatus est aer, iterum coepit converti ab ortu in occasum convertendo se de puncto caeli ad punctum et item illuminavit aëra. Quo illuminato, calore³ immixto ei et incumbente per lucem, quoniam ex luce quae prima vis ignis est calor procedit, eo, inquam, illuminato, quoniam erat vicinior igni, calor, ei incumbens et immixtus, aquas subjacentes ad se traxit et super aëra (qui aether vocatur et factus est firmamentum) vaporaliter suspensas statuit aquas.

[41] Est etenim caloris natura aëre mediante aquas subjacentes attrahere et in aëre sive super aëra vaporaliter suspensas statuere, sicut cotidie nobis apparet quod calor solis aëre mediante incumbit aquis et eas vaporaliter suspensas in aëre constituit. Unde et nubes sunt. Nubes enim nihil aliud est quam conglobatio minutissimarum guttarum aquae quae, quando incurrunt se ad invicem, faciunt grossas guttas. Et inde pluviae. Quodsi, priusquam se incurrant, frigidis contingantur ventis, faciunt nivem. Si vero condensatae in grossas guttas vehementia frigidorum constringantur ventorum, faciunt grandinem congelare. Hinc pluviae, nives, et grandines naturaliter proveniunt. Et sicut calor modo aquas subjacentes attrahit et in aëre vaporaliter in nubes suspendit, ita secunda conversione praetaxatae lucis i.e. secunda die calor, ex luce incumbens aquis subjacentibus, aëre mediante fecit aquas ascendere, super aëra vaporaliter suspensas.

[42] Quibus ascendentibus et spatium quod erat inter terram et lunarem regionem deserentibus, aer iste inferior, i.e. haec *humecta substantia*⁴,

¹ Cf. CLARENBALDUS, *De Hebdom.*, 7; ed. HARING, p. 6. ² Cf. HUGH OF ST. VICTOR, *De Sac.* I, 5, 23; P. L., 176, 256D. *Summa sent.* II, 3; P. L., 176, 82D. ³ Cf. *Summa sent.* II, 2; P. L., 176, 82B. JOHN SCOTUS, *De Div. naturae* I, 7; P. L., 122, 446A.

¹ Cf. HUGH OF ST. VICTOR, *De Sac.* I, 5, 4; P. L., 176, 248D. *Summa sent.* II, 1; P. L., 176, 81A. ² The reading is uncertain. ³ colore Ms. ⁴ CHALCIDIUS, *In Tim. Platonis*, 128; ed. MULLACH, p. 211.

qua vescimur, ex aquis factus est. Unde et *humecta* vocatur *substantia*. Et aer superior, scilicet aether super quem ascenderunt aquae vaporaliter suspensae, factus est firmamentum. Haec itaque facta sunt secunda lucis conversione.

Tertio quoque conversa est lux effectiva dierum. et tertio illuminavit aëra fecitque diem tertium. Et aëre tertio illuminato, magis et magis multitudo aquarum super aëra suspensa est, natura caloris hoc exigente, sicut praedictum est. Calore namque immixto aquis, mediante aëre, aquae ascenderunt *et apparuit arida*. Sicut aqua cooperiente mensam; si ignis supponatur, calore desiccatur aqua et apparent maculae in mensa, aqua deficiente, sic aquis deficientibus ascendendo per calorem ad superiora apparuerunt insulae. Et hoc est quod dicitur *Et apparuit arida*.

[43] Et tunc terra concepit¹ vim velut quoddam seminarium producendi ex se herbas et arbores et caetera quae deinceps processerunt ex ipsa. Et ut dicunt sancti doctores *paradisus factus est cum integritate sua*, scilicet cum arboribus et pomis et cum omni integritate. Quod² videtur miraculo Dei contigisse, ut scilicet cum integritate fieret. Nondum enim terra erat apta producere herbas et arbores et animalia sua. Sed tantum vim producendi et velut quoddam seminarium conceperat — quod ex hoc quod rerum integritas, quae ex terra processerunt, in aliis terrae partibus nisi in paradiso non processit facile perpendi viderique potest. Factus est itaque paradisus die tertia. Unde dicitur *Et plantaverat paradisum voluptatis a principio*, i.e. tertia die. «Principium» enim vocantur tres dies, solis creationem praecedentes. Et terra concepit vim producendi ex se herbas et arbores *et apparuit arida*, sicut dictum est. Et mare congregatum est. Et aquae positae in ea forma quam modo habent.

Quarto enim conversa est lux caelestis effectiva dierum. Et calore operante per aëra multitudo aquarum ascendit adeo ut aer ipse superior, qui factus est firmamentum, aquarum multitudine densaretur. Et sic quarta lucis conversione, i.e. quarta die de aëre densato aquis factae sunt stellae, factus est sol et caetera stellaria corpora. Et ideo dicitur quod quarto die creatus est sol, per cuius additionem augmentata est aëris illuminatio, sive factus sit de praecedenti luce materialiter, quod quidem dici potest, sive factus sit aliunde.

[44] Quarta itaque die stellae factae sunt et in firmamento positae. Quibus creatis, eorum motu, natura motus hoc exigente, calor adauctus est eoque mediante aëre incumbente inferiori elemento sub aëre, i.e. aqua quae erat circa terram: aqua, calore immixto, natura rerum hoc exigente, concepit et produxit animalia sua, pisces scilicet et volatilia: Volatilia quidem quibus sedes est haec humecta substantia, quia haec humecta substantia ex aqua facta est, ut ostendimus, animalia aquae

¹ cepit Ms.

reputantur. Unde dicitur in hymno: *Magnae Deus potentiae qui ex aquis ortum genus partim remittis gurgili, partim levas in aëra*³. Hoc dicitur loquendo de animalibus aquae. Quinto itaque die aqua concepit et produxit animalia sua.

Sexto denique die post recessionem aquarum, calore incumbente terrae, terra produxit herbas et arbores et sua animalia, et homo creatus est et in paradiso positus. Sed qua hora diei hoc factum fuerat, in sequentibus dicitur. Et hic est ultimus creandi modus. Sunt enim praedicti sex modi condendi sive creandi res, ultra quos nec est nec esse potest alius sive novus creationis modus. Unde Moyses: *Et requievit septimo*² *die*, scilicet ab omni opere suo quod patrarat, vel quod facere disposuerat, i.e. cessavit a novo condendi modo. Praeter hos enim nullus creationis modus esse potest. Quodsi quaedam monstra vel animalia post diluvium et post refluctionem Nili nascentur vel creentur, aliquo praedictorum modorum nascuntur, eo modo scilicet quo terra post aquarum recessum sua produxit animalia. Et quicquid adhuc cotidie nascitur, aliquo praedictorum modorum producitur.

[45] Et haec physica lectio, quam sancti doctores hic notant, licet magis allegoricae et morali lectioni, ut ad populum loquentes homelias facientes intendant. Tres etenim lectiones, scilicet allegorica³, moralis, historialis, in hac sacra scriptura exequendae et observandae sunt. Anagogica, quae est de vita caelestium, ad allegoriam pertinet. Et nos has tres lectiones in littera diligenter exequemur. Sed praedictum ordinem sex dierum secundum tempus idcirco praemisimus quoniam ad intelligentiam litterae necessarium et valde utilem cognoscimus.

[46] Et est diligenter retinendus ordo iste. Si quaeratur de anima an, quando angeli creati sunt, creata fuerit, dicimus quod angeli primo temporis momento creati sunt, non sub tempore. Anima vero sub tempore creata est, quando homo creatus est. Quod Martianus Mineus Felix Capella, inter philosophos magnus, in libro *De Nuptiis Mercurii et Philologiae*⁴ notavit eo loco ubi Mercurium Psychen, Entelechia ac Solis filiam, in conjugem postulasse commemorat. Subsignans namque causam cur suo illa digna conjugio videretur, dicit deos in *natali die Psyche ad convivium corrogatos* multa dona virgini contulisse, inter quos et Jovem *diadema aureum capiti ejus imposuisse quod ipse honoratiori filiae suae, Aeternitati, detraxerat*. In quo nimirum figmento veram de creatione animae sententiam involvit philosophus. *Psyche* enim Graece, anima dicitur Latine. Unde Prudentius librum quem de pugna animae cum vitiis composuit, librum *Psychomachiae* intitulavit. *Machia* namque

¹ Cf. *Summa sent.* III, 1; P. L., 176, 89C. WILLIAM OF CONCHES, *De Philosophia mundi* I, 22; P. L., 172, 55C. In *Tim. Platonis*; ed. PARENT, p. 161. ² sexto Ms. ³ allegoria Ms. ⁴ *De Nupt. Merc.* I, 6 f.; ed. A. DICK (Leipzig, 1925), p. 7. Cf. ALANUS DE INSULIS, *Theol. reg.*, 1; P. L., 210, 627 B. *Dist. dist. theol.*, P. L., 210, 166 D.