


Year of the Locust



A Soldier's Diary and the Erasure of Palestine's Ottoman Past

SALIM TAMARI

The Erasure of Ottoman Palestine

The past is a foreign country; they do things differently there.

Lesley Poles Hartley, *The Go-Between* (1953)

I fought the English troops at Gallipoli for an Ottoman country that no longer exists—even though I continued living on the same land.

Onbası (Umbashi) Muhammad Ali Awad, Palestinian officer in the Ottoman army from the village of Anabta who fought in Suez and in Gallipoli

Soldiers' diaries, particularly those from World War I, have been a constant reminder of the horrors of war. A large stock of such memoirs have reached us from the ranks of the Allied forces, particularly from British, French, American, and Anzac soldiers, as well as from Austrian and German soldiers fighting for the Central powers.¹ Much less material has been available from the Ottoman side, particularly from the Syrian provinces. This book analyzes the Great War from the perspective of three ordinary soldiers who fought on the Ottoman side, as expressed in the newly found diary of Private Ihsan Turjman and journal of Lieutenant Aref Shehadeh, both of Jerusalem, as well as in the published Turkish diary of Mehmet (Muhammad) Fasih of Mersin. It explores two important ways in which the Great War impacted the Ottoman Empire. First, it examines how the experience of the war transformed the consciousness and the living conditions of the people of the Arab East (Ottoman Syria)—a shift that historians sometimes describe as the onset of Arab modernity. Second, it looks at what Falih Rifki, the Ottoman essayist and modernist, called—with the benefit of hindsight—the “Turkish problem” in Syria: namely the inability of Ottoman constitutional reform to create a multiethnic domain in which the Syria (including Palestine) would become an integral part of the empire. The crucial time for both these transformations was the short but critical six-year period between the constitutional revolution of 1908, with its project for a representative, multi-

ethnic state, and the collapse of this project under the dictatorial regime of Cemal Pasha.

While the events discussed in the diary in the second part of this book center in the city of Jerusalem and show the war's impact on the urban population, they also had a significant impact on the region as a whole. Jerusalem, we have to remember, was the administrative and political center of a huge Ottoman province, the Mutasarflık of al Quds al Sharif, which comprised more than half of what became Mandate Palestine. Its *ashraf* and notables were a critical elite with a major influence on Ottoman policy in Istanbul as well as in Jaffa, Hebron, and other regional centers.² The devastation felt by the city during the war—food shortages, disease, pauperization, and mass deportation—was repeated throughout the region in various degrees. The city was the crucible in which the breakdown in the normative system, and the subsequent rupture with the region's Ottoman past, was first experienced; from there, the turmoil engulfed the rest of the country.

The hero of our story is Ihsan Hasan Turjman (1893–1917), a common soldier in the Ottoman military headquarters in Jerusalem. His life was short and uneventful—he served as a clerk in the Manzil (Commissariat) and briefly as a foot soldier in Nablus and Hebron—but his observations on the impact of military events on his relationship to his city and his nation are without parallel. The power of wartime diaries lies in their exposure of the texture of daily life, long buried in the political rhetoric of nationalist discourse, and in their restoration of a world that has been hidden by subsequent denigration of the Ottoman past—the life of communitarian alleys, obliterated neighborhoods, heated political debates projecting possibilities that no longer exist, and the voices of street actors silenced by elite memoirs:

soldiers, peddlers, prostitutes, and vagabonds. By the third year of the war, the diaries of such ordinary soldiers project a desperate search for *normalcy* in daily life—a normalcy that was experienced in prewar Ottoman Palestine but seemed to elude its citizens for the next hundred years.

The Great War brought about a radical break with the Ottoman past in the whole Arab East, not only in the established constitutional regime but also in the system of governance, local administration, and identity politics. In the popular memory of peasants and city folk alike, 1915 was the Year of the Locust (*'am al Jarad*). Even four generations later, the locust invasion continues to evoke the combined memory of natural disasters and the manmade devastation of war. These events erased four centuries of a rich and complex Ottoman patrimony in which popular narratives of war and nationalist ideology colluded. An anti-Ottoman rewriting of history took place simultaneously, and in the same abrupt manner, both on the Turkish side (in the guise of modernizing the state and making it geographically manageable) and on the Arab side (in the sustained annals of nationalist historiography). The erasure replaced four centuries of relative peace and dynamic activity, the Ottoman era, with what was known in Arabic discourse as “the days of the Turks”: four miserable years of tyranny symbolized by the military dictatorship of Ahmad Cemal Pasha in Syria, *seferberlik* (forced conscription and exile), and the collective hanging of Arab patriots in Beirut’s Burj Square on August 15, 1916.

This book deals with the totalizing and transformative nature of the Great War. The war was *totalizing* not only in the manner in which it molded soldiers’ work and living habits but also in its impact on the daily lives of civilians, creating an atmosphere of continued panic and uncertainty and disrupting daily patterns



Figure 1. Dead Ottoman soldier holding a hand grenade, Sheikh Jarrah, Jerusalem, December 1917. Courtesy Library of Congress, Eric Matson Collection.

of behavior. This anxiety often took the form of persistent concern about food, clothing, and the availability of essential commodities such as kerosene and tobacco, as well as fear of arbitrary army actions (arrest, transfer of populations, and conscription of older people as the war progressed). This period also saw the first systematic censorship of the press and of people's private mail.

In a related process, the Great War had transformative effects on social norms. In the absence of adult male household members—who either were conscripted or perished at the front—many families suffered extreme poverty, famine, and disease. People were driven to drastic measures that undermined traditional normative behavior. Begging, theft, and prostitution became daily features in the streets of Jerusalem. The war ultimately helped redefine the nature of the state and its relationship to its subjects. In Palestine the war was a watershed that separated the country from its Syrian expanses and brought British colonial rule, creating new borders, new citizenship, and new forms of national consciousness.

The war also had an unanticipated emancipatory impact on society. This aspect is not well discussed in war literature, which stresses rather its devastation, dehumanization, and disruption of normality. Yet in many respects it was precisely the instruments of brutalization and destruction—and particularly the disruption of normalcy—that opened up new social horizons. For example, the socialist theoretician Anton Pannekoek has argued that World War I played a crucial role in shedding illusions about nationalism and opening possibilities for class solidarities across national boundaries.³ In the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, Engels made a similar analysis of the impact of a future “total war” in which barbarism would give rise to a new civilization.⁴ In the same vein, the move-

ment of large numbers of young males from rural areas to army camps created a network of training grounds for former peasants in literacy and manual skills that laid the foundation for mass movements and radical reform. In Palestine and the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman regime, the war had the opposite effect on nationalism and national boundaries. It decisively undermined progress toward a multinational, multiethnic state and gave rise to narrow and exclusivist nationalist ideologies and provincial affinities. But as in Europe it brought masses of people into greater contact with their national communities and enabled the wider introduction of literacy, as well as the expansion of transport networks and greater electrification in urban society—a process that had already been set in motion by the Ottoman reforms of the 1850s but now accelerated several fold.

The presence of army camps near major towns catalyzed many of these changes. Khalid Fahmy has examined the conflictual modernity brought about by Muhammad Ali's army on nineteenth-century Egypt.⁵ This process of massive military socialization came to Palestine several decades later, especially after the conscription act of 1914. The first segments of the population to experience the impact of this mobilization were peasants and small-town conscripts. In the Arab East, as in mid-nineteenth-century Egypt, local society underwent changes that altered the rural landscape and redefined its relationship to the city. In his major study of the criminal underworld in World War I Alexandria, *The Men of Raya and Sekina*, Salah Issa examines the world created by the labor battalions—a sort of conscript peasant labor force created by the British administration, the exact equivalent of the Ottoman *Tawabeer al 'amaleb* (labor battalions; *amele taburları* in Turkish) described in Ihsan Turjman's diary of his war years in Palestine.⁶

These conscript “volunteer labor battalions”—essentially compulsory work gangs—were crucial instruments in building projects, assigned to build roads, railroad tracks, army encampments, and military installations. The misery of these conscripts, often sent to die in the distant expanses of Anatolia or in Gallipoli or the Sinai desert, was tempered by a salutary side: they were offered free food, lodging, and (sometimes) relocation to the big cities of the empire. These forced “volunteers” had almost no option but to join the army. The alternative was often death by starvation. Moreover, the conscripts, isolated in their camp life, developed a critical distance from the normative ethics of their original communities when they moved to the margins of major cities like Alexandria and Cairo.

Since one of their major tasks was to remove the dead and the injured from the battlefield, they became used to the sight of blood and war casualties. They became immune to death, and the mass carnage of war. The ethical norms of civilian life, and the communal boundaries of behaviour from which they had originally come, no longer restrained them in an atmosphere in which killing the enemy became a primary target.⁷

The conscripts also became used to new patterns of consumption and behavior, which created a further rupture from their earlier habitat:

They became attuned to life in the big city, in which they created the illusion that it was their last port of migration; one that would realize their dream of a more hopeful life than the life of village drudgery they came from. . . . They became used to a cycle of disciplined work, and experienced the luxury of three meals a day, of consuming meat, and buqsumat (army biscuits) and jam—and of periodic changing of their clothes with clean attire. War gave them the opportunity to meet men from other regions which they had

only heard about, and to travel in open markets and city boulevards which they had not dreamt of seeing before.⁸

Above all, these experiences of war made it difficult for these conscripts to go back to their villages and towns, and made them shed what Issa calls “the virtue of contentment” typical among Turkish and Arab peasants. Upon their release, this “loss of contentment,” among other things, created the social background for the criminal underworld that haunted Alexandria and other port cities of the Mediterranean in the postwar period.

In Palestine the war transformed the country into one major construction site. The Syrian and Palestinian labor battalions (*Tawabeer al 'amaleb*) were mobilized by the Ottoman Corps of Army Engineers to substantially modernize the communication and transportation system.⁹ Many features of Palestine’s modernity that have been attributed to the British colonial administration seem to have been initiated by the Ottomans in this period. In the first modern history of Palestine in the new century (published in 1920), Khalil Totah and Omar Salih Barghouti discussed the major changes brought about by the technological exigencies of war. Water wells were drilled all over the country and linked through pipes to the major urban centers. Railroads linked the northern part of the country to the southern front; a network of telephones and telegraph lines connected the country to the outside world. Post offices, which originated in consular European services, were unified and replaced by the Ottoman postal services; roads were expanded to allow the passage of military traffic and mechanized cars (automobiles and buses).¹⁰ Public hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies were introduced in all provinces to combat the malaria, cholera, and typhus epidemics during the war. urban poor. The labor battalions that built this infrastructure—recruited from released prisoners, village

dwellers (chosen by lottery), and the urban poor—were different from the conscripts in the army (*nizamiyyeh*), who undertook the brunt of the fighting on the front and from whose ranks emerged the two diaries I discuss below.¹¹

Nevertheless, the emancipatory features of war affected both the regulars and the “volunteers” (because the latter often belonged to minority groups, the Ottomans deemed them unreliable for the front). They both experienced army discipline in military camps, were uprooted from their traditional communities, and traveled throughout the empire for the first time; and both came in contact with “ethnic others” in the imperial army: Turks, Kurds, Syrians, Albanians, and Bulgarians, as well as Austrian and German officers from the European Allies.

The war period also witnessed substantial transformations of lifestyles and work habits. Pocket watches were now worn by the urban population and regulated the beginning and end of work days. Men increasingly met in coffeehouses rather than in each other’s homes. An increasing number of middle-class women removed their veils, joined the workforce, and participated in the emerging secular public culture. In Jerusalem and Jaffa (as in Beirut, Aleppo, and Damascus) nightclubs and bordellos became available to members of the armed forces under the regulation of the state.¹² In their history of turn-of-the-century Palestine, Totah and Barghouti observe the beneficial interaction between the civilians and the military, and the impact of travel to Beirut, Damascus, and Aleppo on people from small towns. But they also lament the decline of the old moral order when people were exposed to the “degenerate” influences of army life:

During the war we witnessed the spread of social diseases among city folks, and we thought that this was a national product [of the war]. But when the German and Austrian soldiers arrived we found

that they were worse [than us]. We attributed their behaviour to their contacts with the Turks. And when the British army arrived, we found that they were even more degenerate, for there is no vice and immodesty that is beyond them. We concluded that war is the source of this moral corruption, especially since the city population, and especially those who live in the vicinity of army camps were much more degenerate than those who lived in villages and towns away from military centres.¹³

Yet despite the writers' judgmental tone, they had been ambivalent about the impact of war on Palestine's destiny. They believed that war brought some degree of progress, discipline, and certainly nationalism to the Arab East. Their fears stemmed as much from uncertainty about the new secular modernity as from unease about the unknown future of Palestine after the loss of the Ottoman motherland.

In the annals of World War I much rethinking about the evolution of Arab and Turkish nationalism is under way. Among Arab historians, this has mainly taken the form of rectifying the nationalist historiography of scholars like Khaldun Sati Husari.¹⁴ On the Turkish side, scholars are also reexamining the idea of an Arab "betrayal" of the Ottomans during the Arab Revolt of 1916–18. Historian Gurcel Goncu noted recently that Arab recruits constituted about three hundred thousand soldiers, a third of the Ottoman forces in 1914—far more than the number of soldiers who followed the banner of the Arab Revolt.¹⁵ In the 2004 ceremonies marking the eighty-eighth anniversary of the Ottoman victory at Gallipoli, the participation of individual soldiers from countries such as New Zealand, Australia, and other Western nations was duly noted, but not the huge [non]presence of soldiers from the Arab provinces, all of whom were subsumed under the Ottoman banner.

Australian historian Bill Sellers noted that Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) owed his defeat of Allied attacks largely to the fighting stamina of his Arab recruits. “Two-thirds of the troops who made up his 19th Division . . . who faced the first wave of the Allied invasion were Syrian Arabs [soldiers from Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Palestine], comprising the 72nd and 77th regiments of the Ottoman army.”¹⁶ Of the eighty-seven thousand troops who died defending Gallipoli and the Dardanelles Straits, many were Arabs. Yet these victories are portrayed today as Turkish, not Ottoman, victories. This pattern is equally true for the battles of al ‘Arish, Suez, Gaza, Megiddo, and Kut al Amara, where native soldiers (Iraqi, Hijazi, Palestinian, and Syrian recruits) were a large component of the Ottoman troops. Below I examine the diaries of three World War I soldiers whose lives were irrevocably transformed by the war: Mehmet (Muhammad) Fasih, of Mersin; Ihsan Turjman, of Jerusalem; and Aref Shehadeh, also of Jerusalem.

WAR DIARIES:
MERSIN, JERUSALEM, AND SIBERIA

Our three soldier-diarists came from distant sides of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire and were unknown to each other, yet the diverse trajectories of their lives, as soldiers in the sultan’s army, encapsulate the three major ways in which the Great War transformed the lives of its citizens: through immersion in republican Turkish nationalism (Aref Shehadeh, who was held in a Siberian prison camp for the bulk of the war), a turn to Arab separatism (Second Lieutenant Mehmet Fasih), or a renewed embrace of local urban identity (Private Turjman). In keeping a daily record of their war experiences, the soldiers

preserved for posterity a vivid narrative of the great divide that separated the communitarian, multiethnic, imperial domain of the end of the nineteenth century from the nationalist era of the post–World War I period. The three men, by coincidence, were born around 1893, and all were conscripted between July and November 1914—after the declaration of *seferberlik*, the general mobilization that brought Turkey into the war with Germany and the Central powers against the Allied forces.¹⁷ They all came from middle or mercantile classes. Fasih’s father was a customs clerk, while the elder Turjman was an old city merchant from a landed family that had lost the bulk of its wealth. The elder Aref was also a shopkeeper from Jerusalem.¹⁸ To find three ordinary soldiers in the imperial army writing daily diaries is remarkable for this period of mass illiteracy. For these diaries to have survived and come to light almost a century after the event is also exceptional, for even among the elite literati, very few ventured to record their observations, and of those, fewer still had their records become available to the public. The narratives of Shehadeh, Fasih, and Turjman are particularly valuable in that they record the impact of the war on their society, document their personal transformations, and describe the trauma the war produced in their officers and comrades.

Unlike Turjman, who spent the war years “playing with my moustache” and using all his skills and family connections to evade being sent to the southern front in Suez, Muhammad Fasih was a decorated soldier who fought courageously in Gallipoli—and later in Gaza and Beersheba. He had little hesitation in sacrificing his life for the sultan and his Ottoman homeland. Significantly, the two men’s diaries show that the Great War, at least in its early phases, was able to command considerable loyalty from both its Turkish and Arab citizens for a common future. The

contrasting lives of the two soldiers are intriguing in that they show the complex ethnic identities that colored their lives. Turjman came from an Arabized family, possibly of Turkish descent, which settled in Palestine, while the ethnic identity of Fasih is more difficult to discern. According to Murat Çulcu, his father came from a clan that originally settled in the Erguban country of Malayta and later migrated to Mersin, a mixed city of Arabs and Turks in the Syrian province of Iskenderun. His mother, Şefika Hanım, was from the Gedikoğlu family.¹⁹ Ottoman historian Irvin Schick believes, based on Fasih's family's names, that he was Kurdish, or at least half-Kurdish.²⁰ But the linguistically mixed environment of Mersin when Fasih grew up, and the substantive use of Arabic vocabulary in his diary, indicate that he was familiar with Arabic. And even though he wrote in Ottoman Turkish, his text is full of Arabic usages, which gave considerable difficulty to his Turkish editor.²¹ In the one episode of his diaries when he wanted to cheer his comrades trapped in the trenches of Gallipoli, he and a fellow Mersini soldier, Agati, sing Damascene songs in Arabic.²² Most likely (given his name), Fasih's father was an Arab and his mother was a Turk, since he moved to Istanbul with her when his father died. In 1934 Fasih was compelled to Turkify his name into Mehmet Kayabali to comply with the new republican regulation that required citizens to adopt Turkish last names.²³ In any case, the ambivalence of Fasih's ethnic background and of Turjman's Jerusalem identity are markers of inclusive Ottoman affinities in which the borders of Arab and Turkish ethnicities were not clearly defined.

Fasih and Turjman, although both in their early twenties, could not have been further apart in character. Fasih was highly disciplined and completely devoted to the Ottoman war effort. He had internalized the ranking system of the army and saw

himself as a career soldier whose ambition was to move ahead in the hierarchy. For his devotion he was decorated and promoted, ultimately reaching the rank of brigadier general. To him, martyrdom in combat was both acceptable and necessary, but also traumatizing. His eulogy for his friend Nuri is the most moving passage in his diary:

[Friday, November 5, 1915]

I bury Nuri. It was God's will that I would be the one to bury his remains. Who knows who else I will be burying? After the last shovel of earth, I conduct the religious rites. As I recite al Fatiha, with all the compassion, conviction and eloquence I can muster, I again find it most difficult to control myself. Warm tears stream down my cheeks. As everything must, this also ends. . . . But then another voice insists that neither Nuri, nor all those who preceded him are truly dead, never to see again. It says, "They are temporarily dead. They will come back to life." In that olive grove lie Sha-keeb, Izzat, Rashad, Munib (Şekib, İzzet, Reşad, Münib) and many other comrades.²⁴

Four days later, on November 9, Fasih told his battalion commander that he was prepared to become the regiment's *feda'i* to carry a sacrificial commando operation.²⁵ His commander restrained his zeal.

Martyrdom, by contrast, was the last thing on Ihsan's mind. His main objective was to survive the war in order to marry his sweetheart, Thurayya. Turjman was easygoing and nonchalant, and he served in the army out of compulsion. He continuously questioned the political objectives of the war and celebrated the defeat of his own leaders and their German allies. Nevertheless, both he and Fasih found solace in the camaraderie of the army and were distressed when members of their battalions (or in the case of Turjman, his fellow soldiers) were injured or killed.

Their social life was mainly defined by the lives of their comrades and officers.

Shehadeh, in contrast, found his vocation in a journalism career, which he pursued in Istanbul while still a student. Having an eye on a career in the civil service—which he began as a trainee in the foreign ministry—he entered an experimental period before the war that defined what his relationship would be to the governing authority in Jordan and Palestine after the war.

Neither Fasih's religiosity nor his acceptance of army discipline prevented him from criticizing the brutality inflicted by officers on subordinates. In one diary entry he expressed his rage at an officer who was whipping a sick soldier to move on:

This incident, and many others of the kind, demonstrates that, from the lowest to the highest, many are those who fail to appreciate the true value of our ordinary soldier. He is the backbone of the army. He is the one who does all the work. No army can do without him. Regardless of what officer you put at his head, be he German or otherwise, regardless of whether his uniform is khaki or grey, one must know how to deal with his soul, his spirit.²⁶

But such moments of reflection are exceptional in Fasih's writing. The thrust of his diary was to keep a record of military operations and his role in them. His writing is precise, matter of fact, and telegraphic in style. Turjman, by contrast, is mainly reflective, discursive, and meandering. He appears to seek in his diary an intimate outlet for his forbidden private thoughts, political and personal. Since Fasih's essay has already been published in Turkish and English, and Shehadeh's diary is still not available in complete form, I focus here on Turjman's manuscript, using the Shehadeh and Fasih diaries, as well as the published memoirs of Cemal Pasha's private secretary, Lieutenant Falih Rifki, to provide the necessary historical context.

CHRONICLE OF A DISAPPEARANCE

Ihsan's diary was one of the first casualties of war. It disappeared after his sudden death, just before the end of the war, only to surface almost a century later in a most unusual place. Apparently his parents and his siblings were not aware of its existence, so they did not notice its absence. He must have hidden it for safekeeping with an acquaintance, possibly with Hasan Khalidi, his cousin and closest confidant. During the mid-1920s, the Turjman, like many middle-class Jerusalemites during the Mandate years, moved out of the old city to a new house in the Musrara neighborhood, near Prophets Street. The area became known as *bayy al Turjman*, because the family had inherited a substantial piece of land in that area (alluded to in the diary, when Ihsan notes that the municipality sequestered part of the family's property to build a connecting road). The family sold one *dunum* (one thousand square meters, or approximately a quarter acre) of the property to architect Andoni Baramki, who built a two-story family dwelling on it. During the war of 1948 the area came under heavy bombardment since it was at the seam of the fighting between the Haganah and the Arab Legion. After the armistice the area was deserted and became a no-man's-land. For two decades the Mandelbaum Gate, in *bayy al Turjman*, was the only entry point connecting the Jewish part of the city to the Arab one, under U.N. supervision. When Israel occupied the eastern part of the city in 1967, it annexed the whole area to the western part of the city and eventually—in 1999—built the Turjman House: Museum of the Seam in the bullet-ridden Baramki building. The building was renamed the Turjman Post, an oblique allusion to its original owners, and both the Baramkis and the Turjmans attempted for many years, in vain, to reclaim

their confiscated property through Israeli courts.²⁷ The diary itself, lost since 1917, resurfaced in the 1970s in the Abandoned Arab Property section of the Hebrew University library.²⁸

When the diary was first discovered, its author was unknown. The handwritten name on the diary, “Muhammad Salih,” was a false lead and did not indicate the true name of the author. The only published reference to this diary appeared in Adel Mana’'s *History of Palestine at the Ottoman Era (1700–1918)*, published in 1999.²⁹ In discussing Cemal Pasha’s campaign against deserting soldiers during World War I, he refers to a diary by a Jerusalem soldier named Muhammad Adil Salih who was stationed in Jerusalem and who narrated “the suffering of soldiers during the war.” Another scholar who used the manuscript, Abigail Jacobson, also refers to the author as Muhammad Salih.³⁰ A 1949 catalogue in the National Library contains a list of West Jerusalem Arab households from which property and papers were appropriated by the Haganah. The following line appeared in the list: Adel Hassan Turjmans—St. Paul St.³¹ St. Paul was the street in Musrara to which the Turjmans moved in the early 1920s from the old city, and Adel was the youngest of Hasan Bey’s sons. Thus, the National Library became the silent depository of Ihsan’s war diary by virtue of military conquest.

Why the manuscript was listed under the name of Muhammad Adel Salih is not clear. Salih was the legal name of the Turjmans, and Adel was Hasan Bey’s son and Ihsan’s youngest brother, so it is possible that the papers were taken from the family house in 1948. When I acquired a photocopy of the diary in 2005, the family was not aware of its existence. Moreover, nothing on the cover indicates the real name of the author. The only direct clue to his identity was the appearance of the name Ihsan five or six times in passages in which family members address the writer. Luckily I

found another diary, that of Khalil Sakakini, Ihsan's teacher and friend, then also unpublished, which included entries for 1915 and 1916. I was able to trace four instances in which entries in the two diaries corresponded. Of these four entries *only one*—for Sunday, March 31, 1915—recorded a visit by Turjman to Sakakini. In it the diarist discusses a visit to his former teacher in which the subject of Sakakini's impending conscription dominated the evening. The writer offers to have his family intervene with the mayor to help him pay the exemption fee (*badal*) of 50 Ottoman pounds in lieu of military service.³² Sakakini's March 31 entry makes the following observation: "I must register here my gratitude to my friend Hussein Effendi Salim Husseini, the mayor, for he offered to pay 22 Ottoman liras to pay half of my *badal*. I was also told that his niece, the daughter of Zaki Dawoodi offered to arrange for the *badal* in conversation with my sister Milia. Ihsan Turjman informed me that his family are very worried about me, considering me one of their members, when they heard that I am to be sent as a soldier to Beisan."³³ With this entry the name of the author was finally revealed.

An enigmatic feature of Ihsan's diary is the use of a cryptogram, which he called *shifra*, a secret numerical code in accordance with Ottoman military encryption practices, to express his inner thoughts. This occurs in two sections of the diary. The first one deals with his relationship to Thurayya, his woman friend, where the purpose was obviously to protect her identity and to hide his longing for her. In the second section the purpose of the coded entries is less clear. Initially the reader might think that he sought to hide his association with opposition groups within the army, but this explanation does not make sense given the ferocity of his attacks on Cemal and Enver Pashas in plain language. Upon closer examination we discover an association

between the coded messages and references to his dispute with his father. The frequency of their occurrence increases when Ihsan recounts the scandalous theft of the family jewelry during the 'Turjman's' temporary move outside the city walls in the autumn of 1916. The culprits were caught when they tried to sell the jewelry (mostly belonging to his two aunts), and they turned out to be his cousins from the Abul Su'ud family. The incident was particularly traumatic for Ihsan since he had to give testimony against his cousins to the police interrogator, and then again in a public court hearing. He tried unsuccessfully to persuade his father to drop the case, but his father persisted. At this point, Ihsan began to use the numerically coded messages to discuss his controversy with his father. The use of cryptograms here is fascinating since an educated person like Turjman had the option of using another literary code known as *bisab al jummal*, often used by poets to convert secret words into numbers, but he decided to create his own numerical system to provide added caution against discovery, given that the literary code was probably easy to breach. The writer kept a coded key to his cryptogram, which he deposited with his cousin for safekeeping.

IN THE SERVICE OF RUŞEN BEY

Ihsan Salih Turjman, who grew up in the old city, was conscripted into the Ottoman army in November 1914, when he was twenty-three years old. He was first stationed in Dhahriyyeh in the Hebron district and then moved to Nablus, before drawing on his family's connections to acquire a post in the Jerusalem central military command, where he could commute to work from his home near Bab al Silsilah, inside the Haram (al Aqsa Mosque) area. Early in 1915 he began to keep a daily diary



Figure 2. Ihsan Turjman, private, in Ottoman army uniform, Jerusalem, 1915. Courtesy Turjman family.

of his intimate thoughts and activities as a way of venting his frustration at the drudgery of military life.³⁴ In doing so he was emulating his teacher and mentor Khalil Effendi Sakakini at al-Dusturiyya College, who had been keeping a diary since 1906 and often read excerpts to his inner circle.

The Turjmans, officially known as the Salih family in court records, were an established clerical family who served for several centuries in the Ottoman civil service and in the Islamic court of Jerusalem as translators—hence their name.³⁵ One of Ihsan's great-grandfathers was Qasim Bey Turjman, in whose name a *sabeel* (public water fountain) was endowed near al-Haram area (opposite Bab al Silsilah) in 1701. He owned an open court market in Bab al Amud and acquired substantial properties in the old city.³⁶ Another ancestor, Ahmad Bey Turjman, lived in Haret al Sharaf, near what became the Jewish Quarter, and owned a large plaza in the area known as Sahit Ahmad Bey Turjman.³⁷ Both were prominent translators in the court.

Ihsan's father, Hasan Bey Salih, inherited much of this property, but most of it was tied up in public endowments, or leased land. The family lived inside the Haram at the entrance of Bab al Silsilah in a three-story house that overlooked the Haram plaza from the east and the Wailing Wall and the Magharbeh Quarter from the south. Hasan Bey lived for two decades in a childless marriage until his first wife prevailed on him (according to contemporary stories) to marry his second wife, Nabiha Khalili—descended from Sheikh Ali Khalili, a prominent Jerusalemite and one of the first city dwellers to build a mansion outside the city walls in al Baq'a neighborhood. Nabiha bore him six children (three boys and three girls), of whom Ihsan was the eldest.³⁸ But Hasan remained faithful to his first wife, Safiyyah, and continued to live with her after his second marriage, in a separate apartment in the third floor of their home, until she died during the first war.

Ihsan grew up with Safiyyah as his second mother. He studied in Qur'anic schools by the Haram and then went to a local *nizamiyyeh* school for his primary education. After 1909 he joined Khalil Sakakini's Dusturiyya College, which offered an Arab secular curriculum. To the end of his life Ihsan considered Sakakini his mentor and confidant, as is evident from his diary.

When the general mobilization was announced by the Ottoman government in November 1914, Ihsan was conscripted and sent to central Palestine. Just before he was to be sent to the Suez front in Sinai, he was transferred to Jerusalem's military headquarters to serve under the commander Ali Ruşen Bey.

Ruşen Bey was an Albanian officer whose administrative skills earned him a promotion to *qa'immaqam* (deputy governor), which put him in charge of army logistics in the southern front. His headquarters, the Commissariat, were in the sequestered

Notre Dame building opposite Jerusalem's New Gate.³⁹ In this position he became the highest military officer in Ottoman Palestine, subject only to Cemal Pasha, commander of the Fourth Army. The latter was based in Damascus during the war and visited Jerusalem periodically.

Ali Ruşen's official title was residence inspector (*mufattish manzil*), and his domain included the mobilization and training of soldiers for military and auxiliary tasks and the overall administration of army logistics—feeding, munitions, and the setting up of army camps in southern Palestine.⁴⁰ Omar Salih attributes the initial success of the Ottomans on the Egyptian front to the organizational skills of Ruşen Bey.⁴¹ Ali Ruşen remained in Jerusalem to the very end of the war, where he commanded a battalion and fought tenaciously—according to an eyewitness account—against Allenby's advancing army in Nebi Samuel.⁴² He was last seen leading his battalion in retreat to the village of Gib. Aside from local contemporary sources, such as the Barghouti and Jawhariyyeh memoirs, very few records provide information about the fate of Ali Ruşen Bey. Ottoman military archives contain four telegrams sent in code from the governor of Sivas, Muhyi ed-Din, that mention Ruşen Bey in reports of military maneuvers involving Mustafa Kemal, all dated Huzeiran 1335 (June 1919), so he must have still been active in Anatolia toward the end of the war.⁴³

Ihsan served as a petty clerk in Ruşen's headquarters. His main tasks, aside from "when I was just sitting there playing with my moustache," were to review petitions for exemption from service and to file paperwork within the Ottoman military bureaucracy. In that capacity he was privy to political discussions among Turkish, Albanian, and Syrian officers in Palestine—as well as the occasional German visiting officers—and

could observe the deteriorating mood of the rank and file. His diary, written daily by candlelight during the early war years, reflects the cosmology of a common soldier and a plebian citizen of the city at a critical period of Palestine's history, when of four centuries of Ottoman rule were ending and an unknown future lay ahead, as the British army advanced on Gaza and Beersheba from the south and bombarded Jaffa and Haifa from the sea.

Almost every chronicle that we have inherited from the period was authored by a political leader (Awni Abdul Hadi, Muhammad Izzat Darwazeh, and Rustum Haydar), a military commander (Fawzi Quwakgi), or an intellectual-activist (Sakakini, Najati Sidqi). Ihsan's diary is unique in providing the detailed observations of a foot soldier, written with intimacy and simple but keen reflections on an encircled city. As such it is one of the few surviving subaltern chronicles of the Ottoman period. Because Ihsan commuted daily to work from his family house in the old city, he lived in two worlds—the military circles of the Ottoman officer corps and the tribulations of the urban street in times of war. His diary contains a wealth of observation on daily life in Jerusalem in 1915 and 1916, the reactions of the urban poor and artisans to deprivation, and the disasters that accompanied the locust attacks and the army confiscation of property, means of transport, and work animals. But the diary is also full of intimate social details about the soldier's private life: his love affair with a neighboring woman, his daily visits to his teacher and mentor, his disgust at the debaucheries of his commanding officers, his constant (and failed) attempts to evade army service, the role of rumors in the life of the city, his detective work to uncover the identity of the thief that robbed his house and his shame at finding out that his cousins were responsible, his rift with his father and family on this subject, and the devastation caused by chol-

era, famine, locust attacks, and the wholesale forced movement of populations. Ihsan survived all of these disasters only to be fatally shot by an Ottoman officer of the withdrawing Ottoman army in 1917. He never saw his twenty-fifth birthday.⁴⁴

Ihsan's world was permeated by war and by the impending catastrophe: his disrupted studies, scenes of disease and hunger in the streets, the absence of tobacco and other goods from stores, and his declining prospects for marriage to his beloved as his fortunes and his family income began to dissipate. Ihsan's despair seems to echo William Pfaff's belief that "the moral function of war [has been] to recall humans to the reality at the core of existence: the violence that is part of our nature and is responsible for the fact that human history is a chronicle of tragedies."⁴⁵

THE DECENTERING OF PALESTINE: THE EGYPTIAN OPTION

The Turjman diary opens with a self-interrogation about the destiny of the Holy Land after the war. "We more or less agreed that the days of the [Ottoman] state are numbered, and that its dismemberment is imminent. But what will be the fate of Palestine?" When he wrote this entry on March 28, 1915, the fate of the empire was the burning issue of debate among his fellow soldiers, his officers, his family, and the members of his social circle whom he met daily in the municipal park and in the cafés inside Jaffa Gate.

His answer reflects the mood of the street at that moment, but it is one that runs contrary to conventional wisdom about the popular currents prevailing in Palestine at the turn of the century. Not Syria—*bilad al Sham*—was the destiny for Palestine, but Egypt.

We all saw two possibilities: independence or annexation to Egypt. The last possibility is more likely since only the English are likely to possess this country, and England is unlikely to give full sovereignty to Palestine but is more liable to annex it to Egypt and create a single dominion ruled by the khedive of Egypt. Egypt is our neighbor, and since both countries contain a majority of Muslims, it makes sense to annex it and crown the viceroy of Egypt as king of Palestine and the Hijaz.⁴⁶

What is striking about this observation is not its contemplation of the possibility of Palestine's independence in the post-Ottoman settlement, but the fact that it does not reflect, even as an alternative, the presumed consensus of the nationalist movement in that period—that Palestine would be annexed as the southern Syrian province in an autonomous Arab East. This perceived merger (or annexation) when the Hashemite leadership was on the eve of announcing the Arab Revolt of 1916 and negotiating an alliance with the Syrian nationalist forces in Damascus.

There is no doubt, however, that the pro-Syrian wing in the Arabist movement in Palestine was quite strong and was represented in the Ottoman Decentralization Party (which wanted autonomy for the Arab region within a reformulated arrangement with Istanbul) as well as in secret secessionist groups such as al Arabiyya al Fatah and al 'ahd group. In central Palestine these tendencies were articulated by political activists like Muhammad Izzat Darwazeh and Awni Abdul Hadi, the future leaders of al Istiqlal Party, which considered Palestine the southern region of an independent Syria.

Turjman's comments suggest an amorphous political atmosphere that opened up several future possibilities for Palestine (and Syria) during World War I. In noting the desire for a merger with Egypt, Turjman was not uttering an isolated political




Figure 3. Palestinian leaders representing various factions after the war, including Awni Abdul Hadi, Haj Amin Husseini, Musa Kazim Pasha Husseini, and Ragheb bey Nashashibi, later mayor of Jerusalem, c. 1926. Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut.

thought. He was reflecting a position that was heatedly debated (although by no means adopted) among soldiers in Jerusalem's central command and among his inner circle of friends. Quite a few intellectuals during the war harbored hopes for the retention of Palestine within a reconstructed (and constitutional) Ottoman regime. Some of these proponents were outright Ottomans and close allies of Cemal Pasha's political line. Most notable among these well-known political figures were Sheikh As'ad Shuqairi from Akka, Mufti Taher Abul Su'ud and Ali Rimawi from Jerusalem, and Sheikh Salim Ya'coubi from Jaffa. Darwazeh describes how the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) mobilized them in September 1915 to go on a publicity tour to Istanbul and Gallipoli, under the guise of supporting the war effort, where

they openly attacked the Arab nationalists for “undermining the unity of the Sultanate and Turkish Arab brotherhood.”⁴⁷ CUP, whose members were commonly known as the Young Turks, was a movement formed at the turn of the nineteenth century by various ethnic groups in the Ottoman Empire in opposition to the oppressive regime of Sultan Abdülhamid II. It became a political party in 1906 and came to power in 1908. The group included a number of pro-Ottoman journalists, including Muhammad Kurd Ali, owner of the widely circulating Damascene newspaper *al-Muqtabis*, to create an atmosphere favorable to the repression of the secessionist movement. In Gallipoli, according to Mehmet Fasih, the group was welcomed by Turkish and Arab fighters alike. On October 21, 1915, Fasih wrote, “17:30 hrs . . . delegation of Syrian literati visits Regimental HQ with a gift of Damascus *baklava* for the officers. Each of us receives a slice.”⁴⁸ According to Darwazeh, however, Cemal Pasha used the support of this group to justify his repression of the Arab nationalist movement, including the hanging of its leaders in Beirut.⁴⁹

Most Ottoman loyalists in this period, however, were not hostile to Arab nationalism. They included a number of people who until recently had had sympathies with the CUP or with the Ottoman Decentralization Party, such as Omar Salih Barghouti, Is‘af Nashashibi, and Khalil Sakakini—all closely associated with Turjman. In this intellectual circle only Adel Jaber, a prominent young lawyer and journalist, continued to identify strongly with the Ottomans for the duration of the war.⁵⁰

A similar debate on the future of Palestine was taking place in the major urban centers of the country. Najib Nassar, editor of *al-Karmil* in Haifa (established in 1908) published a war memoir, *Miflib al Gbassani* (his *nom de plume*), while hiding from Ottoman police, which contains a revealing encounter between Arab offi-

cers in the Ottoman army and local nationalists about the situation in the North.⁵¹ Nassar/Miflih reports that with few exceptions, like Sheikh As'ad Shuqairi of Akka and Prince Shakib Arsalan, from Mount Lebanon, the majority of his companions, both inside and outside the army, are strong advocates of Arab nationalist autonomy, and pro-Ottoman unity. Nassar/Miflih believes and fights for Arab-Turkish amity and reconciliation, seeing this step as essential for the stability of the Ottoman regime. Like many young Arab officers in their circle, Nassar/Miflih and his peers struggle to keep the country out of the war, which they believe would be a disaster for Syria and Palestine. In their view, their enemies are the Germans (who want to divert the Allies to Egypt (Suez) away from the western front); the CUP, which has taken an anti-Arab path under Enver and Cemal's leadership; and Zionism, which under the cover of war, is displacing the country's native population with Eastern European immigrants.

These young officers' debate, in contrast to that in Jerusalem circles, is more sophisticated and more directed at Ottoman policy at the local level. Surprisingly they considered one of the main allies of the Arab dissidents in the early period of the war to be Küçük Cemal Pasha (Mersini), based in Damascus as leader of the Eighth Army, whom Miflih described as "judicious, level-headed, friendly to the Arab nationalists, and largely unaffected by the anti-Arab campaign of Ahmad Cemal."⁵² At one point, Cemal interceded to lift Nassar's name from the blacklist.⁵³ In Nassar's dialogue with Sabih, the young Ottoman officer, the latter argued, "We should have an armed neutrality (*biyad musallab*), so that by the end of the war, when all the allies are exhausted we [the Ottomans] can annul the Capitulations, and ensure our real independence, before the Allies regain their strength."⁵⁴ Miflih/Nassar responded that real indepen-

dence depended on ending anti-Arab Turkish attitudes and on full equality in citizenship: “Only thus can the Ottoman state be strong enough to stand against colonial schemes. A main obstacle to this independence is the Arab hypocrites [whom he calls “Turkified Arabs”] who kowtow to the Turkish rulers and don’t tell them the truth.”⁵⁵ The seeming paradox is the expression of strong Arab nationalist sentiments in conjunction with an insistence, before and during the war, on the integrity and unity of the Ottoman state. Nassar does not mention the possibility of Arab independence (Syrian or Palestinian) from Istanbul or talk about unity with Egypt. He mentions the latter only in reference to German schemes encouraging Arab nationalists to overthrow the pro-British government there.⁵⁶

In Jerusalem, however, the Egyptian option was very much alive. Like several intellectuals in his company, Ihsan, in his diary, makes his claims for a merger with Egypt on two counts: Palestine is too small to be independent, and British interests would not allow it. This sentiment also reflects his recognition of the underlying aims of the Ottoman campaign in the southern front—to instigate a pro-Ottoman popular rebellion in Egypt against the British administration. Agents of Cemal Pasha, commander of the Fourth Army and governor of Syria, were at work in Cairo, Alexandria, and the Suez region instigating the Egyptian street against the British.⁵⁷ The overall objective of the campaign was to disrupt the shipping traffic at the canal and to divert Allied troops from the Dardanelles.⁵⁸ Cemal Pasha had in fact organized Arab and Bulgarian Muslim units in a separate battalion named the Islamic Salvation Army of Egypt (*Halaskâr Mısır Ordu-yı İslâmiyesi*), including Druze units under the leadership of Shakib Arsalan.⁵⁹ In his memoirs, published immediately after the war, the CUP leader makes his intentions explicit:

[During the initial attack on Suez] the Arab fighters, who constituted the bulk of the 25th Battalion performed splendidly, which hardly mitigated my disgust at Sherif Hussein's attempts to plant the seeds of dissension in this united mass of solidarity [between Arabs and Turks]. . . . Every time I heard the lyrics of "The Red Banner Shall Fly over Cairo" which echoed the footsteps of the throngs leading their way in the darkness of the desert, my heart became certain of our victory . . . I invested a great deal of hope in this moment on the support of patriotic Egyptians, whom I had anticipated would revolt as one man encouraged by the [anticipated] fall of Isma'iliyya in the hands of the Ottoman army.⁶⁰

Elsewhere in his memoirs, however, he suggests that the thrust of the Suez campaign was demonstrative and diversionary: "I never seriously imagined that we would cross and seize the Canal, but so thoroughly did I convince HQ and the main units under my command, no one had any notion that this was a demonstration and no one held back for a moment from displaying the utmost self-sacrifice."⁶¹ But this comment can also be taken as a retrospective apologia for his lack of military achievements in the campaign.

The failure of the Suez campaign—in large part due to bad Turkish intelligence about the strength of pro-Ottoman forces in Egypt, underestimation of the fighting capacities of Indian troops under British command, and Arab troops' weak performance in Sinai—unleashed Cemal Pasha's campaign of repression against the Arab nationalist movement in the spring of 1915.⁶²

Turjman's Egypt-centrism was also rooted in the decentering of Palestine's geography in that period. The boundaries of Ottoman Palestine were delineated by the *Mutasarrıflık* of Jerusalem, a relatively recent entity (from 1873) that was administered directly from Istanbul. These boundaries included Jaffa and Sinjil at the northern frontiers and the great expanses of the Sinai des-




Figure 4. Ottoman Palestine as defined by the boundaries of the Mutasarrıflık of al Quds Al Sharif, 1917. Reprinted from R. Tekin and Y Bas, *Osmanlı Atlası* (Istanbul: Ekim, 2001). Courtesy Institute for Jerusalem Studies.

ert to the south.⁶³ Although the recognized boundaries between Egypt and Ottoman Palestine were north of al ‘Arish, the 1917 Ottoman map of Palestine indicated a Governorship of Jerusalem that extended as far as Port Said and the Suez Canal, with the wilderness of Sahra’ al Tayh in Sinai constituting the central focus of the region.⁶⁴ Contributing to this decentering of Palestine was the assumption in the cartography of the period that the Suez Canal marked the separation of Ottoman Africa (Afrika-yı Osmanî) from Ottoman Asia (Asya-yı Osmanî). The maps presented the Sinai Peninsula as a natural, if not administrative, extension of the Mutasarrıflık of Kudüs-i Şerif (Jerusalem).⁶⁵

With the improvement of transportation routes at the turn of the century and with commercial and cultural exchanges between Egypt and Palestine, the Egyptian press became a primary influence on the Jerusalem and Jaffa intelligentsia—much more so than the Beirut or Damascus press. Within Jerusalem intellectual circles, Is'af Nashashibi was particularly known for his Egyptian cultural affinities. He later wrote a polemical essay on the Arabness of Egypt in which he attacked those who favored the separation of Egypt from its Arab environment: “Those who question the Arabness of Egypt and the Egyptian roots of Arabness, are a retrograde burning with anti-Islamic hatred, and poisoned by Western propaganda.”⁶⁶ Sakakini wrote primarily for the Cairene *al Masa'* and *al Muqattam* in this period, and Ihsan's diary shows that he was a regular reader of *al Hilal*, and *al Muqtatif* when they arrived in Jerusalem. With the exception of *al Himara al Qabira* (The Stubborn Donkey) and *Filasteen*—which was suspended in Jaffa most of the war years—all of his reading material came from Cairo.

The possibility of creating an Egyptian-Palestinian condominium, and sometimes an Egyptian-Syrian federation, was at one point widely discussed within Arabist circles, including among those still active in Ottoman political parties, even before the Great War. Salim Salam, a Beirut member of the Ottoman parliament and an important advocate of decentralization, describes in his memoirs a meeting with Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha as early as February 1912 in which the two men discussed the possibility of a Syrian-Egyptian union. He was sent on a mission to intercede with the Egyptian authorities on behalf of the Ottomans to allow armed groups fighting against the Italian occupation forces in Libya to gain safe passage through Egyptian territories.⁶⁷ He mentions that as a result

of the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan War, Syrian nationalists sought to join Egypt under British protection.⁶⁸ Wajih Kawtharani, the Lebanese historian, quotes a secret report by the French consul in Beirut that confirms that Deputy Salam was sent to Egypt, under the guise of soliciting aid from Libyan rebels, to negotiate Syrian unity with Egypt and indicates that the khedive received him with that purpose in mind.⁶⁹

Within three years, however, this mood shifted noticeably. Ottoman retreat and British control of Palestine made the idea of merging with Egypt far-fetched, and the independence of Palestine created fears within the nationalist currents that it would have to face the Zionist movement alone. Palestinians went back to favoring a greater Syria. "The idea of joining Palestine to Syria is spreading powerfully those days," wrote Khalil Sakakini in his diary on January 20, 1919: "People say: Palestine and Syria are two sisters visited together by catastrophes so far, and by a common thirst for freedom and independence. Now they must have the same fate, and under no circumstance should one be amputated from the other. At the same time the notion of 'Palestine for the Palestinians' and full independence is retreating, and you have many people who are against the idea [of independence] altogether."⁷⁰

LIVING IN THREE TIME ZONES:
OTTOMAN/GREGORIAN/HIJRI

The modernity of Ottoman Palestine created a disjointed universe that was most visible in the divided time zones as people made daily transitions from the domestic unit to the public sphere. Army regulations introduced new notions of timekeeping aimed at regimenting soldiers' cycle of work and ensuring

discipline. Mehmet Fasih's diary entries while he was in Galipoli itemized his daily chores by the minute. Here is a typical entry, for November 26, 1915:

22.30 hrs Go to bed. Impossible to sleep. New orders keep pouring in. 57th, 27th, and 25th regiments are to carry out reconnaissance probes.

01.30 hours Written order arrives. Get up. Division orders us to prepare a reconnaissance patrol to be commanded by an officer . . .

02.00 hrs Prepare my report. No incidents. Are awaiting orders. Go back to bed.

03.09 hrs Get up. No orders yet. Men are ready. Officers from Engineers drop in . . . plans abandoned.⁷¹

No such minutiae exist for Turjman, but he does record his activities in fractions of the hour ("lunch 12:20, meeting with Taher Effendi, 4:40; went to bed 11:45"). These categories of time segments were—for Palestine—a novelty that began to gain dominance in World War I. Soldiers internalized them and began to alter the ways in which they marked their tempo in the civilian sphere. In Europe, as well as in Istanbul and Egypt, tower clocks had been introduced to public buildings and public squares in the nineteenth century, but in greater Syria and Palestine, the new methods of keeping time were more recent, the most notable example being the Jaffa Gate clock tower celebrating the anniversary of Sultan Abdülhamid's assumption to the throne (in 1901), which extended army discipline and government departments to the public at large. Gelvin suggests that the Jerusalem public clock represented the intersection between "time and work discipline," exemplifying "the attempt to regulate Jerusalem's labour force and make it submissive to a daily, nine-to-five type of schedule."⁷²

Turjman used three calendar notations (Ottoman/Rumi, Gregorian/Western, and Hijri) and two time zones (Arab and *franji*) in his daily diary entries. The Ottoman notations regulated all financial and military matters, such as paydays, military commands, and regulations. The Gregorian calendar regulated political events and major events of the war—such as dates of battles and of the entry of competing armies—as well as Jerusalem’s relationship to the external world. The Hijri calendar marked the approaching holidays and ceremonial events. Throughout Palestine, farmers used a fourth calendar, the Julian (Eastern Orthodox) calendar, to mark the cycle of agricultural crops—sowing, harvesting, and preparing for the winter provisions. At the time (and even today in large parts of the rural Middle East), Christians and Muslims alike widely believed that the Julian calendar is more attuned to nature’s cycles than the Hijri, Ottoman, or Western calendars. Some city folks, such as Sakakini, used the Julian calendar in their daily lives to mark major events, including the coming of the new year. Ihsan’s world was also regulated by two timing systems. The *franji* system marked working hours in military headquarters and determined rendezvous times with friends and acquaintances. Those times were kept through pocket watches, which were expensive but within the means of ordinary citizens. We know that Ihsan had a pocket watch because he describes an episode in which he kept taking his watch apart until “my idiotic mind ruined the spring mechanism.”

Arabic time divided the day into five spans punctuated by prayer times and regulated fasting periods as well as the end of the working day at sunset. “Arab time” divided the day into twelve hours of sunlight beginning with sunrise and ending in sunset.⁷³ Some clocks, such as the sundial in the Haram area near

the Turjman house, bridged the two timekeeping systems, and Ihsan moved relatively smoothly from one system to another (“I met him at 4 P.M. *franjî*, equivalent to ten o’clock Arabic time,” is an example of the type of double notation he commonly used), just as he worked simultaneously with the three daily calendars. All entries were duly made in Ottoman, Gregorian, and Hijri notations. Occasionally, however, confusion reigns in his entries, such as when he visits his neighbors during the Asha’—and it is not clear whether he is having his supper with them or joining them for evening prayer.

As with the army of Muhammad Ali Pasha a century earlier, army discipline at Notre Dame’s military headquarters inculcated in the young Palestinian conscripts notions of discipline and time awareness that transformed their daily habits. Work shifts, lunch breaks, afternoon breaks, evening shifts, and so on were keenly observed. The military Commissariat at Notre Dame was the first building in Jerusalem to introduce electric power (1915) through its own generators, which created the possibility of a twenty-four-hour working day. In Ihsan’s mind the Commissariat represented modernity, exemplified by army uniforms, electric lighting, and the automobile, while his home near the Haram, where he wrote his memoirs late at night by candlelight, represented tradition.

UNSENTIMENTAL EDUCATION

Ihsan’s world outlook was at once secular, pacifist, and compassionate. One is struck by his cosmopolitan outlook given his traditional family milieu, limited education, and even more limited life experience and young age when he was drafted into the army. We know that his father, Hasan, had insisted that his sons

and daughters receive a Qur'anic education before they went on (mostly) to secular schools.⁷⁴ His natural (i.e., nonideological) pacifism was no doubt a reaction to the carnage of the war and the high death rate from disease and famine during World War I. But his outlook was formed basically through his interaction with several intellectual figures: Omar Salih al Barghouti, Adel Jaber, Musa Alami, Khalil Sakakini, Is'af Nashashibi, and his cousin Hasan Khalidi, who had just received his medical degree from Beirut. Within this group Ihsan, still a young and impressionable soldier, was mainly an observer. To these we must add the towering figure of Rustum Haydar, the deputy director of al-Salahiyya College in Damascus, who visited Jerusalem frequently and who met with Turjman during one of his visits to the home of Sakakini, his teacher at al-Dusturiyya College (established in 1909). Ihsan visited his teacher/mentor at least three or four times a week during the war years, and it was here that he met Haydar. Sakakini gave him the idea of recording his thoughts in a diary, but more significantly, Ihsan absorbed his teacher's critical thinking about nationalism and his progressive views on children's education and the emancipation of women.

The diversity of Turjman's close circle of friends challenges the prevailing assumption that the only place Arabs could acquire a secular and modernist education in the late Ottoman period was the mission schools (such as the Russian seminaries in Nazareth and Beit Jala, the La Salles Brothers in Jaffa and Jerusalem, St Joseph's Schools and the Sisters of Zion, and Bishop Gobat's schools). Sakakini, aided by advocates of the Arab Enlightenment such as Nakhleh Zureik, succeeded in establishing an educational system that challenged the confessional system and attracted hundreds of students from Palestine who chose to avoid the sectarianism of the Christian missionaries.

Al-Dusturiyya College (later known as al-Wataniyya College) was established in 1909 in the spirit of the new Ottoman constitution, basically as a protest against the (Greek) ecclesiastical orthodox hierarchy. Here Ihsan received his basic education, and he continued to associate with al-Dusturiyya graduates and teachers while in the military.

For the military elite, the Imperial War Academy in Istanbul and the regional military colleges in cities like Damascus and Baghdad introduced a select few students to a “national” alternative to the missionary schools. But another, often-overlooked intellectual current was the modernist Ottoman educational system introduced after the revolution of 1908. Most public schools in Jerusalem began to introduce secular curricula along European lines. The most important public school in the city was al Rashidiyya, which graduated leading figures of reform in that period. Reformers such as Sheikh Muhammad Salih were inspired by the Islamic reformism of Jamal Din Afghani and Muhammad Abdo. Sheikh Salih established al Rawda al Faiha’, which took the daring step of converting all history, geography, literature, and religious texts from Turkish to Arabic.⁷⁵

The most important Ottoman college in Palestine in Ihsan’s day was al-Salahiyya, established in 1913 at Cemal Pasha’s initiative on the grounds of St. Anne’s (a crusader church near the Haram area that was confiscated from the French during the war). Selâhaddîn-i Eyyûbî Kulliye-i İslâmiyesi, as it was known in Turkish, was Cemal’s ambitious attempt to train a generation of pro-Ottoman Arab intelligentsia. The college provided twelve years of studies in two phases after primary education and was therefore a university-level institute; its curriculum was a mixture of theological studies and the latest secular disciplines available in that period.⁷⁶ The college was administered by three protégés

of Cemal Pasha: Abdel Aziz Shawish, Shakib Arsalan, and Abdul Qadir Mughrabi, all of whom were early supporters of the Young Turk movement and champions of Ottoman decentralization. But the most important figure in *Salahiyya* was Rustum Haydar (1886–1940), who established the secret Arab society *al Jam'iyya al Arabiyya al Fatat* (Society of Young Arabs) in 1911 with Awni Abdul Hadi and Ahmad Qadri.⁷⁷ Haydar appears prominently in Turjman's diary as a friend of Sakakini and a fierce exponent of Arabism in the Ottoman state. In 1918 he escaped from Damascus with Sakakini to Jabal Druze to join the Arab rebellion under the leadership of Prince Faisal. Two other prominent intellectuals from Turjman's circle of friends were also on the faculty at *al-Salahiyya*: Is'af Nashashibi, who taught Arabic, and Adel Jaber, who taught French and geography. Sakakini also taught at *al-Salahiyya*, when his busy schedule at his own college allowed him.

In his diary Turjman expressed hostility toward both Nashashibi and Jaber for their arrogance and elitism. But he was particularly venomous toward Adel Jaber, whom he accused of being an apologist for Cemal Pasha and, at one point, a secret agent for the government.⁷⁸ In an entry on May 15, 1915, he notes that Jaber was sent to Jaffa on behalf of Ahmad Cemal Pasha, most likely on a recruitment mission for *al-Salahiyya* College. At the end of the entry, he approvingly quotes his cousin Hasan Khalidi's comment that Adel Jaber was "an Ottoman spy."⁷⁹ Jaber himself never disguised his pro-CUP sentiments and defended Ottoman policy in heated debates with Nashashibi, Sakakini, and Musa Alami throughout the war. In his political leanings, he was not alone. This episode reflects the tension building up between the Arab secessionists and the Ottomanists within the Palestinian (and Syrian-Lebanese) intelligentsia. There is no indication that Ihsan's spying accusation against Jaber was based on

fact (however, Adel may secretly have been vying for the attention of Thurayya [Surayya], Ihsan's woman friend). Cemal had a hand in creating this schism in the ranks of Arab political groups, for he sought to foster hostility between what he considered "extreme nationalists" and moderate Arab nationalists.⁸⁰ He saw al-Salahiyya as the institutional base from which he could build a loyalist Arab civil service for the new regime.⁸¹

Another major objective for al-Salahiyya was to create an intellectual base for a pan-Islamic movement under Ottoman sponsorship. According to Martin Strohmeier, Cemal Pasha aimed to train "theologians who would be both open-minded and intellectually equipped to deal with a secular and scientific concepts" in the spirit of Muhammad Abdo.⁸² The latter was greatly admired by Sakakini's circle—which later became known as the party of Vagabonds—but the group had moved beyond Abdo's objectives of Islamic reform to adopt essentially secular and (in a few cases) antireligious perspectives. With British troops getting close to southern Palestine, Cemal Pasha moved the premises of the college, together with the students and teaching staff, to Damascus. Subsequently al-Salahiyya College failed in its objectives for two reasons: it was unable to recruit students from outside the Syrian-Palestinian areas (that is from India and Indonesia), as Cemal had anticipated; and it was too short-lived to develop an independent school of thought. After the move to Damascus, most of the college's staff, including Sakakini and Rustum Haydar, defected and joined the Arab rebellion.

Ihsan's reading while serving under Ruşen Bey was very eclectic. His family had a substantial library at home from which Is'af Nashashibi and Musa Alami would borrow books. Ihsan also added a few volumes during his apprenticeship at al-Dusturiyya College. In the long waiting hours at his desk, he read Zamach-

shari's works and other Arab classics, such as the *History of Arab Civilization* by Muhammad Kurd Ali, who was a chief supporter of al-Salahiyya pan-Islamic program. Ihsan read and admired Qasim Amin's book *Tabrir al Mar'a* (The Liberation of Women, Cairo, 1899). But he also was a heavy consumer of romantic novels—the equivalent of today's pulp fiction. He also read "marriage manuals," such as *Selecting Your Wife* (*Intikhab al zarwja*), *Night of the Wedding* (*Lailat al urs*), and *Our Sexual Life* (*Hayatuna al tanasuliyya*)—mostly by European authors. These were most likely local translations of English and French pamphlets, and Ihsan read them surreptitiously at work for fear of being caught by his father. He notes that his military officers—Turkish, Albanian, and Arab (such as Faris Effendi and Ismail Mani)—rebuked him whenever they caught him reading, mostly out of anti-intellectual motivations rather than concern about his lack of work discipline. At least this is what Turjman claimed. He also read the local press with great enthusiasm. His favorite was *al Himara*, a weekly of political satire that made fun of the leadership of the CUP. The fact that Ihsan had access to this publication suggests that Ottoman censorship during the war years was much more lax than many people have assumed.

THE RUPTURE OF OTTOMAN IDENTITY

With Mehmet Fasih came the loss of Ottoman identity, as the postwar struggles in Anatolia eliminated the CUP from positions of power and the Turkish republican leadership assumed power after successfully eliminating the Greek, British, and other European armies of occupation. Fasih was part of the military chain of command that experienced this transition and was one of its primary beneficiaries. In Syria and Palestine, as

in Hijaz and Iraq, the situation was very different. For Lieutenant Aref Shehadeh, the transformation took place in his Siberian internment, where the Russian command successfully manipulated Turkish-Arab ethnic tensions among Ottoman prisoners.

Ihsan Turjman's diary is exceptional for its extreme positions against Cemal Pasha and the CUP leadership. We should compare it not to Arab nationalist historiography of the postwar period but to autobiographical works by contemporary writers such as Muhammad Izzat Darwazah and As'ad Rustum. Both authors started their political careers as Ottoman decentralists and ended by joining the Arab nationalist camp. In Ihsan's circle both Sakakini (his teacher) and Omar Salih Barghouti (his friend) wrote memoirs that indicate an ambivalent attitude toward Ottoman decentralism during the war. As the war progressed, both of them began to identify with the leadership of Prince Faisal. Rustum eventually joined the Arab rebellion in Jabal Druze and became Faisal's private secretary. Sakakini escaped from Damascus after his release from jail (in 1918) and went over to the rebel side—where he was credited with the writing the Arab national anthem. For all of them the turning point was the Allied military trials of Syrian nationalists and their hanging in Beirut in August 1916.

By contrast several members of the Jerusalem intelligentsia continued to favor a settlement that would keep Palestine as an Ottoman province until the end of the war. They included Adel Jaber, who edited *al Hayat* in Jerusalem and Jaffa; Sheikh Muhammad Salih, director of Rawdat al Ma'arif; and Mahmud Jawish, principal of al-Salahiyya College. Omar Salih, in his autobiography, discusses meetings held by Cemal Pasha with Arab leaders in Jerusalem and Damascus in 1916 and 1917 to discuss a Turkish-Arab confederation.⁸³

Turjman's diary contains a sustained tirade against Cemal and Enver Pashas, particularly against Cemal's failed campaign in the Suez and the Sinai desert fronts, which involved many of Ihsan's friends and relatives. A recurrent nightmare was Turjman's fear of being sent to the front. His portrayal of Cemal is contradictory. On the one hand, he depicts him as pandering to Jewish and Christian soldiers, seeking to win the support of the minorities of Syria by exempting them from military service and assigning them to clerical jobs. On the other hand, Ihsan attacks both Enver and Cemal for humiliating Jerusalem Jews and Christians by conscripting them into the labor battalions to clean the streets and undertake heavy-duty road and railroad construction. Many members of these battalions perished from hunger and disease in the backbreaking work. Contemporary descriptions are replete with tales of the humiliating impact of these battalions on the local population. One of several entries by Sakakini on this subject makes the following observation: "Today a large number of Christians were recruited as garbage collectors to Bethlehem and Bait Jala. Each was given a broom, a shovel, and a bucket and they were distributed in the alleys of the town. Conscripts would shout at each home they passed, 'send us your garbage.' The women of Bethlehem looked out from their windows and wept. No doubt this is the ultimate humiliation. We have gone back to the days of bondage in Roman and Assyrian days."⁸⁴ When he was appointed as a temporary clerk in the Jerusalem military command in charge of exemption from service, Turjman tried, unsuccessfully, to ameliorate the suffering of these soldiers.

In one episode Ihsan describes Cemal Pasha's wedding to a "Jewish prostitute" from Jerusalem as an example of his favoritism. He is referring to the commander's concubine Lea Tannenbaum, whose family was active in the pro-Ottoman Red

Crescent Society. Other entries portray Cemal as arbitrary and engrossed in his own glorification—extending work hours for ordinary soldiers and abolishing their weekly holidays on Fridays. Cemal is also seen as hypocritical, distributing sweets and slaughtering lambs for the benefit of the soldiers during public holidays yet letting them go hungry and underpaid for the rest of the year. Ihsan was particularly hostile to the CUP's cynical attempts to manipulate religion in defense of the war effort in the Arab provinces. One of several entries describes Ruşen Bey's hosting of a major party in the military headquarters in honor of Ahmad Cemal Pasha and Cemal the Younger (Mersini).

The height of Ihsan's wrath against Cemal Pasha is recorded during Cemal's campaign against the secret nationalist groups. The attack started with the hanging of two soldiers at Damascus Gate on March 30 allegedly for being spies for the British army. The repression reached its zenith in the execution of members of the Arab society and the secret "ahd" group among Arab officers after a summary trial in Aley. But Turjman's anti-Ottoman sentiments are tempered by his positive reference to several Turkish and Albanian commanders toward whom he had great affection. Those included his commander in chief Ali Ruşen Bey (an Albanian); Nihad Bey, the chief of staff of the Jerusalem garrison (a Turk); and many Turkish officers with whom he had worked. When he was assaulted and threatened by his commanding officer (an unnamed Albanian), he sought the protection of Ruşen Bey, not from his fellow Arab officers.

Ihsan's diary is full of recrimination about Arab submissiveness in the face of Ottoman military repression. He repeatedly describes the Syrian and Palestinian people as a subservient lot (*ummatun dhalilab*) who are no match to the Turks. No proud nation would tolerate being led to slaughter and not rebel.

Although a pacifist at heart, he occasionally rejoices in Ottoman victories in Gallipoli and Kut al Amara (southern Iraq), and he describes his national identity interchangeably, sometimes writing that he belongs “to the Ottoman nation” and other times saying he is part of “the Arab nation,” but never does he define himself as a member of an “Islamic nation”—a category that Cemal Pasha began to cultivate after 1917 to win Persian and Indian support to the Ottoman side. The *ulama* and sheikhs were particular objects of scorn in Ihsan’s diary. Sheikh As‘ad Shuqairi, the mufti of the Fourth Army from Akka, is described as a hypocrite for traveling to Istanbul with religious bodies from Palestine to eulogize the Ottoman martyrs in Gallipoli and the Dardanelles.

Only when Sherif Hussein and the tribes of Hijaz rebelled against Ottomans, with British support did Ihsan express his vindication and pride for being an Arab. “Salute to the Hijazis. May God lead Hussein to victory, so that the blood of our martyrs in Beirut shall not go in vain.” But he calls the rebels the ‘*urban*’ (“Bedouins”), and he is aware that their revolt is not entirely altruistic. Among the reasons he cites for their rebellion is the fact that Cemal Pasha stopped paying protection money to the Hijazis for securing the Damascus Medina rail tracks.

The impact of this rupture in Ottoman identity on Turkish-Arab relations can be fruitfully traced from the Turkish side in another war remembrance—the memoirs of Falih Rifki, who was Cemal Pasha’s private secretary in Damascus and Jerusalem, and a contemporary of both Turjman and Fasih (by a strange coincidence, Rifki, like the three soldier-memoirists, was born in 1893).⁸⁵ Rifki’s observations are particularly valuable because he was close to the events as they unfolded and because he was a keen observer of Arab-Turkish relations inside the armed forces. In addition Rifki was fascinated by the dramatic ways in which

religion in molded people's lives in the Holy Land. In the following observation he compares Jerusalem with Medina:

The pilgrims in Jerusalem are no happier than the pilgrims at Medina. The people of Jesus are as hungry as the people of Muhammad and are equally doomed to live in misery. The only difference is the majestic décor of the beggar in Jerusalem. Medina was an Asiatic bazaar which has turned religion into trade goods. Jerusalem is a Western theatre which has turned religion into a play . . . I thought the priests of the Holy Sepulcher were wearing false beards. When they bend down, one can see the bulge of their pistol-holsters beneath their robes.⁸⁶

In general Rıfki justified Cemal Pasha's campaign of repression against the Arab nationalists as a way to preserve stability and effective Ottoman administration. Furthermore he apparently believed that the use of violence was effective: "For Palestine we used deportation; for Syria, terrorization; for the Hijaz, the army. The circumspect Jews, waiting on the coast at Jaffa for the Balfour Declaration, lost no lives for its sake; not so much as an orange. The Hijaz rose in revolt, but Syria was quiet."⁸⁷ In his memoirs, he also defends the massive deportations of the civilian population from coastal Palestine, especially from Jaffa, after the British fleet established its blockade. The Jewish population especially, in his view, had to be prevented from sending intelligence to the Allies about Ottoman troops.⁸⁸

Rıfki makes insightful observations about the integration of Turkish and Arab ethnicity into Ottoman society. "The Ottoman Sultanate is solidly bureaucratic, but the bureaucracy here [in Palestine] is half Arab. I have not seen a single Turkicized Arab, and I have seen precious few Turks who were not Arabized. . . . We have neither colonized this region nor made it part of our land. The Ottoman Empire here is the unpaid watch-

man of the fields and streets.”⁸⁹ When the author moves on to discuss the situation in Jerusalem, this notion of the *assimilating* but nonassimilated Arab becomes a source of protest against the Turkish predicament outside Anatolia. “We are lodgers in Jerusalem,” Rıfki remarks sardonically, in a manner reminiscent of Russian protestations of being marginalized in Soviet Moscow. “As all minorities in the Ottoman Empire had privileges, while the Turks had none, it was more advantageous to belong to any Muslim minority than to be a Turk.”⁹⁰ These remarks may sound ridiculous to an Arab historian looking back at the era, but they reflected a serious perception of the “Arab problem” within an important contingent of the ruling Ottoman elite, and certainly by Cemal Pasha himself, who was fighting a desperate struggle to salvage the Ottoman idea as secessionist groups gnawed the peripheries of the empire. The significance of Arab integration, in this view, was that Arabs were the last element of the Sultanate (the Kurds probably did not count then) that was Muslim (in the main) and a potential ally against co-optation by the Western powers. Hence the disappointment was compounded by the Arab “betrayal.” At the end the Arabs deserted the Turks; the Turks—in their campaign of Turkification—did not undermine the Ottoman idea. This perception is clear in Rıfki’s analysis. “Don’t think there was an ‘Arab problem’ in that huge land stretching from Aleppo to Aden,” he insists, “. . . what existed then was widespread anti-Turkish sentiment. Take that away and the Arabs would have collapsed into disunity.”⁹¹

Rıfki does not shed light on Cemal’s presumed strategy of building an Arab-Turkish federation to replace the disintegrating Ottoman regime, as suggested by some Arab thinkers, like Omar Salih. But he makes clear in his memoirs that Cemal’s failure was a defeat for any future Turkish-Arab dominion. Rıfki

recounts the bitterness of seeing his commander replaced in the supreme command by General von Falkenhayn:

Cemal Pasha was unwilling to give up his Syrian dream; he wanted to return to Istanbul at the end of the war bearing the gift of a Syria preserved. Perhaps they took advantage of his weakness for pomp and circumstance; he was appointed commanding general of Syria and Western Arabia. A sort of commander-in-chief, second class [to von Falkenhayn]. . . . It wasn't Cemal Pasha that was falling; it was the province of Syria. But because it was a country with an excessive regard for rank, decorations and gold braid, it fell not as Anatolian villages fall, in silence and loneliness, but more showily and magnificently, wrapped in the uniforms of commanders-in chief, marshals and ministers.⁹²

In the introduction to his memoirs, *Zeytindagi* (Mount of Olives), Falih Rifkî refers emblematically to this problem of Turkish identity in Palestine. “*Olberg* is the German [term] for Mount of Olives. *Jabal al-Zaytun* is the Arabic. And *Zeytindagi*? *Zeytindagi* is just the name I gave to my book. *There never was a Turkish Jerusalem*.”⁹³ But of course there was an *Ottoman* Jerusalem, which Rifkî bey was resisting identifying.

THE END OF INNOCENCE

Ihsan Turjman's diary is a long, sustained attack on the ethos of war. His stance is born not so much from an ideology of pacifism as from revulsion against the war-induced social disintegration and the loss of the earlier era of stability—conditions that he attributed to the megalomania of the new Ottoman leadership. The new politics of nationalist aggrandizement, ethnic oppression, and carnage brought an irrational and incoherent world. It produced what John Berger called “the inversion of politics.” As

in the European front, in Belgium, in France and in the Dardanelles, the impact of the war was seen as catastrophic, and people felt they had lost control over the future. With the earlier debate about the future of Palestine, we witnessed a sense of disorientation and a decentering from old certainties. The impending loss of empire created a sense of geographic fragmentation. According to John Berger, under these conditions of alienation, which were very similar to the situation in the Levant, “Nobody realized how far-reaching would be the effects of the coming inversion of politics—that is to say the predominance of ideology over politics.” This was also the case with the European war, which ended the age of “political innocence”:

Soon such innocence ceased to be justified. Too much evidence had to be denied to maintain it: notably the conduct of the First World War (not its mere outbreak) and the widespread popular acquiescence in it . . . what in fact happened is that most people remained politically innocent at the price of denying experience—and this in itself contributed further to the political-ideological inversion.⁹⁴

We can see this spread of popular acquiescence recorded in Ihsan’s daily impressions about the progression of the war. Indeed, the world was disintegrating around him. The large-scale military impounding of grain from the peasants led to skyrocketing food prices in the city, followed by the disappearance of vegetables and meat. Women and children (most young men were already conscripted) formed long queues in front of bakeries and fought for meager amounts of bread. Famine struck every major town in Syria, Palestine, and Mount Lebanon, and as Ihsan notes, it was man-made, caused initially by the British economic blockade of the Palestine coast and later by military sequestration of food, not by scarcity. In Lebanon the famine was

compounded by economic sanctions imposed by Cemal Pasha to punish nationalist leaders for their presumed collaboration with the French authorities.⁹⁵ By the summer of 1915 the locust attack reached Jerusalem, followed by the spread of cholera, typhus, and other epidemics.

Beggars began to appear everywhere. The graphic descriptions of beggars in European travel literature might cause one to assume that begging was a perennial feature of the Jerusalem cityscape. Had this been the case, however, Ihsan, who spent all his life in the old city, would not have devoted much attention to them in his diary. In fact the war led to the disintegration of family life and created an army of beggars. As in many provincial capitals of the Ottoman Empire, the very poor were catered to by a chain of endowments known as *takaya*, which provided soup kitchens and public food. In most neighborhoods people took care of their own, through confessional and kinship networks. With the onslaught of the war and the wide-scale absence of male breadwinners from poor families, the city experienced the breakdown of communal solidarities. The monthly salary of an Ottoman soldier was eighty-five piasters, hardly enough to buy his monthly consumption of tobacco. During the war tobacco was a main staple of survival and a medium of exchange among soldiers. It became a hard-sought commodity in the black market. At least twelve entries in Ihsan's diary deal with the absence of cigarettes and the crisis it represented to soldiers and civilians alike. The absence of tobacco became a metaphor (in all war diaries) for the general deprivation imposed by the war. On Friday, April 23, 1915, Ihsan made the following entry:

Nowhere can we find cigarettes. Everybody is complaining and missing their *tutton* [Arabo-Turkish for rolling tobacco]. We have been deprived already of sugar, kerosene, and rice, but these short-

ages have not had the same impact as the deprivation of tobacco. . . . People in the city have given up on most items but now, deprived of their smokes, they are attacking the government for getting us involved in this war.⁹⁶

Officers were given preference when new consignments of tobacco arrived, and they often supplemented their salaries by selling it to soldiers, especially if the shipment included choice brands from Istanbul, such as Samsoun and Murad.

With the economic collapse of many households, Jerusalem, like Damascus and Beirut, began to witness the emergence of a new institution: prostitution. The Ottoman military had introduced its own bordellos in the holy city to cater to soldiers. Several contemporary writings mention that the high officer corps, as well as potentates and city notables, kept concubines.⁹⁷ By the second year of the war, however, prostitution was widespread and serviced all categories of army personnel—most of whom were separated for months and years from their families and female company. On the occasion of Sultan Muhammad Rashad's assumption to the throne, on April 27, 1915, Cemal Pasha held a major party in the garden of the Commissariat for the Ottoman high brass and local notables. Fifty prostitutes were brought in from the city bordellos to accompany the officers—while the city notables brought in their wives. Ihsan expressed his shock at this mixing of prostitutes with “respectable” ladies, but also at the fact that this indulgence took place at the height of fighting in Janaq Qal'a (Gallipoli), where thousands of fellow soldiers, Arabs and Turks, were being slaughtered. Prostitution soon spread to the streets of the old city.⁹⁸

To illustrate the depths of moral degeneration in the city, the diarist cites a case in which several well-known teachers from a public school in Baq'a were caught hosting local prostitutes

in school during teaching hours. The Jerusalem governor had the three teachers (who included the religious instructor Sheikh Yacoub Azbaki) expelled from their positions. But former mayor Faidi Alami (then a member of parliament in Istanbul) intervened on their behalf, and their sentence was reduced to paying a fine of 150 *qirsh*.⁹⁹ Ihsan wrote in protest, “Teachers should be first professionals whose conduct is above reproach, and secondly, they should be equipped with knowledge in the training of children. In our case thank God both traits are lacking entirely. It is true that teachers are human beings and have needs to satisfy their basic desires, but they should exercise control over their instincts. In all cases they should never be allowed to bring women of easy virtue to their schools where children are [exposed] to these practices, and are given a bad example in ethical conduct.”¹⁰⁰ Many poor war widows in Ihsan’s own neighborhood and near Damascus Gate were seen selling their bodies for a few piasters. Ihsan met them daily on his way to work near the new gate. One evening, while he and his cousin Hasan were on their way to have dinner with Sakakini, he met a streetwalker loitering near the Austrian Hospice.

I said to Hasan, “This poor woman, waiting for her deliverance.” He said, “What can she do? She has to live. She makes a majidi per trick to survive.” What miserable creatures, selling their bodies for pennies to satisfy the bestial needs of men. I am sure that most prostitutes would not practice their professions except for their [financial] need. Some may have enslaved themselves to men who promised them marriage and then deserted them.¹⁰¹

Ihsan expressed his compassion for the Jerusalem prostitutes in terms of general compassion for Muslim women. He had read and admired Qasim Amin’s call for women’s emancipation

(*Tabrir al Mar'a*, 1899) and expressed the belief that the general backwardness of Arab society was related to the confinement of women. He also called for the removal of the veil and linked the struggle for women's rights to the fight against the Turkish dictatorship of the CUP. The occasion for his comment was a department of education ban on the performance of dramatic shows in public schools that alluded to the heroism of classical Arab figures (in this case a play about Tariq Bin Ziad, the conqueror of Andalusia).¹⁰² "We have entered into a compact with this [Ottoman] state that can only work if we are treated on equal footing with the Turkish [subject]. Now however the state has chosen to treat us as a colonized possession and the time has come to break the partnership." He adds,

I spoke with Hilmi Effendi about the status of the Muslim woman. I told him that education is the key to her emancipation. I mentioned that the veil is an obstacle to her advancement, but it should not be removed all at once since this would harm the movement to improve her condition. I said, "How can we progress when half of our nation is ignorant? How can we live when half our bodies are paralyzed? We need to teach her, then teach her and teach her."¹⁰³

By spring of 1915 Jerusalem, as well as the rest of the Syrian provinces, was overwhelmed by a sense of impending catastrophe. The combination of war casualties and natural disasters produced a sense of atrophy among the civilian population. "Our lives are threatened from all sides: a European war and an Ottoman war, prices are skyrocketing, a financial crisis, and the locusts are attacking the country north and south. On top of all this, now infectious diseases are spreading throughout the Ottoman lands. May God protect us." Ultimately his reaction to the accumulated catastrophes, like that of many Jerusalemites, was

one of increasing indifference, almost a placidity, a response that is common to people seeking to shield themselves from impending doom. “Usually I worry about the smallest matter that can happen to me, but now with disaster visiting everybody, I have stopped caring. Since this devastation has been heaped on our lives, we cannot focus on one single calamity. One disaster overwhelms the other; and when we think of all these misfortunes coming together, we stop caring at all.”¹⁰⁴ One year later the situation got even worse, with hunger setting in:

Monday, July 10, 1916. Jerusalem has not seen worst days. Bread and flour supplies have almost totally dried up. Every day I pass the bakeries on my way to work, and I see a large number of women going home empty-handed. For several days the municipality distributed some kind of black bread to the poor, the likes of which I have never seen. People used to fight over the limited supplies, sometimes waiting in line until midnight. Now, even that bread is no longer available.¹⁰⁵

As the carnage of war engulfed people’s lives and Cemal Pasha escalated his measures against Arab nationalists, anti-Turkish sentiment increased. With the intensification of fighting in the Sinai Peninsula and Suez, more Jerusalem residents were either taken to the front or forced into labor battalions to undertake public work for the army. In September 1918 the Fourth Army issued a new order banning the stationing of soldiers in their own townships—an order that would have transferred Ihsan from his clerical work to the front in Suez. He wrote,

I cannot imagine myself fighting in the desert front. And why should I go? To fight for my country? I am Ottoman by name only, for my country is the whole of humanity. Even if I am told that by going to fight, we will conquer Egypt [liberating it from the British], I will refuse to go.¹⁰⁶

The expression “I am Ottoman by name only” must have seeped into Turjman’s vocabulary from Khalil Effendi Sakakini, his teacher and mentor, who had written a similar statement in his private diary during the war. “Why do the authorities want to exile me from Jerusalem? I am not a Christian, nor a Buddhist, nor a Muslim, nor a Jew. I do not see myself as an Arab, or an Englishman, or a Frenchman, or a German, or a Turk. Above all I am a member of the human race.”¹⁰⁷

The lofty ideals Ihsan expresses in his diary—toward nationalism, the emancipation of women, the alleviation of poverty, and especially his amorphous humanism—were born of his pre-war innocence and were unattached to any ideological commitment, whether socialist, nationalist, or religious. He was free from all ideational constraints—partly due to his lack of a rigorous educational background but also—like Sakakini and Mikhael Naimy from the same generation—due to his naïve belief in humanist concepts, which was soon to be extinguished.

But unlike the situation in Central and Western Europe, where the war ushered in the repressive apparatus of the modern nation-state, as well as the promise of social emancipation, the Syrian-Palestinian front opened up a different set of possibilities to Arab society. Instead of fostering internationalism, it gave rise to new nationalisms and an appetite for national self-determination. Instead of bringing social emancipation, it created a vivid experience of modernity, enhanced by the machinery of war and the emergence of a mass society that undermined communal solidarities. The building blocks of such a society—the press, public education, and notions of citizenship—had been evolving in Europe for over a century. But the experience of social emancipation and the emergence of a new national identity were intertwined only in concept. As we will see, they

took place in the mind of the young soldier, and his generation, as separate life events.

DISCOVERY OF INTIMACY

The experience of new rhythms of daily life was at the heart of these modernities of war. We have seen that the war created a new sense of time (discreteness) and geography (the decentering of Palestine within the imperial domain); increased people's mobility through the advent of the railroad and the automobile, introduced greater discipline in military work, and conquered the night (through electrification and the positioning of guards on the streets outside the city walls). As a result, people in the city began to socialize and entertain themselves in the evening.¹⁰⁸ Ihsan's diary refers to daily incursions into the municipal park in Manshiyyeh, on Jaffa Road, where Ottoman military bands entertained the public. Ya'acov Yehoshua, father of Hebrew writer A. B. Yehoshua, wrote in *Jerusalem of the Old Days* (*Yerushalaim Tmol Shilshom*), "[The] Army Band played there twice a week conducted by a person called Kovalsky (who had a music instruments shop)."¹⁰⁹ In the same period Wasif Jawhariyyeh, the musician, also described Manshiyyeh as a major place of entertainment in the city. His father, Girgis, had a concession for a café there, where Wasif and his brother played their ouds. The place was particularly popular among soldiers.¹¹⁰ The new sense of mobility meant that people's work and social networks began to extend beyond their townships. In discussing his marriage plans, sometime toward the end of the war, Ihsan contemplates finding a partner outside Jerusalem—a possibility that would have been unthinkable a generation earlier.¹¹¹

Mass-circulating newspapers and popular books were also

new developments during the war. Papers were read aloud in public cafés for those who were illiterate or could not afford them.¹¹² In Palestine, as in Syria and Egypt, the daily press already existed, of course, but the war enhanced newspapers' circulation because people were hungry for news from the war front (Iraq, Suez, and the Dardanelles) where their family members were stationed.

Ihsan's diary reflects the obsessions of a young soldier with the care of his body and its ailments. Again he displays the strong influences of al-Dusturiyya College, which offered physical training classes as part of the core curriculum. Muhammad Salih's *Rawdat al Ma'arif* introduced similar paramilitary classes.¹¹³ Sakakini was famous in his circle for his regimen of daily cold showers and rigorous physical training, and Ihsan sought to follow his mentor in this practice. Amateur wrestling was one of his Sakakini favorite pastimes, in which he engaged many of his students and fellow teachers. Ihsan himself was a mild hypochondriac, examining his body daily for symptoms of disease and expressing fear of catching one of the main epidemics that ravished Palestine during the war: malaria, cholera, and typhus. Many of his comrades and acquaintances died from the latter two diseases.

For a provincial Ottoman city, Jerusalem was well equipped with medical facilities and services. Both government clinics and mission hospitals gave Palestinians a wide choice of medical services.¹¹⁴ Two of Ihsan's cousins, Hasan and Hussein Khalidi were newly trained doctors serving as medical officers in the Jerusalem area. His neighbor Rustum Effendi was an *ajzakhani* (pharmacist) and played a big role in Ihsan's crisis at the end of his life. Another doctor, Tawfiq Canaan, the famous dermatologist and ethnographer from Beit Jala, was the director of Jeru-

salem's Military Hospital and also a family friend. Ihsan often used his services to acquire medical leaves from army duty (and Canaan was apparently happy to oblige). When Ihsan discovered a rash on his genitals one day, Hasan (his cousin) examined him and informed him that it was probably a venereal infection (*al da' al ifranji*, "the Frankish disease"). Ihsan went into panic. He protested using the same language attributed to the Virgin Mary when she was informed by the angel of the Lord that she was bearing a child: *lam yamassani basbaran* ("I was not touched by a human being").¹¹⁵ And when Dr. Khalidi suggested that perhaps the rash came from "association with soldiers" (*mu'asbarat al 'saker*), Ihsan threatened to commit suicide. He was particularly concerned that catching any disease would jeopardize his future chances with his beloved Suraya, the woman he intended to marry. Eventually the rash disappeared, and he was restored to sanity.

Contemporary observations indicate that homosexuality was widely practiced in the Jerusalem garrison, as in the ranks of armed forces worldwide. Ihsan was shocked when one of his commanders, an Albanian officer, took a sudden fondness for him and pursued him relentlessly. He recorded in his diary that the officer wrote him incessant letters expressing his affection and the desire to play with his hair and "kiss me between the eyes." When Ihsan rebuffed the man, the Albanian resorted to threats and became abusive. He began to visit Ihsan at his home late at night and threatened to kill him unless he yielded. Finally, in desperation, Ihsan hesitantly reported the abusive captain to his commander in chief, Ruşen Bey—also an Albanian. He was afraid of the man's retribution. At this juncture the diary abruptly ends. This episode casts dark shadows on the causes of Turjman's death, since we know from family sources that he was

killed by an Ottoman soldier just before Allenby troops entered Jerusalem in December 1917.

Ihsan's diary dwells at length on his search for love. His experience is typical of young Arab men at the turn of the century. Similarly Muhammad Fasih's diary, despite its preoccupation with the deteriorating situation at the front, makes many references to a normal life with his wife (or betrothed). More women began to appear in public and to encounter men at work and in their neighborhoods. Literacy and mobility allowed for men and women to exchange letters and have chaperoned rendezvous, sometimes with their families' blessings. Romantic correspondence from the 1910s and 1920s indicates that young people were influenced by the European romantic novels they were reading and were beginning to articulate new notions of love and intimacy.¹¹⁶ Studio photographers like Khalil Raad and Krikorian catered to the needs of friends and couples to exchange photographs on holidays. In these ritual exchanges, the photographs became mementos of friendship and tokens of remembrance of the beloved in periods of extended travel. The subjects of these photographs adopted their most impressive posture and dressed in their best attire, often wearing their official uniform and (for soldiers) holding a gun or a ceremonial sword.¹¹⁷

Unlike middle-class intellectuals like Alami, Sidawi, and Sakakini, Ihsan experienced a restricted and sublimated kind of love, since the object of his affections, Suraya, was unattainable. Her family was not ready to accept him, presumably because he was an ordinary soldier with few prospects of a decent income. To complicate matters she was veiled, and he was able to steal a look at her only by hiding near her house in the old city and waiting for her to remove her veil as she entered the house. On one occasion, he left his photograph with her brother, hoping

that she would reciprocate. He was frustrated by the appearance of a competitor for Suraya's love—a more established and more financially secure intellectual whom he refers to as A. B. The cryptic narrative suggests that A. B. was his code for Adel Jaber, at the time a professor at al-Salahiyyeh college and a close friend of Sakakini in the Sa'aleek circle (Vagabond Party). Fortunately for Ihsan, neither Suraya nor her mother reciprocated A. B.'s overtures. But the danger remained that her father was considering other suitors. In any case Turjman's attacks on Jaber's pro-Ottoman politics were likely also a cover for his personal loathing and jealousy of the latter's overtures to Suraya.

Ihsan's love affair with Suraya, and his failure to consummate it, became emblematic of his search for a life of normalcy, which was denied to him by the war and his life in the army. His daydreams usually involved an escape from military service—going to the countryside, becoming a farmer, and settling down with Suraya. Despite his disciplinary background, or perhaps because of it, Muhammad Fasih also dreamt of a sudden escape from the military to enter into the tranquility of married life. His search for domestic normalcy was even more pronounced and explicit than Ihsan's since he was denied it altogether in the trenches. "Daydream about a happy family and congenial kids. Will I live to see the day when I have some?" (November 22, 1915); "Oh My God, will I ever have a child who will call me daddy?" (November 24); "Will I ever have a sweetheart? God, maker of heaven, earth and all the creatures that inhabit it. Please allow me to see the day when I shall taste this bliss. Otherwise my life, which has always been so sad, shall remain full of yearnings and grief" (December 4). Turjman, who had spent his entire adult life war, imagined peace in a different way—as a plateau of tranquility that literally existed in a different country (often the Swiss coun-

tryside), a vision almost assuredly borrowed from the pages of the popular romances he consumed during his desk job at headquarters. The confinement of his beloved Suraya, and his inability to reach her, led Ihsan to reflect on the condition of Arab and Muslim women in general. The new postwar era was linked in his mind with the emancipation of women (which in his mind meant their release from their domestic confinement) and the end of their physical seclusion.

The search for normalcy became an all-consuming passion for the vast majority of young men, soldiers, and civilians who experienced the military horrors of World War I. In their yearning the war's end would be the turning point for the new cherished freedoms. They also saw the end of the Ottoman era as the beginning of a new "rational" order, whose features were contested and fluid (would it be a Syrian homeland, an Egypto-Palestinian union, or simply the Arab nation?). Unlike many of his contemporaries, however, Ihsan expressed this yearning as a desire for a military defeat of his own army and the dissolution of "his" imperial state.

IMPRISONMENT AND EXILE: THE CASE OF LIEUTENANT SHEHADEH

The experience of imprisonment by the enemy and exile during World War I was another important dimension in the dissolution of Ottoman identity. The case of Lieutenant Aref Shehadeh, also from Jerusalem, is particularly relevant because of his considerable education and his early training in the imperial capital, Istanbul, before he was sent to the Caucasian front in 1915.

The late Ottoman period and the early colonial Mandates (French and British) witnessed the appearance of a type of polit-

NOTES

THE ERASURE OF OTTOMAN PALESTINE

Second epigraph: Quoted in an interview with Samir Awad, grandson of Umbashi Awad, July 16, 2006. Awad was from the village of Anabta, and he fought in Suez and Gallipoli.

1. For a good selection of World War I soldiers' diaries, see Edward Lengel's "In the Trenches: The Soldier's Experience in World War I," which provides an extensive network of diaries from several World War I sites: <http://wsrv.clas.virginia.edu/~egl2r/wwi.html> (accessed November 22, 2008). For Ottoman sources, see Altay Atli, Turkey in the First World War, <http://www.turkeyswar.com/campaigns/palestine1.htm> (accessed December 9, 2009). This site has an extensive section on Palestine.

2. *Asbraf* were the potentates of the city, claiming lineage from the Prophet Muhammad.

3. John Gerber, "Anton Pannekoek and the Quest for an Emancipatory Socialism," *New Politics*, no. 5 (Summer 1988).

4. "The only war left for Prussia-Germany to wage will be a world war, a world war, moreover, of an extent and violence hitherto unimagined. Eight to ten million soldiers will be at each other's throats and in the process they will strip Europe barer than a swarm of locusts. The

depredations of the Thirty Years' War compressed into three to four years and extended over the entire continent; famine, disease, the universal lapse into barbarism, both of the armies and the people, in the wake of acute misery; irretrievable dislocation of our artificial system of trade, industry and credit, ending in universal bankruptcy; collapse of the old states and their conventional political wisdom to the point where crowns will roll into the gutters by the dozen and no one will be around to pick them up; the absolute impossibility of foreseeing how it will all end and who will emerge as victor from the battle. Only one consequence is absolutely certain: universal exhaustion and the creation of the conditions for the ultimate victory of the working class. That is the prospect for the moment when the systematic development of mutual one-upmanship in armaments reaches its climax and finally brings forth its inevitable fruits." Fredrick Engels, quoted by Gilbert Achcar in "Engels: Theorist of War, Theorist of Revolution," *International Socialism Journal*, no. 97: 38.

5. Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army, and the Making of Modern Egypt*, Cambridge Middle East Studies 8 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

6. Salah Issa, *Rijal Raya wa Sekina: Sira Ijtima'yya wa Siyasiyya* (Cairo: Dar Al Ahmadi, 2002).

7. *Ibid.*, 111–12.

8. *Ibid.*

9. For a history of these units, see Erik Jan Zürcher, "Ottoman Labour Battalions in World War I," Working Papers Archive, Department of Turkish Studies, Leiden University, March 2002.

10. Khalil Totah and Omar Salih Barghouti, *The History of Palestine* (Jerusalem: 1920), 248–52.

11. On the "recruitment" of the labor battalions, see *ibid.*, 249; Khalil Sakakini, *Yawmiyyat, Rasa'il, Ta'amulat 1906–1948* [Khalil Sakakini, Diaries, Letters, Reflections 1906–1948], 8 vols. (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2006–2010), hereafter, Sakakini diary; Ihsan Turjman, war diary, Jerusalem 1915–16, unpublished diary manuscript, hereafter, Turjman diary. All citations, including page numbers, derive from the Arabic published version of the diary: Salim Tamari, *'Am al Jarad: al*

Harb al Uthma wa Mabu al Madi al Uthmani fi Filastin (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2008). All chapter headings and subheadings are mine, except for the one heading Turjman provided on his birthday. Diary translated by Salim Tamari.

12. Omar Salih Barghouti, *al-Marabil: Tarikh siyasi* [Turning Points: A Political History] (Beirut: al-Mu'assasa al-'Arabiyya li al-dirasat wa al-nashr, 2001), 192; and Jens Hanssen, "Public Morality and Marginality in *Fin-de-siècle* Beirut," in *Outside In: On the Margins of the Modern Middle East*, ed. Eugene Rogan (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002), 186–89.

13. Totah and Barghouti, *The History of Palestine*, 253–54.

14. The works of Aziz Duri, Philip Houry, Adel Mana, Abdul Karim Rafiq, Dina Rizek, and Rashid Khalidi come to mind. See most recently Muhammad 'Afifi, *'Arab wa 'utbmaniyyun: ru'ya mughayira* (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2005).

15. Goncu quoted by Jonathan Gorvett, "The Forgotten Arabs of Gallipoli," *Al Fazira Net*, January 14, 2004, <http://english.aljazeera.net/archive/2004/01/200849135129326810.html> (accessed October 2007).

16. Sellers quoted in *ibid.*, 3–4.

17. Ihsan's exact birth date is unknown. I have calculated it from approximations of his schooling dates and the known birth dates of his brothers and sisters.

18. The information about Muhammad Fasih's family comes from the English edition of his diary, *Diary of Lt Mehmed Fasih 5th Imperial Ottoman Army, 1915*, trans. and ed. Hasan Basri Danisman (Istanbul: Denizler Kitabevi, 2003), henceforth Fasih, *Diary*; the original version was transliterated from Ottoman Turkish by Murat Çulcu (Istanbul: Arba, 1997). The information about the Turjman family comes from Ihsan's diary.

19. Mehmed Fasih, *Kanlısirt günlüğü : Mehmed Fasih Bey'in Çanakkale anıları/yay. baz. [i.e., yayına hazırlayan]*, transliterated and edited by Murat Çulcu (Beyoğlu, İstanbul: Denizler Kitabevi, Kaptan Yayıncılık, 2002), 18–120.

20. Communication with Irvin Schick, Cambridge, June 16, 2009. I thank Professor Schick for his helpful comments on the Fasih diary.

21. Hasan Danisman, introduction to Fasih, *Diary*, viii.

22. Fasih, *Diary*, 136–39.

23. Danisman, epilogue to Fasih, *Diary*, 209.
24. Fasih, *Diary*, 61–62. Fasih uses the Turkish spelling of these Arab names.
25. *Ibid.*, 74.
26. *Ibid.*, 63. The mention of German officers refers to Germans seconded to the Ottoman army as advisors and trainers.
27. The history of this property is told in Thomas Abowd, “The Politics and Poetics of Place: The Baramki House,” *Jerusalem Quarterly*, no. 21 (2004): 49–58.
28. *Yawmiyyat Mubammad al Salib min abali al alquds, 1333 [1914–1915]*, Manuscripts Department, AP.AR 846, National Library, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
29. Mana’s book was published by the Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut.
30. Abigail Jacobson, “Negotiating Ottomanism in Times of War: Jerusalem during World War I Through the Eyes of a Local Muslim Resident,” paper presented at the conference “The Roots of Liberal Thought in the Eastern Mediterranean,” Erlangen, Germany, July 30–August 3, 2005. I am very grateful to Dr. Jacobson for bringing the diary to my attention and for providing me with missing pages from the Hebrew University copy.
31. Amit Gish, “Ownerless Objects? The Story of the Books Palestinians Left behind in 1948,” *Jerusalem Quarterly*, no. 33: 18.
32. Turjman diary, “Cinematographic Propaganda for the Ottoman Army,” March 31, 1915: “waqafna fi bab al-khalil nantadhir qudum khalil al-sakaini la’anahu dhahaba ila ra’is al baladiiya yas’alahu bi’an yusa’id fi dif’i badalahu al-naqdi. Thumma hadara ubasharana ba’anna sayadfa’ badalahu fi hadha al yawm, fasurra al-jami’, thumma sirna wanahnu natajathab atraf al hadith.” “We were all waiting for Khalil Sakakini to come to Jaffa Gate since he went to see the mayor, asking him to help in paying his military exemption fees [*badal*]. Then he came and assured us that his *badal* will be paid today. Everybody was happy, and we proceeded on our walking and chatting.”
33. Sakakini diary, vol. 2, 158–59 (emphasis added). This entry is dated March 28 and covers a ten-day period.

34. All data about Turjman's personal life, unless otherwise mentioned, come from his diary.

35. According to Saleh Turjman, Ihsan's nephew, the Turjmans, also known as the Salihs, were Asyad, tracing their origins to the family of Prophet Muhammad. In the eighteenth century they were challenged in the Court of Aleppo to produce evidence of this lineage, and upon producing a valid genealogy, they were allowed to continue bearing the title of Sayyids. Interview with Saleh Turjman, Ramallah, January 2006.

36. Hijjat Waqf Qasim Beyk Turjman, Islamic Court of Jerusalem, file no. 201, p. 130. I am grateful to Dr. Muhammad Ghosheh for providing me with this information about the properties of the Turjman family in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

37. *Hijjat Waqf Ahmad Beyk al Turjman*, 1735, Islamic Court of Jerusalem, file no. 227, p. 289.

38. Most of this information comes from Huda Khalidi (Mrs. Abdul Shafie) and from Ihsan's grand-nephew Saleh Turjman (interviews in Ramallah in October 2004 and January 2005).

39. Even today, the road connecting the New Gate to Damascus Gate is still popularly known among the Jerusalem elderly as 'qbet al Manzil.

40. Omar Salih Barghouti, *Al Marabil, Tarikh Siyasi* (Beirut: Al Mu'assasah al Arabiyyah lil Dirasat wal Nashr, 2001), 154.

41. *Ibid.*, 165.

42. Sarkis Boghosian. *Diary of an Armenian Officer in the Ottoman Army* [in Armenian]. 2 vols. (Paris: n.p., 1931). I am indebted to George Hintilian for bringing this diary to my attention.

43. Dahiliye Nezareti, Emniyet-Umumiye Mudiriyeti [Ministry of Interior, General Directorate], Evrak Numarsu [number of telegrams]: 4562–954, 8 Huzeiran, 1335 (June 1919).

44. Khalil Sakakini recorded Ihsan's death in the diaries he wrote while he was in his Damascus jail.

45. William Pfaff, *The Bullet's Song: Romantic Violence and Utopia* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), cited by Pankaj Mishra, "A Cautionary Tale for Americans," *New York Review of Books*, May 26, 2005.

46. Turjman diary, “What Will Be the Fate of Palestine in This War?” 1.

47. Muhammad Izzat Darwazeh, *Mudbakkirat Muḥammad ‘Izzat Darwazeh, 1305 H-1404 H/1887 M-1984 M: sijill ḥafil bi-masirat al-ḥarakah al-‘Arabiyah wa-al-qadīyah al-Filasṭīniyah kbilala qarn min al-zaman*, vol. 1 (Beirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, 1993), 258–59.

48. Fasih, *Diary*, 26.

49. Darwazeh, *Mudbakarat*, 260.

50. In the north, especially in Nablus, pro-Ottoman sentiments continued to be strong even after the Ottoman defeat in Jerusalem, and were articulated by figures such as Muhammad Izzat Darwazeh and Ihsan Nimr.

51. Najib Nassar, *Riwayāt Mifliḥ al-Gbassani* (Haifa: al-Karmil Press, 1922; Nazareth: al Sawt Publications, 1981). The 1981 edition, which is the one cited in later notes, has a long introduction by Hanna Abu Hanna and a useful glossary of terms. Abu Hanna makes clear that Mifliḥ is a thinly disguised cover for Nassar himself—hence my use of the term Mifliḥ/Nassar.

52. *Ibid.*, 76, 246.

53. *Ibid.*, 83–85.

54. *Ibid.*, 47.

55. *Ibid.*, 48.

56. *Ibid.*, 49.

57. Anthony Bruce, *The Last Crusade: The Palestine Campaign in the First World War* (London, John Murray, 2003), 23–25; see also Hasan Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 46.

58. Bruce, *The Last Crusade*, 19–22.

59. Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 189.

60. Ahmad Cemal Pasha, *Memoirs* (Arabic Edition) (Beirut: al Dar al Arabiyyah lil Mawsu‘at, 2004), 187–88.

61. Quoted by Geoffrey Lewis, “An Ottoman Officer in Palestine, 1914–1918,” in *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period*, ed. David Kushner (Jerusalem, Yad Izhak Ben Zvi, 1986), 403.

62. Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 193; also Darwazeh, *Mudbakarat*.
63. For a detailed discussion of the southern boundaries of Palestine and the concept of Palestine's administrative boundaries at the end of World War I, see Gideon Biger, *An Empire in the Holy Land: Historical Geography of the British Administration in Palestine, 1917–1929* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994), 39–44.
64. *Osmanli Atlasi*, ed. Rahmi Tekin and Yasar Bas (Istanbul: Osav, 2003), 112–13.
65. *Ibid.*, 104–5, 120.
66. Muhammad Is'af Nashashibi, "al 'Arabiyyah al Misriyyah," in *Nuql al Adib* (Beirut: Dar Rihani, 1947), 161; originally published in Jerusalem 1352 (Hijri).
67. Hasan Ali Hallaq, ed., *Mudbakarrat Salim Ali Salam (1868–1938)* [The Memoirs of Salim Ali Salam] (Beirut: al Dar al jami'yyat, 1982), 127–28.
68. *Ibid.*, 128.
69. Wajih Kawtharānī, *Bilād al-Sbām: al-sukkān, al-iqtisād, wa-al-siyāsah al-Faransīyah fī maṭlā' al-qarn al-'isbrīn: qirā'ah fī al-wathā'iq* (Beirut: Ma'had al-Inmā' al-'Arabī, 1980), 256.
70. Sakakini, *Yawimiyyat*, vol. 3, *The Mandate and Questions of Identity, 1919–1922*, (2004), 46.
71. Fasih, *Diary*, 133–34.
72. James Gelvin, *The Modern Middle East: A History* (London: Oxford University Press, 2005), 101.
73. "Arabic time probably has its roots in the common and most logical system of timekeeping used most places in the world until about A.D. 1600. In those days, daytime was divided into 12 equal parts, and nighttime also into 12 equal parts. Depending on the season, hours used in the daytime were either longer or shorter than hours used during the night. The sundials and astrolabes used as timekeepers were calibrated to divide into 12 regardless of the seasons. Thus, the same sundial could divide both a long summer daylight period and a short winter day equally into 12. The 'day' was made up of 24 hours and began at sunset. Twelve hours of darkness preceded 12 hours of daylight, although the hours in the daytime were not the same length as

the nighttime hours. This system of beginning the new ‘day’ at sunset remained in use on the isolated Arabian Peninsula when it became the practice in Europe to commence the 24-hour period not at dusk, as had theretofore been the custom, but in the middle of the nighttime part—and to end it in the middle of the following nighttime part. Thus, roughly speaking, six hours of darkness were followed by 12 hours of daylight and then six more hours of darkness to make the complete 24-hour period.” From Elias Antar, “Dinner at When?” *Aramco Magazine*, March/April 1969, 2–3.

74. I am grateful to Saleh Turjman for this piece of information. (interview January 11, 2006, Ramallah). Ihsan studied in al-Dusturiyya; Adel and Hasan, at St George’s College; and the three girls, Asma, Sirat, and Yusra, at the Sisters of Zion school. All schools in Jerusalem.

75. Yacoub Awdat, “Sheik Muhammad al Salih,” in *A’lam al Fikr wal Adab fi Filasteen* (Jerusalem: Dar al Isra’, 1992), 342–43.

76. Martin Strohmeier, “Al Kulliyya al-Salahiyya, A Late Ottoman University in Jerusalem,” in *Ottoman Jerusalem: The Living City 1517–1917*, ed. Sylvia Auld and Robert Hillenbrand (London: Altajir World of Islam Trust, London, 2001), 57–62.

77. *Ibid.*, 60.

78. Turjman diary. See the entries on May 5, 1915, “Adel Jaber Defends the Government”; and May 15, 1915, “Is Adel Effendi an Ottoman Spy?”

79. *Ibid.*

80. These are the expressions used by Muhammad Izzat Darwazeh in his memoirs and by Strohmeier (“Al Kulliyya al-Salahiyya”), who wrote from a different perspective but basically offered the same assessment of Cemal Pasha’s objectives.

81. Strohmeier, “Al Kulliyya al-Salahiyya,” 61.

82. *Ibid.*

83. Barghouti, *Al Marabil*, 187.

84. Sakakini diary, vol. 2, March 28, 1915, 158–59.

85. Falih Rifkî [Atai], *Zeytindagi* (Istanbul: n.p., 1932; repr. Istanbul: Bates Yaymevi, 1981). I have relied here on Geoffrey Lewis’s essay on Rifkî, “An Ottoman Officer in Palestine, 1914–1918.”

86. Ibid., 407–8.
87. Ibid., 405.
88. Ibid., 411.
89. Ibid., 412.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid., 413.
93. Ibid., 414 (emphasis added).
94. John Berger, “An Article of Faith,” in *About Looking* (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 130.
95. Darwazeh, *Memoirs*.
96. “The Government Imposes a Locust Tax Is Imposed on the City’s Residents,” Turjman diary, Friday, April 23, 1915, 33–34.
97. See Wasif Jawharīyah, Salim Tamari, and Issam Nassar, *Al Quds al’Utmaniyyeh fil Mudbakarat al Jarwhariyyeh: al-kitāb al-arwal min mudbakkirāt al-mūīqī Wāṣif Jarwharīyah, 1904–1917*. [Ottoman Jerusalem: 1904–1917] (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Dirāsāt al-Filasṭīniyah, 2003).
98. “Jerusalem Whores Celebrate the Anniversary of Sultan Mehmet Rashad,” Turjman diary, Tuesday, April 27, 1915, 47–48.
99. “Teachers Bring in Prostitutes to Their Schools,” Turjman diary, Wednesday, May 12, 1915, 72.
100. Ibid.
101. “An Encounter with a Prostitute,” Turjman diary, Thursday, April 29, 1915, 50–51. A majidi was twenty piasters.
102. “When Commander Ruṣen Bey Is Drunk, All Work Is Suspended,” Turjman diary, Wednesday, April 28, 1915, 154.
103. “Veiling and the Status of Muslim Women,” April 28, 1915, 155.
104. “Misfortunes Invade Us All at Once: War, Inflation, and Diseases,” Turjman diary, Sunday, May 9, 1915, 68.
105. “Sherif Hussein Declares Rebellion against the State,” Turjman diary, Monday, July 10, 1916, 181.
106. “I Am Ottoman by Name Only, the World Is My Country,” Friday, September 10, 1915, 132.
107. Sakakini diary, 2003.
108. Hanssen, “Public Morality and Marginality,” 189–95.

109. Ya'acov Yehoshua, *Yerushalaim Tmol Shilshom*, part 2 (Jerusalem: Rubin Mas, 1979), 33–36. I am grateful to Yair Wallach for this information.

110. Jawharīyah, Tamari, and Nassar, *Al Quds al 'Utmaniyyeh fil Mudbakarat al Jawhariyyeh*'.

111. Strategic marriages across regions existed earlier for upper-class and merchant families but were outside the capacities of ordinary citizens.

112. See Ami Ayalon, *Reading Palestine: Printing and Literacy, 1900–1948* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004).

113. Awdat, “Sheikh Muhammad al Salih.”

114. Kamel Assali, *Muqaddima fi tarikh al-tibb fil-Quds* (Amman: University of Jordan Publications, 1994).

115. “I Was Not Touched by a Human,” Turjman diary, Friday, September 10, 1915, 262.

116. For Palestine I was able to find three sets of love correspondence for that period: love letters between Khalil Sakakini and Sultana Abdo, Musa Alami's letters to his future wife from Aleppo Alia Jabiri, and the letters of Alphonse Alonzo to his fiancée, Afifeh Sidawi.

117. See Issam Nassar, *Laqa'at mugbayirab: al-taṣwir al-mahalli al-mubakkir fi Filasṭin, 1850–1948* (London: Mu'assasat 'Abd al-Muḥsin al-Qaṭṭan, 2005).

118. Abu Khaldun Saṭi' Husri, *The Day of Maysalun: A Page from the Modern History of the Arabs*, trans. Sidney Glazer (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1966).

119. In this chapter I use both names: Aref Shehadeh for the war period and Aref Aref (which he assumed after his return to Palestine) for his reflections in the postwar period.

120. Muhammad Muslih, *The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

121. Aref Aref, *Mujaz Siratub 1892–1964* [an autobiographical essay published as a pamphlet] (Jerusalem: al Maaref Press, 1964); and Yacoub Awdat, *Min a'lam al-fikr wa-al-adab fi Filasṭin* (Amman: Wakalat al-Tawzi' al-Urduniyyah, 1987), 400–403.

122. Awdat, “Sheik Muhammad al Salih,” 406.