The four modes of dwelling have a denominator: language. "Language is the house of Being," Heidegger says, intending that language contains the whole of reality. 136 What does that mean? What does the word "house" mean here? It means that everything that is, is known through language, and that everything remains in language. Things and language are given together. We all know the strange experience of meeting something or somebody without yet knowing the name. It is the name which makes what is perceived part of a world, and hence makes it a meaningful percept. "In the naming, the things named are called into their thinging." Therefore language is the "house" of Being. Man's being-in-theworld as mood and understanding depends on language, or, in Heidegger's words: "Discourse is existentially equiprimordial with state-of-mind and understanding." No world is given without language, and in language the world is, so to speak, stored. When man speaks, he makes what is kept in language appear. In speaking, he reveals how things are, rather than expressing "himself." Therefore Heidegger says: "Language speaks, ...and, "man speaks only as he responds to language."138

Heidegger's understanding of language differs fundamentally from the current linguistic theory which considers language a system of conventional signs, or "code." This theory deprives language of any existential basis, and reduces it to an arbitrary, "culturally determined" construct. which serves communication rather than revelation. Language evidently is a means of communication and has a historical dimension; this, however, does not explain its fundamental nature as the "house of Being." It


follows from Heidegger's definition that discourse is a "putting into words" of truth, which, in accordance with the Greek concept of alétheia, happens as simultaneous disclosure and concealment. That is, when something is revealed, it implies that other aspects of what is, remain hidden. We can never have the whole truth, but only illuminate certain aspects at a time. This process never stops, and the way it happens is certainly culturally determined. It takes place, however, within the "house of Being," which is always there as the timeless ground on which revelation occurs. When man speaks, he founds this ground and at the same time relates what is transcient to what remains, giving it thus its 'measure."140

How, then, does man speak? "Poetry speaks in images," Heidegger says, and "poetry is what really lets us dwell.' That is, when man speaks he creates an image which reveals the world, and offers us an existential foothold. Such images disclose the nature of things as interdependent parts of that "mirror-play" which is the world. "Earth and sky, divinities and mortals... each of the four mirrors in its own way the presence of the others... This mirroring does not portray a likeness. The mirroring, lightening each of the four, appropriates their own presencing into simple belonging to one another... This appropriative mirroring sets each of the four free into its own, but it binds these free ones into the simplicity of their essential being toward one another."142 Thus "the poet calls all the brightness of the sights of the sky and every sound of its courses and breezes into the singing word and there makes them shine and ring. Yet the poet, if he is a poet does not describe the mere appearance of sky and earth. The poet calls, in the

sights of the sky, that which in its very self-disclosure causes the appearance of that which conceals itself, and indeed as that which conceals itself. Thus the image lets the invisible be seen, and lets man dwell. What is here stated, is that poetry is the authentic mode of discourse, and that all other uses of language are made possible by poetic understanding. "Poetry proper is never merely a higher mode of everyday language. It is rather the reverse: Everyday language is a forgotten and used-up poem." 144

It goes without saying that language is shared. As the "house of Being"-it is not invented individually, but given as part of a common world. Thus it does not only help man to belong to the earth, but also to belong to the others. Being-in-the-world is always a being-with-others<sup>145</sup> and to share a world is not only a question of the here and now but of the common ground.

The language of architecture To be able to understand the language of architecture, it has been necessary to look into the nature of language in general. How, then is architecture a language? Evidently buildings do not name anything, they are not words and it is even doubtful whether they may be considered "signs."146 And still, they speak. Over and over again those who have been open to listen, have beheld the "saying" of works of architecture. "Few things are indeed so strange as this thaumaturgic art of the builder," Baillie Scott writes, "he places stones in certain positions — cuts them in certain ways, and behold, they begin to speak with tongues - a language of their own, with meanings too deep for words.147 When this happens, truth is not "put into words," but rather "set into work." It is not enough that man






"says" the things, he also has to keep and visualize them in concrete images which help us to see our environment as it is. Together with painting, sculpture, and music, Heidegger explicitly names architecture as one of the arts which "in essence are poetry." In general, "art is the setting-into-work of truth." Basically this happens as a "poetic projection" which "sets itself into work as figure (Gestalt)." "Figure is the structure in whose shape the rift composes and submits itself.149 The world "rift" (Riss) here means the difference between thing and world, that is, between beings and Being. In "composing the rift," things are illuminated and world revealed. The word "figure" does not mean an abstract shape but a concrete embodiment. "The rift must set iself back into the heavy weight of stone, the dumb hardness of wood, the dark glow of colors." In general, embodiment takes place in things, or in the "earth," which Heidegger in this context understands as the opposite of world. The setting-into-work thus becomes as "strife between world and earth," the world offering the "measure" and the earth the "boundary" of the figure.

To illustrate his notion of art, Heidegger uses an example taken from ar-chitecture. "A building, a Greek temple, portrays nothing. It simply stands there in the middle of the rock-cleft valley. The building encloses the figure of the god, and in this concealment lets it stand out into the holy precinct through the open portico... The temple and its precinct, however, do not fade away into the indefinite. It is the templework that fits together and at the same time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape

118. "The mute resistance of wood," Norwegian peasant house (eighteenth century).



of destiny for the human being... Standing there, the building rests on the rocky ground. This resting draws up out of the rock the mystery of that rock's clumsy yet spontaneous support. Standing there, the building holds its ground against the storm raging above it and so first makes the storm manifest in its violence. The luster and gleam of the stone, though itself apparently glowing only by the grace of the sun, yet first brings to light the light of the day, the breadth of the sky the darkness of the night. The temple's firm towering makes visible the invisible space of air.. The temple-work, standing there, opens up a world and at the same time sets this world back again on earth, which itself only thus emerges as native ground... The temple, in its standing there, first gives to things their look and to men their outlook on themselves."151

What does this passage tell us? To begin with Heidegger points out that the work of art, the building, does not represent anything; rather it presents: lit brings something into presence. Then he goes on telling what this something is. First, the temple makes the god present. Second, it "fits together" what shapes the destiny of human being. Finally, the temple makes all the things of the earth visible: the rock, the sea, the air, the plants, the animals, and even the light of the day and the darkness of the night. In doing this, the temple "opens up a world and at the same time sets this world back again on earth." Thus it sets truth into work. How, then, is that accomplished? Four times Heidegger repeats that the temple does what it does by "standing there." Both words are important. The temple does not stand anywhere; it stands there, "in the middle of the rock-cleft valley." The words rock-cleft valley are certain-

ly not introduced as an ornament. Rather they indicate that temples are built in particular, prominent places. By means of the building the place gets extension and delimitation, whereby a holy precinct is formed. In other words, the meaning of the place is revealed by the building. How the building makes the destiny of the people present, is not explicit, but it is implied that this is done simultaneously with the housing of the god, which means that the fate of the people is also intimately related to the place. The visualization of the earth, finally, is taken care of by the temple's standing. It rests on the ground and towers into the air. In doing this, it gives to things their look. In general, the temple is not "added" to the place as something foreign, but, standing there, first makes the place emerge as what it is. What a poem and a work of art have in common is their being images, or in our terminology, their figural quality. A work is in addition a thing; but a thing as such does not possess the quality of image. As a gathering it mirrors the fourfold in its way, but its thingness is hidden and has to be disclosed by the work. Thus Heidegger shows how Van Gogh's painting of a pair of peasant shoes reveal the thingness of the shoes. By themselves, the shoes are mute, but the work of art speaks for them. Thus the work gives the world presence. We have already, following Heidegger, defined the world which is disclosed by the work of architecture as the known or "inhabited" landscape. We have also pointed out that the spatiality of this landscape may be understood in terms

of the two aspects, admittance and

embodiment. A location, thus, makes

room for the fourfold and simultane-

ously, as a built thing, discloses the

fourfold. Evidently a work of architec-

ture does not make a total world visi-

ble, but only certain of its aspects. These aspects are contained in the concept of spatiality. Spatiality is a concrete term denominating a domain of things which constitute an inhabited landscape. The Greek example in fact starts with the image of a rock-cleft valley and later refers to several concrete elements of earth and sky. But it also suggests that landscape cannot be isolated from human life and from the divine. The inhabited landscape therefore is a manifestation of the fourfold, and comes into presence through the buildings which bring it close to man. We could also say that the inhabited landscape denominates the spatiality of the fourfold. This spatiality becomes manifest as a particular between of earth and sky, that is, as a place. A work of architecture is therefore not an abstract organization of space. It is a concrete figure, where the plan (Grundriss) mirrors the admittance, and the elevation (Aufriss) the embodiment. Thus it brings the inhabited landscape close, and lets man dwell poetically, which is the ultimate aim of architecture.

In the last four chapters we have discussed the morphology, topology and typology of the manifestations of the modes of dwelling, and should to conclude sum up the findings in some general remarks on the language of architecture.

Morphology

We have acknowledged that the meaning of a built form consists in its standing, rising and opening, that is, in its being between earth and sky. Through its being between earth and sky it gathers and embodies a world. We may also say that the embodiment takes place in the boundaries which define the spaces where life takes place, primarily in the wall. Thus we have

discussed the wall of the settlement, the wall of the urban spaces, the wall of the public building and the wall of the house, and found that they are distinguished by certain characteristics. The city wall, thus, mainly appears as a silhouette, the urban wall as a varied repetition of a "theme," the public wall as a conspicuous order, and the private wall as a relatively informal reflection of a particular "here." We have also mentioned that floor and ceiling (roof) play a role in the definition of the built form. In vernacular architecture, thus. the roof usually recalls the forms of the landscape, whereas the public roof may act as a symbolic landmark, for instance in the shape of a dome. 152 The wall is as a matter of fact composed of elements. Thus it usually consists of stories which are more or less distinguished from each other. This distinction is taken care of by means of subordinate elements such as columns, architraves, arches, windows, bases and cornices. Together these elements constitute a built figure. What, then, is in this context the difference between element and figure? The figure is characterized by being a form which gathers earth and sky. The three-story wall of the "classical" palace may illustrate what this means. The groundfloor should at the same time express closeness to the earth, that is, solidity and enclosure, and entry, that is, communication with the outside world. This double and, in a certain sense, contradictory task, has for instance been solved by means of mighty stone piers. possibly in connection with squat arches. Magnificent examples are found in the buildings of Richardson and Sullivan. 158 The top floor, on the contrary, should present closeness to the sky and a panoramic view. It was therefore often transformed into a light and open loggia or belvedere. The