The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious

Translated by Bruce Fink
The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious
or Reason Since Freud

"Of Children Who Are Wrapped in Swaddling Bands"
O cities of the sea, I behold in you your citizens, women as well as men, tightly bound with stout bonds around their arms and legs by folk who will have no understanding of your speech; and you will only be able to give vent to your griefs and sense of loss of liberty by making tearful complaints, and sighs, and lamentation one to another; for those who bind you will not have understanding of your speech nor will you understand them.¹
—Leonardo Da Vinci

While the theme of the third volume of La Psychanalyse² commissioned this contribution by me, I owe this deference to what will be discovered here by introducing it in situating it between writing and speech—it will be halfway between the two.

Writing is in fact distinguished by a prevalence of the text in the sense that we will see this factor of discourse take on here—which allows for the kind of tightening up that must, to my taste, leave the reader no other way out than the way in, which I prefer to be difficult. This, then, will not be a writing in my sense of the term.

The fact that I contribute something wholly new at each class of my seminar has heretofore prevented me from providing such a text, except in one class, which has nothing particularly outstanding about it in terms of the series, and is only worth referring to for an idea of its overall level.

For the urgency that I am now taking as a pretext for leaving that aim behind merely covers over the problem that, in maintaining it at the level at which I must present my teachings here, it might stray too far from speech, whose very different measures are essential to the training I seek to effect.

This is why I took the opportunity presented to me at that time by an invitation to meet with the philosophy group of the Fédération des étudiants ès lettres³ to make an appropriate adjustment to my exposé—its necessary generality matching the extraordinary character of their interest, but its sole object encountering the connivance of their common background, a literary background, to which my title pays homage.

Indeed, how could we forget that Freud constantly, and right until the end, maintained that such a background was the prime requisite in the training of analysts, and that he designated the age-old universitas litterarum as the ideal place for its institution.²¹

Thus this reference to the real-life context of my lecture, by showing whom I tailored it for, also marked those to whom it is not addressed.

I mean: none of those who, for whatever reason in psychoanalysis, allow their discipline to take advantage of some false identity.

This is a vice of habit and its effect on the mind is such that its true identity may appear among them as just one more diversion, whose refined redoubling one hopes will not escape the notice of subtler minds.

It is thus that we observe with curiosity the beginnings of a new tack concerning symbolization and language in the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, a great many wetted fingers leafing through works by Sapir and Jespersen. These exercises are still green around the edges, but it is above all the tone that is missing. A certain seriousness always raises a smile when it enters the domain of veracity.

And how could a contemporary psychoanalyst not sense, in coming upon speech, that he had reached this domain, when it is from speech that analytic experience receives its instrument, its frame, its material, and even the background noise of its uncertainties?

I. The Meaning of the Letter

My title conveys the fact that, beyond this speech, it is the whole structure of language that psychoanalytic experience discovers in the unconscious. This is to alert prejudiced minds from the outset that the idea that the unconscious is merely the seat of the instincts may have to be reconsidered.

But how are we to take the letter here? Quite simply, literally [à la lettre].

By "letter" I designate the material medium [support] that concrete discourse borrows from language.

This simple definition assumes that language is not to be confused with the various psychic and somatic functions that serve it in the speaking subject.

The primary reason for this is that language, with its structure, exists prior to each subject's entry into it at a certain moment in his mental development.

Let us note that, although the deficits of aphasia are caused by purely anatomical lesions in the cerebral systems that provide the mental center for
these functions, they prove, on the whole, to be distributed between the two aspects of the signifying effect of what I am calling here "the letter" in the creation of signification. This point will become clearer in what follows.

And the subject, while he may appear to be the slave of language, is still more the slave of a discourse in the universal movement of which his place is already inscribed at his birth, if only in the form of his proper name.

Reference to the experience of the community as the substance of this discourse resolves nothing. For this experience takes on its essential dimension in the tradition established by this discourse. This tradition, long before the drama of history is inscribed in it, grounds the elementary structures of culture. And these very structures display an ordering of exchanges which, even if unconscious, is inconceivable apart from the permutations authorized by language.

With the result that the ethnographic duality of nature and culture is giving way to a ternary conception of the human condition—nature, society, and culture—the last term of which may well be reduced to language, that is, to what essentially distinguishes human society from natural societies.

But I shall neither take sides here nor take this as a point of departure, leaving to their own obscurity the original relations between the signifier and labor. To settle accounts with the general function of praxis in the genesis of history by way of a quip, I will confine myself to mentioning that the very society that wished to restore the hierarchy responsible for the relations between productive and ideological superstructures to its rightful political place, alongside the privilege of the producers, has nevertheless failed to give birth to an Esperanto whose relations to socialist reality would have ruled out from the start any possibility of literary formalism.

For my part, I will put my faith in only those premises whose value has already been proven, in that they have allowed language to attain the status in experience of a scientific object.

This is what permits linguistics to present itself in the pilot position in this domain, around which a reclassification of the sciences is signaling, as is usually the case, a revolution in knowledge; only the necessities of communication have made me term this domain, in the theme of this volume of La Psychanalyse, "the sciences of man"—despite the confusion that may hide behind it.

To pinpoint the emergence of the discipline of linguistics, I will say that, as in the case of every science in the modern sense, it consists in the constitutive moment of an algorithm that grounds it. This algorithm is the following:

\[
S \quad \frac{S}{s}
\]
will fail to sustain this question as long as we have not jettisoned the illusion that the signifier serves [répondre] the function of representing the signified, or better, that the signifier has to justify [répondre de] its existence in terms of any signification whatsoever.

For even if it is reduced to this latter formulation, the heresy is the same—the heresy that leads logical positivism in search of the "meaning of meaning,"* as its objective is called in the language [langue] in which its devotees snort. It can be seen here how this sort of analysis can reduce the text the most highly charged with meaning to insignificant trifles. Only mathematical algorithms resist this process; they are considered to be devoid of meaning, as they should be.9

The fact remains that if we were able to subtract solely the notion of the parallelism of its upper and lower terms from the algorithm, each term only being taken globally, it would remain the enigmatic sign of a total mystery. Which, of course, is not the case.

In order to grasp its function, I will begin by reproducing the faulty illustration by which its usage is classically introduced:

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\[
\text{\textsc{Tree}}
\]
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We can see here how it lends itself to the kind of direction indicated above as erroneous.

In my lecture, I replaced this illustration with another, which can be considered more correct only because it exaggerates in the incongruous dimension psychoanalysts have not yet altogether given up, because of their justified sense that their conformism derives its value from it alone. Here is the other illustration:

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\[
\text{\textsc{Gentlemen}} \quad \text{\textsc{Ladies}}
\]
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Here we see that, without greatly extending the scope of the signifier involved in the experiment—that is, by simply doubling the nominal type through the mere juxtaposition of two terms whose complementary meanings would seem to have to reinforce each other—surprise is produced by the precipitation of an unexpected meaning: the image of two twin doors that symbolize, with the private stall offered Western man for the satisfaction of his natural needs when away from home, the imperative he seems to share with the vast majority of primitive communities that subjects his public life to the laws of urinary segregation.

The point is not merely to silence the nominalist debate with a low blow, but to show how the signifier in fact enters the signified—namely, in a form which, since it is not immaterial, raises the question of its place in reality. For in having to move closer to the little enamel plaques that bear it, the squinting gaze of a nearsighted person might be justified in wondering whether it is indeed here that we must see the signifier, whose signified would in this case be paid its last respects by the solemn procession in two lines from the upper rave.

But no contrived example can be as telling as what is encountered in the lived experience of truth. Thus I have no reason to be unhappy I invented the above, since it awoke in the person the most worthy of my trust a childhood memory which, having come serendipitously to my attention, is best placed here.

A train arrives at a station. A little boy and a little girl, brother and sister, are seated across from each other in a compartment next to the outside window that provides a view of the station platform buildings going by as the train comes to a stop. "Look," says the brother, "we're at Ladies!" "Imbecile!" replies his sister, "Don't you see we're at Gentlemen."

Aside from the fact that the rails in this story materialize the bar in the Saus­

arian algorithm in a form designed to suggest that its resistance may be other than dialectical, one would have to be half-blind to be confused as to the respective places of the signifier and the signified here, and not to follow from what radiant center the signifier reflects its light into the darkness of incomplete significations.

For the signifier will raise Dissension that is merely animal in kind, and destined to the natural fog of forgetfulness, to the immeasurable power of ide­

ological warfare, which is merciless to families and a torment to the gods. To these children, Gentlemen and Ladies will henceforth be two homelands toward which each of their souls will take flight on divergent wings, and regarding which it will be all the more impossible for them to reach an agreement, since, being in fact the same homeland, neither can give ground regarding the one's unsurpassed excellence without detracting from the other's glory.

Let us stop there. It sounds like the history of France. Which it is more humane to recall here, and rightly so, than that of England, destined to flip from the Large to the Small End of Dean Swift's egg.
It remains to be grasped up what steps and down what corridor the S of the signifier, visible here in the plurals [hommes and dames] by which it focuses its welcome beyond the train window, must pass to impress its curves upon the ducts by which—like hot air and cold air—inflammation and scorn hiss on this side.

One thing is certain: this access must not, in any case, carry any significance with it if the algorithm, $S^2$, with its bar is appropriate to it. For insofar as the algorithm itself is but a pure function of the signifier, it can reveal only a signifying structure in this transfer.

Now the structure of the signifier is, as is commonly said of language, that it is articulated.

This means that its units—no matter where one begins in tracing out their reciprocal encroachments and expanding inclusions—are subject to the twofold condition of being reduced to ultimate differential elements and of combining the latter according to the laws of a closed order.

These elements, the decisive discovery of linguistics, are phonemes; we must not look for any phonetic constancy in the modulatory variability to which this term applies, but rather for the synchronic system of differential couplings that are necessary to discern vocables in a given language [langue]. This allows us to see that an essential element in speech itself was predestined to flow into moveable type which, in Didots or Garamonds squeezing into lower-cases, renders validly present what I call the "letter"—namely, the essentially localized structure of the signifier.

The second property of the signifier, that of combining according to the laws of a closed order, affirms the necessity of the topological substratum, of which the term I ordinarily use, "signifying chain," gives an approximate idea: links by which a necklace firmly hooks onto a link of another necklace made of links.

Such are the structural conditions that define the order of the signifier's constitutive encroachments up to the unit immediately above the sentence as grammar, and the order of the signifier's constitutive inclusions up to the verbal locution as the lexicon.

In the limits within which these two approaches to understanding linguistic usage are confined, it is easy to see that only signifier-to-signifier correlations provide the standard for any and every search for signification; this is indicated by the notion of "usage" of a taxeme or semanteme, which refers to contexts just one degree above that of the units in question.

But it is not because grammatical and lexical approaches are exhausted at a certain point that we must think that signification rules unreservedly beyond it. That would be a mistake.
For broken down into the double specter of its vowels and consonants, it calls up—with the robur-oak [arbre] and the plane tree [platan]\textsuperscript{\textdagger}—the significations of strength and majesty that it takes on in our flora. Tapping all the symbolic contexts in which it is used in the Hebrew of the Bible, it erects on a barren hill the shadow of the cross. Next it reduces to a capital owe nothing to the tree, however genealogical it claims to be. Crystals precipitated into a tree that conducts lightning, is it your that traces our destiny for us in the fire-scorched tortoiseshell, or your flash that brings forth from an infinite night that slow change in being that imprisoning leaves us with hardly any idea what we are to consider aspect of the actual field the signifier can only operate, to not let myself be imprisoned in some sort of communiqué of the facts, however official it may be, and if I know the truth, convey it, despite all the censors, between-the-lines using nothing but the signifier that can be constituted by my acrobatics through the branches of the tree. These acrobatics may be provocative to the point of burlesque or perceptible only to the trained eye, depending on whether I wish to be understood by the many or the few.

The properly signifying function thus depicted in language has a name. We learned this name in our childhood grammar book on the last page, where the shade of Quintilian, relegated to some phantom chapter to convey final consideration on style, seemed suddenly to hasten its voice due to the threat of being cut off.

It is among the figures of style, or tropes—from which the verb “to find” [rechercher] comes to us—that this name is, in fact, found. This name is metonymy. I shall refer only to the example of it given there: “thirty sails.” For the worry I felt, over the fact that the word “ship” [bateau] that was hiding therein seemed to split its presence there in two by having been able to borrow its figurative sense from the very rehashing of this example, veiled [voilait] not so much those illustrious sails [voiles] as the definition they were supposed to illustrate.

The part taken for the whole—I said to myself, if the thing is supposed to be based on reality [réel]—leaves us with hardly any idea what we are to conclude about the size of the fleet these thirty sails are nevertheless supposed to gauge for a ship to have but one sail is very rare indeed.

This shows that the connection between ship and sail is nowhere other than in the signifier, and that metonymy is based on the word-to-word nature of this connection.\textsuperscript{\textdagger} I shall designate as metonymy the first aspect of the actual field the signifier constitutes, so that meaning may assume a place there.

The other aspect is metaphor. Let me illustrate it immediately; Quillet's dictionary seemed appropriate to me to provide a sample that would not be suspected of being deliberately selected, and I didn’t pursue the farce any far-
other than Victor Hugo’s well-known verse, “His sheaf was neither miserly nor hateful . . . ,” with which I presented metaphor, when the time came for it, in my seminar on the psychoses.

Let us say that modern poetry and the Surrealist school led us to take a major step forward here by showing that any conjunction of two signifiers could just as easily constitute a metaphor, if an additional condition—that of the greatest disparity of the images signified—weren’t required for the production of the poetic spark, in other words, for metaphoric creation to occur.

Of course, this radical position is based on the so-called “automatic writing” experiment, which would not have been attempted without the assurance its pioneers drew from Freud’s discovery. But it remains marked by confusion because the doctrine behind it is false.

Metaphor’s creative spark does not spring forth from the juxtaposition of two images, that is, of two equally actualized signifiers. It flashes between two signifiers, one of which has replaced the other by taking the other’s place in the signifying chain, the occulted signifier remaining present by virtue of its (metonymic) connection to the rest of the chain.

One word for another: this is the formula for metaphor, and if you are a poet you will make it into a game and produce a continuous stream, nay, a dazzling weave of metaphors. You will, moreover, obtain the intoxicating effect of Jean Tardieu’s dialogue that goes by this title, due solely to the demonstration it provides of the radical superfluousness of all signification to a perfectly convincing representation of bourgeois comedy.

In Hugo’s verse, it is obvious that not the slightest light emanates from the assertion that a sheaf is neither miserly nor hateful, because it is clear that the sheaf has no more the merit than the demerit of these attributes, since misersliness and hatred, along with the sheaf, are properties of Booz, who exercises them when he uses the sheaf as he sees fit, without making his feelings known to it.

If “his sheaf” refers back to Booz, as is clearly the case nevertheless, it is because it replaces him in the signifying chain—at the very place that awaited him, because it had been raised up a step by the clearing away of misersliness and hatred. But the sheaf has thus cleared this place of Booz, ejected as he now is into the outer darkness where misersliness and hatred harbor him in the hollow of their negation.

But once his sheaf has thus usurped his place, Booz cannot go back to it, the slender thread of the little “his” that attaches him to it being an additional obstacle thereto, because it binds this return with a title of ownership that would detain him in the heart of misersliness and hatred. His asserted generosity is thus reduced to less than nothing by the munificence of the sheaf which, being drawn from nature, knows neither our reserve nor our rejections, and even in its accumulation remains prodigal by our standards.

But if, in this profusion, the giver disappears with the gift, it is only to reemerge in what surrounds the figure of speech in which he was annihilated. For it is the radiance of fecundity—which announces the surprise the poem celebrates, namely, the promise of acceding to paternity that the old man receives in a sacred context.

Thus it is between a man’s proper name qua signifier and the signifier that metaphorically abolishes it that the poetic spark is produced, and it is all the more effective here in bringing about the signification of paternity in that it reproduces the mythical event through which Freud reconstructed the path along which the mystery of paternity advances in the unconscious of every man.

The structure of modern metaphor is no different. Hence the joculation, “Love is a pebble laughing in the sun,” recreates love in a dimension that I have said strikes me as tenable, as opposed to its ever imminent slippage into the mirage of some narcissistic altruism.

We see that metaphor is situated at the precise point at which meaning is produced in nonmeaning—that is, at the passage which, as Freud discovered, when crossed in the opposite direction, gives rise to the word that is “the word” (“le mot”) par excellence in French, the word that has no other patronage there than the signifier esprit— and at which it becomes palpable that, in deriding the signifier, man defies his very destiny.

But to return to metonymy now, what does man find in it, if it must be more than the power to skirt the obstacles of social censure? Doesn’t this form, which gives oppressed truth its field, manifest a certain servitude that is inherent in its presentation?

It’s worth taking the time to read a book in which Leo Strauss, from the land that has traditionally offered asylum to those who have chosen freedom, reflects on the relations between the art of writing and persecution. By honing in on the sort of connaturality that ties this art to this condition, he allows us to glimpse something that imposes its form here, in the effect of truth on desire.

But haven’t we been feeling for a while now that, in following the paths of the letter to reach the Freudian truth, we are getting hot, its flames spreading all around us?

Of course, as it is said, the letter kills while the spirit gives life. I don’t disagree, having had to pay homage somewhere here to a noble victim of the letter. The spirit’s pretensions would nevertheless remain indisputable if
the letter hadn't proven that it produces all its truth effects in man without the 
spirit having to intervene at all.

This revelation came to Freud, and he called his discovery the unconscious.

II. The Letter in the Unconscious

In Freud’s complete works, one out of three pages presents us with philological 
references, one out of two pages with logical inferences, and everywhere 
we see a dialectical apprehension of experience, linguistic analysis becoming 
still more prevalent the more directly the unconscious is involved.

Thus what is at stake on every page in *The Interpretation of Dreams* is what 
I call the letter of discourse, in its texture, uses, and immanence in the matter 
in question. For this book inaugurates both Freud’s work and his royal road 
to the unconscious. And we are informed of this by Freud, whose confession 
in letters to Fliess that have since been made public, when he launches this 
book toward us in the early days of this century,[] merely confirms what he 
continued to proclaim to the end: that the whole of his discovery lies in this 
no-holds-barred expression of his message.

The first clause, articulated already in the introductory chapter because its 
exposition cannot be postponed, is that the dream is a rebus. And Freud stipulates 
that it must be understood quite literally [à la lettre], as I said earlier. 
This is related to the instance in the dream of the same “literating” (in other 
words, phonemic) structure in which the signifier is articulated and analyzed 
discourse. Like the unnatural figures of the boat on the roof, or the man 
with a comma for a head, which are expressly mentioned by Freud, dream 
images are to be taken up only on the basis of their value as signifiers, that is, 
only insofar as they allow us to spell out the “proverb” presented by the oneiric 
rebus. The linguistic structure that enables us to read dreams is at the crux of 
the “signifierness of dreams,” at the crux of the *Traumdeutung*.

Freud shows us in every possible way that the image’s value as a signifier 
has nothing to do with its signification, giving as an example Egyptian hieroglyphics in which it would be ridiculous to deduce from the frequency in a 
text of a vulture (which is an aleph) or a chick (which is a vau) indicating a 
form of the verb “to be” and plurals, that the text has anything whatsoever 
where with these ornithological specimens. Freud takes his bearings from cer-
tain uses of the signifier in this writing that are effaced in ours, such as the 
use of determinatives, where a categorical figure is added as an exponent to 
the literal figuration of a verbal term; but this is only to bring us back to the 

But psychoanalysts who have no training in linguistics don’t need the current 
confusion regarding the term “ideogram” to believe in a symbolism deriving 
from natural analogy, or even from instinct’s coaptational image. This is 
so true that, apart from the French school, which attends to this, it is with a 
statement like “reading coffee grounds is not the same as reading hiero-
glyphics” that I must recall to its own principles a technique whose pathways 
cannot be justified unless they aim at the unconscious.

It must be said that this is admitted only reluctantly, and that the mental vice 
dounced above enjoys such favor that the contemporary psychoanalyst can 
be expected to say that he decodes before resolving to take the journey with 
Freud (turn at the statue of Champollion, says the guide) that is necessary for 
him to understand that he deciphers—the latter differing in that a cryptogram 
only takes on its full dimensions when it is in a lost language [langue].

Taking this journey simply amounts to going further in the *Traumdeutung*.

Erstellung, translated as “transposition”—which Freud shows to be the 
general precondition for the functioning of the dream—is what I designated 
earlier, with Saussure, as the sliding of the signified under the signifier, which 
is always happening (unconsciously, let us note) in discourse.

But the two aspects of the signifier’s impact on the signified are also found 
here:

Verdichtung, “condensation,” is the superimposed structure of signifiers in 
which metaphor finds its field; its name, condensing in itself the word Dicht-
ung, shows the mechanism’s connaturalism with poetry, to the extent that it 
envelops poetry’s own properly traditional function.

Verschiebung or “displacement”—this transfer of signification that 
metonymy displays is closer to the German term; it is presented, right from 
its first appearance in Freud’s work, as the unconscious’ best means by which 
to foil censorship.

What distinguishes these two mechanisms, which play a privileged role in 
the dream-work, *Traumaarbeit*, from their homologous function in discourse? 
Nothing, except a condition imposed upon the signifying material, called Rück-
nick auf Darstellung, which must be translated as “consideration of the 
means of staging” (the translation by “role of the possibility of representa-
tion” being overly approximate here). But this condition constitutes a limitation 
operating within the system of writing, rather than dissolving the system 
expression in which it would intersect the phenomena of nat-
certain types of pictography, which we are not justified in regarding as evo-
lutionary stages simply because they were abandoned in writing as imperfect.

Let us say, then, that dreams are like the parlor game in which each person, in
turn, is supposed to get the spectators to guess some well-known saying or variant of it solely by silent gestures. The fact that dreams have speech at their disposal makes no difference since, for the unconscious, speech is but one stagger- 
ing element among others. It is precisely when games and dreams alike run up against the lack of taxemic material by which to represent logical relationships such as causality, contradiction, hypothesis, and so on that they prove they have to do with writing, not mime. The subtle procedures dreams end up using to represent these logical connections—in a much less artificial way than games usually employ—are taken up specifically in Freud's work, where it is once again confirmed that the dream-work proceeds in accordance with the laws of the signifier.

The rest of the dream revision is termed "secondary" by Freud, taking on its value from what is at stake: they are fantasies or daydreams, Traumdeutung, to use the term Freud prefers to use to situate them in their wish-fulfilling function (Wunschverflüchtigung). Given that these fantasies may remain unconscious, their distinctive feature is clearly their signification. Now, Freud tells us that their role in dreams is either to serve as signifying elements for the statement of the unconscious thought (Traumgedanke), or to be used in the secondary revision that occurs—that is, in a function not to be distinguished, he says, from our waking thought (von unserem wachen Denken nicht zu unterscheiden). No better idea of this function's effects can be given than by comparing it to patches of colorwash which, when applied here and there on a stencil, can make stick figures—which are rather unprepossessing in themselves—in a rebus or hieroglyphics look more like a painting of people.

I apologize for seeming to spell out Freud's text myself; it is not merely to show how much is to be gained by not lopping off parts of it. It is to be able to situate what has happened in psychoanalysis in terms of its earliest reference points, which are fundamental and have never been revoked.

Right from the outset, people failed to recognize the constitutive role of the signifier in the status Freud immediately assigned to the unconscious in the most precise and explicit ways.

The reason for this was twofold, the least perceived being, naturally, that this formalization was not sufficient by itself to bring people to recognize the instance of the signifier, because when the Traumdeutung was published it was way ahead of the formalizations of linguistics for which one could no doubt show that it paved the way by the sheer weight of its truth.

The second reason is merely the flip side of the first, for if psychoanalysis were fascinated exclusively by the significations highlighted in the unconscious, it was because these significations derived their most secret attraction from the dialectic that seemed to be immanent in them.

I demonstrated to those who attend my seminar that the apparent changes of direction or rather changes in tack along the way—that Freud, in his primary concern to ensure the survival of his discovery along with the basic revisions it imposed upon our knowledge, felt it necessary to apply to his doctrine—were due to the need to counteract the ever-accelerating effects of this partiality.

For, I repeat, given the situation he found himself in, where he had nothing corresponding to the object of his discovery that was at the same level of scientific maturity, he at least never failed to maintain this object at the level of its ontological dignity.

The rest was the work of the gods and took such a course that analysis today finds its bearings in the imaginary forms I have just shown to be sketched out through inverse printing on the text they mutilate. It is to them that the analyst's aim now adapts, confusing them, in the interpretation of dreams, with the visionary liberation of the hieroglyphic aviary, and seeking more generally to verify the exhaustion of the analysis in a sort of "scanning" of these forms wherever they appear—with the idea that they bear witness both to the exhaustion of the regressions and to the remodeling of "the object-relation" that is supposed to typify the subject.

The technique that is based on such positions can give rise to many varied effects, which are quite difficult to criticize behind their therapeutic aegis. But an internal critique can emerge from the flagrant discordance between the mode of operation by which the technique legitimates itself—namely, the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis, all the instruments of which, starting with "free association," derive their justification from its inventor's conception of the unconscious—and the complete ignorance reigning there of this very conception of the unconscious. The most trenchant supporters of this technique let themselves off the hook here with a mere flourish: the fundamental rule must, they say, be observed all the more religiously since it is only the fruit of a lucky accident. In other words, Freud never really knew what he was doing.

A return to Freud's texts shows, on the contrary, the absolute coherence between his technique and his discovery, and this coherence allows us to situate his procedures at their proper level.

This is why any rectification of psychoanalysis requires a return to the truth of that discovery, which is impossible to obscure in its original moment.

For in the analysis of dreams, Freud intends to give us nothing other than the laws of the unconscious in their broadest extension. One of the reasons why dreams were the most propitious here is, Freud tells us, that they reveal these laws no less in normal subjects than in neurotics.

In neither, however, does the efficacy of the unconscious cease upon awak-
Ecrits

Psychoanalytic experience consists in nothing other than that the unconscious leaves none of our actions outside its field. The presence of the unconscious in the psychological order—in other words, in the individual's relational functions—nevertheless deserves to be more precisely defined. It is not coextensive with that order, for we know that, while unconscious motivation manifests itself just as much in conscious psychical effects as in unconscious ones, conversely it is elementary to note that a large number of psychical effects that are legitimately designated as unconscious, in the sense of excluding the characteristic of consciousness, nevertheless bear no relation whatsoever, by their nature, to the unconscious in the Freudian sense. It is thus only due to an incorrect use of the term that "psychical" and "unconscious" in this sense are confused, and that people thus term actually an effect of the unconscious on the soma, for example.

The point is, therefore, to define the topography of this unconscious. I say that it is the very topography defined by the algorithm:

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\frac{S}{S'}
\]

What it has permitted me to elaborate concerning the impact of the signifier on the signified allows for its transformation into:

\[
f(S) \frac{1}{S}
\]

It is on the basis of the copresence in the signified not only of the elements of the horizontal signifying chain but also of its vertical dependencies, that I have demonstrated the effects, distributed in accordance with two fundamental structures, in metonymy and metaphor. We can symbolize them by:

\[
f(S \ldots S') \equiv S (-) s
\]

that is, metonymic structure, indicating that it is the signifier-to-signifier connection that allows for the elision by which the signifier instates lack of being [le manque de l'être] in the object-relation, using signification's referral [renvoi] value to invest it with the desire aiming at the lack that it supports. The sign placed in ( ) manifests here the maintenance of the bar — which, in the first algorithm, denotes the irreducible nature of the resistance of signification as constituted in the relations between signifier and signified. It is thus only due to an incorrect use of the term that "psychical" in this sense are confused, and that people thus term actually an effect of the unconscious on the soma, for example.

The point is, therefore, to define the topography of this unconscious. I say that it is the very topography defined by the algorithm:

\[
\frac{S}{S'}
\]

What it has permitted me to elaborate concerning the impact of the signifier on the signified allows for its transformation into:

\[
f(S) \frac{1}{S}
\]

It is on the basis of the copresence in the signified not only of the elements of the horizontal signifying chain but also of its vertical dependencies, that I have demonstrated the effects, distributed in accordance with two fundamental structures, in metonymy and metaphor. We can symbolize them by:

\[
f(S \ldots S') \equiv S (-) s
\]

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Is the place that I occupy as subject of the signifier concentric or eccentric in relation to the place I occupy as subject of the signified? That is the question.

The point is not to know whether I speak of myself in a way that conforms to what I am, but rather to know whether, when I speak of myself, I am the same as the self of whom I speak. And there is no reason not to bring in the term "thought" here. For Freud uses the term to designate the elements at stake in the unconscious, that is, in the signifying mechanisms I just pointed to there.

It is nonetheless true that the philosophical cogito is at the center of the mirage that renders modern man so sure of being himself in his uncertainties about himself, and even in the distrust he has long since learned to exercise regarding the pitfalls of pride.

Now if, turning the weapon of metonymy against the nostalgia that it serves, I stop myself from seeking any meaning beyond tautology, and if, in the name of "war is war" and "a penny's a penny," I resolve to be only what I am, how can I escape here from the obvious fact that I am in this very act?

And how—in going to the other, metaphoric, pole of the signifying quest, and dedicating myself to becoming what I am, to coming into being—can I doubt that, even if I were to lose myself there, I am there?

Now it is on these very points, where the obvious is subverted by the empirical, that the trick of the Freudian conversion lies.

This signifying game of metonymy and metaphor—up to and including its active tip [pointe] that "coter-pins" my desire to a refusal of the signifier or to a lack of being, and links my fate to the question of my destiny—this game is played, in its inexorable subtlety, until the match is over, where I am not because I cannot situate myself there.

That is, it wasn't going very far to say the words with which I momentarily dumbfounded my audience: I am thinking where I am not, therefore I am where I am not thinking. These words render palpable to an attentive ear with what elusive ambiguity the ring of meaning flees from our grasp along the verbal string.

What we must say is: I am not, where I am the playing of my thought. I think about what I am where I do not think I am thinking.

This two-sided mystery can be seen to intersect the fact that truth is evoked only in that dimension of ruse whereby all "realism" in creation derives its virtue from metonymy, as well as this other fact that access to meaning is granted only to the double elbow of metaphor, when we hold in our hand their one and only key: namely, the fact that the S and s of the Saussurian algorithm are not in the same plane, and man was deluding himself in believing he was situated in their common axis, which is nowhere.

At least until Freud made this discovery. For if what Freud discovered isn't precisely that, it is nothing.

The contents of the unconscious, in their deceptive ambiguity, supply us no reality in the subject more consistent than the immediate; it is from truth that they derive their virtue in the dimension of being: Kern unseres Wesen is Freud's own expression.

Metaphor's two-stage mechanism is the very mechanism by which symptoms, in the analytic sense, are determined. Between the enigmatic signifier of sexual trauma and the term it comes to replace in a current signifying chain, a spark flies that fixes in a symptom—a metaphor in which flesh or function is taken as a signifying element—the signification, that is inaccessible to the conscious subject, by which the symptom may be dissolved.

And the enigmas that desire—with its frenzy mimicking the gulf of the infinitesimal and the secret collusion whereby it envelops the pleasure of knowing and dominating in jouissance—poses for any sort of "natural philosophy" are based on no other derangement of instinct than the fact that it is caught in the rails of metonymy, eternally extending toward the desire for something else. Hence its "perverse" fixation at the very point of suspension of the signifying chain at which the screen-memory is immobilized and the fascinating image of the fetish becomes frozen.

There is no other way to conceive of the indestructibility of unconscious desire—given that there is no need which, when its satiation is prohibited, does not wither, in extreme cases through the very wasting away of the organism itself. It is in a kind of memory, comparable to what goes by that name in our modern thinking-machines (which are based on an electronic realization of signifying composition), that the chain is found which insists by reproducing itself in the transference, and which is the chain of a dead desire.

It is the truth of what this desire has been in his history that the subject cries out through his symptom, as Christ said that stones themselves would have cried out, had the children of Israel not lent them their voices.

And this is also why psychoanalysis alone allows us to differentiate in memory the function of remembering. The latter, rooted in the signifier, resolves the Platonic aporias of reminiscence through the ascendancy of history in man.

One need but read Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality—which is covered over for the masses by so many pseudo-biological glosses—to note that Freud has all access to the object derive from a dialect of return.
Having thus begun with Holderlin’s νόστος, Freud arrives less than twenty years later at Kierkegaard’s repetition; that is, his thought, in submitting at the outset to the humble but inflexible consequences of the talking cure* alone, was never able to let go of the living servitudes that, starting from the royal principle of the Logos, led him to rethink the deadly Empedoclean machina never able to let go of the living servitudes that, starting from the outset to the humble but inflexible consequences of the talking cure* alone, was never able to let go of the living servitudes that, starting from the royal principle of the Logos, led him to rethink the deadly Empedoclean antinomies.

And how, if not on the “other scene” Freud speaks of as the locus of the dream, are we to understand his recourse as a man of science to a Deus ex machina that is less derisory in that here it is revealed to the spectator that the machine directs the director himself? How can we fathom the fact that a scientist of the nineteenth century valued more highly than all his other works his Totem and Taboo—with its obscene, ferocious figure of the primordial father, who is inexhaustibly redeemed in the eternal blinding of Oedipus—before which contemporary ethnologists bow as before the Incarnation of Christ, the smallest details of the neurotic’s compulsions, answer to the same necessities as do myths.

This is why, to bring you to the precise point of the commentary on Freud’s work I am developing in my seminar, little Hans, left in the lurch at the age of five by the failings of his symbolic entourage, and faced with the suddenly actualized enigma to him of his sex and his existence, develops—under the direction of Freud and his father, who is Freud’s disciple—all the possible permutations of a limited number of signifiers in the form of a myth, around the signifying crystal of his phobia.

We see here that, even at the individual level, man can find a solution to the impossible by exhausting all possible forms of the impossibilities that are encountered when the solution is put into the form of a signifying equation. This is a striking demonstration that illuminates the labyrinth of a case study which thus far has been used only as a scrap heap. It also makes us grasp that the nature of neurosis is revealed in the fact that a symptom’s development is coextensive with its elimination in the treatment: whether phobic, hysterical, or obsessive, neurosis is a question that being raises for the subject “from where he was before the subject came into the world” (this subordinate clause is the very expression Freud uses in explaining the Oedipus complex to little Hans).

At stake here is the being that appears in a split second in the emptiness of the verb “to be” and, as I said, this being raises its question for the subject. What does that mean? It does not raise it before the subject, since the subject cannot come to the place where being raises it, but being raises it in the subject’s place—in other words, being raises the question in that place with the subject, just as one raises a problem with a pen and as antiquity’s man thought with his soul.

Freud brought the ego into his doctrine in this way, defining it by the resistances that are specific to it.22 I have tried to get people to understand that these resistances are imaginary in nature, like the coaptational lures that ethology shows us in display or combat in animal behavior, these lures being reduced in man to the narcissistic relation introduced by Freud and elaborated by me in “The Mirror Stage.” While Freud—by situating in this ego the synthesis of the perceptual functions in which the sensorimotor selections are integrated—seems to agree with the tradition that delegates to the ego the task of answering for reality, this reality is simply all the more included in the suspension of the ego.

For this ego, distinguished first for the imaginary inertias it concentrates against the message of the unconscious, operates only by covering over the displacement the subject is with a resistance that is essential to discourse as such.

This is why an exhaustion of the defense mechanisms, as palpable as Fenichel renders it in his Problems of Psychoanalytic Technique because he is a practitioner (whereas his whole theoretical reduction of the neuroses and psychoses to generic anomalies in libidinal development is pure platitude), turns out to be the other side of unconscious mechanisms, without Fenichel accounting for or even realizing it. Periphrasis, hyperbaton, ellipsis, suspension, anticipation, retraction, negation, digression, and irony, these are the figures of style (Quinillian’s figurae sententiarum), just as catachresis, litotes, anomalasia, and hypotyposis are the tropes, whose names strike me as the most appropriate ones with which to label these mechanisms. Can one see here mere manners of speaking, when it is the figures themselves that are at work in the rhetoric of the discourse the analysand actually utters?

By obstinately characterizing resistance as having an emotional permanence, thereby making it foreign to discourse, contemporary psychoanalysts simply show that they have succumbed to one of the fundamental truths Freud rediscovered through psychoanalysis. Which is that we cannot confine ourselves to giving a new truth its rightful place, for the point is to take up our place in it: The truth requires us to go out of our way. We cannot do so by simply getting used to it. We get used to reality [réel]. The truth we repress.

Now it is especially necessary to the scholar, the sage, and even the quack, to be the only one who knows. The idea that deep within the simplest of souls—and, what’s more, in the sickest—there is something ready to blossom is one thing. But that there may be someone who seems to know as much as them...
about what we ought to make of it... come to our rescue yon categories of primitive, pre-logical, and archaic thought—nay, of magical thought, so convenient to attribute to others! It is not fitting that these country bumpkins should keep us breathless by posing enigmas to us that prove overly clever.

To interpret the unconscious as Freud did, one would have to be, as he was, an encyclopedia of the arts and muses, as well as an assiduous reader of the Fliegende Blätter. And the task would become no easier were we to put ourselves at the mercy of a thread spun of allusions and quotations, puns and equivocations. Must we make a career out of “antedated fanfreluches”?

Indeed, we must resolve to do so. The unconscious is neither the primal nor the instinctual, and what it knows of the elemental is no more than the elements of the signifier.

The three books that one might call canonical with regard to the unconscious—the Traumdeutung, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, and Jokes (Witz) and their Relation to the Unconscious—are but a web of examples whose development is inscribed in formulas for connection and substitution (though multiplied tenfold by their particular complexity, diagrams of them sometimes being provided by Freud outside the main body of the text), which are the formulas I give for the signifier in its transference function. For in the Traumdeutung it is in terms of such a function that the term Übertragung, or transference, which later gave its name to the mainspring of the intersubjective link between analysand and analyst, is introduced.

Such diagrams are not solely constitutive in neurosis of each of the symptoms, but they alone allow us to encompass the thematic of its course and resolution—as the major case histories provided by Freud demonstrate admirably.

To fall back on a more limited fact, but one that is more manageable as it provides a final seal with which to close these remarks, I will cite the 1927 article on fetishism and the case Freud reports there of a patient for whom sexual satisfaction required a certain shine on the nose (Glanz auf der Nase). The analysis showed that he owed it to the fact that his early English-speaking years had displaced the burning curiosity that attached him to his mother’s phallus—that is, to that eminent want-to-be, whose privileged signifier Freud revealed—into a “glance at the nose,” rather than a “shine on the nose,” in the forgotten language (langue) of his childhood.

It was the abyss, open to the thought that a thought might make itself heard in the abyss, that gave rise to resistance to psychoanalysis from the outset—not the emphasis on man’s sexuality, as is commonly said. The latter is the object that has clearly predominated in literature throughout the ages. And the evolution of psychoanalysis has succeeded by a comical stroke of magic in turning it into a moral instance, the cradle and waiting area of oblivity.

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The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious

Is what thinks in my place, then, another ego? Does Freud’s discovery represent the confirmation, at the level of psychological experience, of Manichaeism?24

There can, in fact, be no confusion on this point: what Freud’s research introduced us to was not some more or less curious cases of dual personality. Even at the heroic era I have been describing—when, like animals in the age of fairy tales, sexuality spoke—the diabolical atmosphere that such an orientation might have given rise to never materialized.25

The goal Freud’s discovery proposes to man was defined by Freud at the height of his thought in these moving terms: Wo Es war, soll Ich werden. Where it was, I must come into being.

This goal is one of reintegration and harmony, I might even say of reconciliation [Versöhnung].

But if we ignore the self’s radical eccentricity with respect to itself that man is faced with—in other words, the very truth Freud discovered—we will renge on both the order and pathways of psychoanalytic mediation; we will make of it the compromise operation that it has, in effect, become—precisely what both the spirit and letter of Freud’s work most repudiate. For, since he constantly points out that compromise is behind all the miseries his analysis assuages, we can say that resorting to compromise, whether explicit or implicit, disorients all psychoanalytic action and plunges it into darkness.

But neither does it suffice to rub shoulders with the moralistic tartufferies of our time or to be forever spouting forth about the “total personality” in order to have said anything articulate about the possibility of mediation.
The radical heteronomy that Freud’s discovery shows gaping within man can no longer be covered over without whatever tries to hide it being fundamentally dishonest.

Which other is this, then, to whom I am more attached than to myself [mot] since, at the most assented to heart of my identity to myself, he pulls the strings?

His presence can only be understood in an alterity raised to the second power, which already situates him in a mediating position in relation to my own splitting from myself, as if from a semblable.

If I have said that the unconscious is the Other’s discourse (with capital O), it is in order to indicate the beyond in which the recognition of desire is tied to the desire for recognition.

In other words, this other is the Other that even my lie invokes as a guarantor of the truth in which my lie subsists.

Here we see that the dimension of truth emerges with the appearance of language.

Prior to this point, we have to admit the existence—in the psychological relation, which can be precisely isolated in the observation of animal behavior—of subjects, not because of some projective mirage, it being the psychologist’s vacuous watchword to hack this phantom to pieces, but because of the manifested presence of intersubjectivity. In the animal hidden in his lookout, in the well-laid trap, in the straggler ruse by which a runaway separated from the flock throws a raptor off the scent, something more emerges than in the fascinating erection of display or combat. Yet there is nothing here that transcends the function of a lure in the service of a need. Or is it simply a presence in that beyond-the-veil where the whole of Nature can be questioned about its design.

For the question to even arise (and we know that it arose for Freud in Beyond the Pleasure Principle), there must be language.

For I can lure my adversary with a movement that runs counter to my battle plan, and yet this movement has its deceptive effect only insofar as I actually make it for my adversary.

But in the proposals by which I initiate peace negotiations with him, what my negotiations propose is situated in a third locus which is neither my speech nor my interlocutor.

This locus is nothing but the locus of signifying convention, as is seen in the comedy of the distressed complaint of the Jew to his pal: “Why are you telling me you are going to Cracow so I’ll believe you are going to Lemberg when you really are going to Cracow?”

Of course the aforementioned flock-movement can be understood in the conventional register of a game’s strategy, where it is on the basis of a rule that I can deceive my adversary; but here my success is assessed as connoting betrayal—that is, as it is assessed in the relationship to the Other who is the guarantor of Good Faith.

Here the problems are of an order whose heteronomy is simply ignored if it is reduced to some “awareness of others,” or whatever people choose to call it. For the “existence of the other” having, not long ago, reached the ears of Midas, the psychoanalyst, through the partition that separates him from the phenomenologists’ confabs, the news is now being whispered through the reeds: “Midas, King Midas, is the other of his patient. He himself said so.”

What sort of breakthrough is that? The other—which other?

Which other was the young André Gide aiming at when he defied the landlady, in whose care his mother had placed him, to treat him as a responsible being by unlocking right in front of her—with a key that was fake only insofar as it opened all locks of the same kind—the lock that she herself considered to be the worthy signifier of her educational intentions? Was it she who would later intervene and to whom the child would laughingly say: “Do you really think a lousy padlock can ensure my obedience?” But by simply remaining out of sight and waiting until that evening before lecturing the kid, after giving him a suitably cold reception upon his return home, it was not simply a female other whose angry face she showed him, but another André Gide, one who no longer really sure, either then or even later when he thought back on it, what he had wanted to do—who had been changed right down to his very truth by the doubt cast on his good faith.

Perhaps it would be worth dwelling on this realm of confusion—which is simply that in which the whole human opera buffa is played out—to understand the pathways by which analysis proceeds, not only to restore order here but also to instate the conditions for the possibility of its restoration.

Kern unseres Wesen, “the core of our being”—it is not so much that Freud commands us to target this, as so many others before him have done with the familiar adage “Know thyself,” as that he asks us to reconsider the pathways that lead to it.

Or, rather, the “this” which he proposes we attain is not a this which can be the object of knowledge, but a this—doesn’t he say as much?—which constitutes my being and to which, as he teaches us, I bear witness as much and more in my whims, aberrations, phobias, and fetishes, than in my more or less civilized personage.

Madness, you are no longer the object of the ambiguous praise with which the sage furnished the impregnable burrow of his fear. And if he is, after all, not so badly enconced there, it is because the supreme agent at work since
time immemorial, digging its tunnels and maze, is reason itself, the same Logos he serves.

Then how do you explain the fact that a scholar like Erasmus, with so little talent for the "commitments" that solicited him in his age, as in any other could hold such an eminent place in the revolution brought about by a Reformation in which man has as much of a stake in each man as in all men?

It is by touching, however lightly, on man's relation to the signifier—in this case, by changing the procedures of exegesis—that one changes the course of his history by modifying the moorings of his being.

It is precisely in this respect that anyone capable of glimpsing the changes we have lived through in our own lives can see that Freudianism, however misunderstood it has been and however nebulous its consequences have been, constitutes an intangible but radical revolution. There is no need to go seeking witnesses to the fact:36 everything that concerns not just the human sciences, but the destiny of man, politics, metaphysics, literature, the arts, advertising, propaganda—and thus, no doubt, economics—has been affected by it.

But is this anything more than the dissonant effects of an immense truth where Freud has traced a pure path? It must be said here that a technique that takes advantage of the psychological categorization alone of its object is not following this path, as is the case of contemporary psychoanalysis apart from a return to the Freudian discovery.

Thus the vulgarity of the concepts by which its practice shows its mettle, the embroidery of Freudery [sofreudisme] which is now mere decoration, and what must be called the discredit in which it prospers, together bear witness to the fundamental repudiation of that discovery.

Through his discovery, Freud brought the border between object and being that seemed to mark the limits of science within its ambit.

This is the symptom of and prelude to a reexamination of man's situation in the midst of beings [dans l'étant], as all the postulates of knowledge have heretofore assumed it to be—but please don't be content to classify the fact that I am saying so as a case of Heideggerianism, even prefixed by a "neo-" that adds nothing to the trashy style by which it is common to spare oneself any reflection with the quip, "Separate that out for me from its mental jetsam."

When I speak of Heidegger, or rather when I translate him, I strive to preserve the sovereign signifinence of the speech he professes.

If I speak of the letter and being, if I distinguish the other from the Other, it is because Freud suggests them to me as the terms to which resistance and transference effects refer—effects against which I have had to wage unequal battle in the twenty years that I have been engaged in the practice that we call repeating after Freud, call impossible: that of psychoanalysis. It is also because I must help others avoid losing their way there.

It is to prevent the field they have inherited from falling fallow, and to that end to convey that if the symptom is a metaphor, it is not a metaphor to say so, any more than it is to say that man's desire is a metonymy. For the symptom is a metaphor, whether one likes to admit it or not, just as desire is a metonymy, even if man scoffs at the idea.

Thus, if I am to rouse you to indignation over the fact that, after so many centuries of religious hypocrisy and philosophical posturing, no one has yet validly articulated what links metaphor to the question of being and metonymy to its lack, something of the object of this indignation must still be there—something that, as both instigator and victim, corresponds to it: namely, the man of humanism and the irremediably contested debt he has incurred against his intentions.

T.t.y.e.m.u.p.t.
May 14—26, 1957

Related to this article is a presentation I made on April 23, 1960, to the Philosophical Society regarding the paper Mr. Perelman gave there on his theory of metaphor as a rhetorical function—found in his Traité de l'argumentation.

My presentation is included as an appendix (Appendix II) in this volume [Écrits 1966].

Notes

2. The theme was "Psychoanalysis and the sciences of man."
3. The talk took place on May 9, 1957, in the Discours Amphithéâtre at the Sorbonne, and discussion continued afterward over drinks.
5. This point—so useful in overturning the concept of "psychological function," which obscures everything related to the matter—becomes clear as day in the purely linguistic analysis of the two major forms of aphasia classified by one of the leaders of modern linguistics, Roman Jakobson. See the most accessible of his works (coauthored by Morris Halle), Fundamentals of Language ('s Gravenhage and New York: Mouton, 1956), part II, chapters 1 to 4; see too the collection of translations into French of his works that we owe to Nicolas Ruwet, Essais de linguistique générale (Paris: Minuit, 1963).
6. Recall that discussion about the need for a new language in communist society really did take place, and that Stalin, much to the relief of those who lent credence to his philosophy, put an end to it as follows: language is not a superstructure.
7. By "linguistics" I mean the study of existing languages [langues] as regards their structure and the laws they reveal; this does not include the theory of abstract codes (incorrectly placed under the heading of communication theory), so-called information theory (originating in physics), or any more
or less hypothetically generalized semiology.

8. Cf. St. Augustine's De Magistro; I analyzed the chapter "De significacione locutionis" in my seminar on June 23, 1954.

9. Thus I. A. Richards, author of a book about procedures appropriate for reaching this objective, shows us their application in another approach exemplified. And the man of letters, of the one and the common sense of depressing British psychologism. And not, our demonstration-model wringer has been guaranteed of in my seminar on June 23, 1954.

10. Indeed, one can recognize in such oblique forms of allegiance the style of that immortal couple, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, who are set apart from the parted, not even by the imperfection of their destiny, for it lasts by the same method as Jeannot's knife, and for this very reason for which Goethe praised Shakespeare for presenting the character in their dialogue: all by themselves they are the whole Gesellschaft, Society in a nutshell (Wolken Meisters Lohnjahre, Vol. 5, ed. Trup. [Hamburg Christian Wegner Verlag], 299)—I mean the International Psychoanalitical Association.

(We should extract the whole passage from Goethe: Dieses lose Aufrreiten, dieses Schieben und Biegen, dies Jasagen, Streichen und Schmeicheln, dieses Behendigkeit, diese Schwänzchen, diese Allheit und Leereheit, diese rechtliche Schurkerei, diese Unfähigkeit, wie kann sie durch einen Menschen ausgedruckt werden? Es sollten ihrer wenigstens ein Dunst sein, wenn man sie haben könnte; denn sie blos in Gesellschaft etwas, sie sind die Gesellschaft.)

Let us be grateful, in this context, to the author of "Some Remarks on the Role of Speech in Psycho-Analytic Technique" (JPP Speech in Psycho-Analytic Technique 6 [1956]: 467) for taking the trouble to point out that his remarks are "based on work by him that dates back to 1952. This is work by him that dates back to 1952. This is work by him that dates back to 1952. This is work by him that dates back to 1952. This is work by him that dates back to 1952. This is work by him that dates back to 1952. This is work by him that dates back to 1952. This is work by him that dates back to 1952. This is work by him)

11. I did so on June 6, 1956, taking as an example the first scene of Athelas, incited, I confess, by an allusion—made in passing by a highbrow critic in The New Statesman and Nation—to the "supreme bitchery" of Racine's heroines, designed to dissuade us from making reference to Shakespeare's savage tragedies, which has become compulsory in analytic circles where such references serve to whitewash the vulgarity of Philistinism.

12. (Added in 1966:) The publication by Jean Starobinski in Le Mercure de France (February 1964), of the notes left by Saussure on anagrams and their hypogrammatical use, from the Saturnine verses to the writings of Cicero, provide the corroboration I didn't have at the time.

13. I pay homage here to what this formulation owes to Roman Jakobson, that is, to his written work, in which a psychoanalytic can always find something to structure his own experience, and which renders superficial these "personal communications" that I could not treat as anyone else.

Indeed, one can recognize in such oblique forms of allegiance the style of that immortal couple, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, who are set apart from the parted, not even by the imperfection of their destiny, for it lasts by the same method as Jeannot's knife, and for this very reason for which Goethe praised Shakespeare for presenting the character in their dialogue: all by themselves they are the whole Gesellschaft, Society in a nutshell (Wolken Meisters Lohnjahre, Vol. 5, ed. Trup. [Hamburg Christian Wegner Verlag], 299)—I mean the International Psychoanalitical Association.

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12. (Added in 1966:) The publication by Jean Starobinski in Le Mercure de France (February 1964), of the notes left by Saussure on anagrams and their hypogrammatical use, from the Saturnine verses to the writings of Cicero, provide the corroboration I didn't have at the time.

13. I pay homage here to what this formulation owes to Roman Jakobson, that is, to his written work, in which a psychoanalytic can always find something to structure his own experience, and which renders superficial these "personal communications" that I could not treat as anyone else.

Indeed, one can recognize in such oblique forms of allegiance the style of that immortal couple, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, who are set apart from the parted, not even by the imperfection of their destiny, for it lasts by the same method as Jeannot's knife, and for this very reason for which Goethe praised Shakespeare for presenting the character in their dialogue: all by themselves they are the whole Gesellschaft, Society in a nutshell (Wolken Meisters Lohnjahre, Vol. 5, ed. Trup. [Hamburg Christian Wegner Verlag], 299)—I mean the International Psychoanalitical Association.

(We should extract the whole passage from Goethe: Dieses lose Aufrreiten, dieses Schieben und Biegen, dies Jasagen, Streichen und Schmeicheln, dieses Behendigkeit, diese Schwänzchen, diese Allheit und Leereheit, diese rechtliche Schurkerei, diese Unfähigkeit, wie kann sie durch einen Menschen ausgedruckt werden? Es sollten ihrer wenigstens ein Dunst sein, wenn man sie haben könnte; denn sie blos in Gesellschaft etwas, sie sind die Gesellschaft.)

Let us be grateful, in this context, to the author of "Some Remarks on the Role of Speech in Psycho-Analytic Technique" (JPP Speech in Psycho-Analytic Technique 6 [1956]: 467) for taking the trouble to point out that his remarks are "based on work by him that dates back to 1952. This is work by him that dates back to 1952. This is work by him that dates back to 1952. This is work by him that dates back to 1952. This is work by him that dates back to 1952. This is work by him that dates back to 1952. This is work by him that dates back to 1952. This is work by him that dates back to 1952. This is work by him)

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